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Private equity (henceforce PE)is less regulated than its bank peers. Paralleling financial 
liberalisation in recent decades, the PE-market was booming in transaction size with ever-
evolving financing strategies. As PE becomes a favourable funding source of start-ups and 
stressed businesses, anecdotal evidence suggests that PEs are trapped in failure deals just as 
much as they breed technology/business giants. The development of PE has drawn attention 
to the synchronising of existing shareholder rights and creditor rights with this new financing 
agent. The literature in finance and law has paid little attention to the PE market. Hence, this 
study aims to examine the relationship between regulation and the efficiency of PE-backed 
financing. The study also investigates the broader scope institutional environment where 
informal institutions are expected to shape deal efficiency on top of the legal bonding.  
To explore the research objectives, this study employs the financing cost of PE-backed 
enterprises as a measure of efficiency. Using two-stage least squares regression, I investigate 
the impact of the institutional environment on the financing cost of PE-backed transactions 
between 1970 and 2016. The results suggest that PE-backed deals cost less when shareholder 
rights and creditor rights are solid. I also find that the impact of informal institutions is two 
fold contingent on financing strategies. 
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Private equity (PE) traces its roots back to the mid-1930s in the US and Europe. In recent 
decades, the industry has grown both in size and geographical reach. As of 2017, PE has been 
gaining traction with nearly $1.3 trillion under management (McKinsey, 2018). As PE firms 
compete with banks through venture capital funds or structured debts, high-risk businesses 
seeking access to capital have greatly benefited from the competition in the underwriting 
business provided by securities operations (Garten, 2001). In these cases, small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) resort to venture capital for financing whereas distressed enterprises 
become target clients of leveraged buyout (LBO) funds (Gompers and Lerner 1999; Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2001; Sahlman, 1990). Dramatic success stories of PE-backed deals include 
Apple Computers, Intel Corporation, Microsoft, and Google. As recorded in Zephyr, the 
maximum price level for a successfully exited IPO deal is 1,153.07 times earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA), or 16,649.02 times net profit1. The 
wealth effect of PE financing has attracted great interest from both investors and researchers.  
 
The literature reveals that the business performance of PE-backed enterprises is significant in 
difference measures (Baeyens and Manigart, 2006; Beuselinck et al., 2007, 2008; Cumming 
2005, 2008; Cumming et al., 2007, 2016; Cumming and Dai, 2011; Heughebaert and 
Manigart, 2012; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). However, 
anecdotal evidence shows that a PE transaction can be a zero-sum game or negative-sum 
                                                            
1 Calculated from available records among 647 worldwide successful IPO transactions by mid-2015. 




game from an optimal society view. Those who find value in the net asset value (NAV) of PE 
funds or the equity return alone, also find that the return is paid at the cost of the investee or 
public market (e.g., the behaviour of taking advantage of tax breaks but not creating any 
operational value, or taking advantage of the market timing to generate profit at the expense 
of public markets) (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). In some extreme cases, a successful exit 
route for a PE investment can be detrimental to the public market (Toms et al., 2015). In 
some case studies, scholars found buyouts led to large-scale layoffs and service disruptions 
(Davis et al. 2011; Rasmussen, 2008). There is not yet a judging rule agreed by all parties to 
assess the economic efficiency of PE-backed financing from an optimal society view. 
  
1.1. Financing through PE 
Growth opportunities for entrepreneurs often depend heavily on the ability to raise capital. 
SMEs that have a limited or non-existent credit history or tangible collateral confront many 
difficulties for a variety of financing resources (Manigart et al., 2002). Similarly, mature 
companies can undergo depression or distress while waiting for financing to restructure or 
revive. Corporates that have difficulty in passing screening by mainstream financing 
intermediaries, such as banks, resort to alternative financing agencies such as PEs. 
 
As the market evolved through competition and innovation, PE emerged, with another 
financing agent, to serve high-risk enterprises or projects that have limited access to social 
capital. PEs are new financing agents financed through a combination of equity from PE 
investors (or PE fund unitholders) and debt from a number of creditors. The PE company or 
fund is generally constructed as a dual-class agent; one is between the PE investor (limited 
partners or PE fund unitholder), the other is between the PE manager and target firms. 
Corresponding to the high-risk business nature, the principal-agency relationship is also 




complicated in PE financing. Figure 1.1 presents the dual-class agent relationship in PE 
financing. 
 
[Image removed for Copyright compliance] 
 
Figure 1.1 A Dual-Class Agent Relationship in PE Financing 
Source: Courtois (2013). 
Note: PE funds are typically carried through a limited partnership structure in which the PE firm, generally 
organised as a partnership or limited liability corporation, with a small group of investment professionals and 
employees, serves as the general partner (GP). The limited partners (LP) consist largely of institutional investors 
and wealthy individuals who provide the bulk of the capital. The enterprises may employ a private equity 
company to work as GP and solicit other LPs through a private placement memorandum that describes the 
business plan, risks, and many other details of the investment (Lerner, 1997). The GP has management control 
over the fund and is liable for all debts; LPs have limited liability; they do not risk more than the amount of their 








Dual class agent financing, which is notable for its contingencies, strikes a balance between 
PEs and fund-searching enterprises. Such contingencies are negotiable between the general 
partners (henceforth, GPs) or PE managers and investee’s management team to balance the 
risk and return of fund providers (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001, 
2003; Sahlman, 1990) especially those that are risk-averse (such as pension funds). The 
contingencies in venture capital (VC) financing contracts separately allocate each stick2 of 
shareholder rights to GPs and the limited partners (henceforth, LPs) with various risk-return 
                                                            
2 By analogy, the property rights can be separated, reassembled and possessed by more than one owner, each 
holding a set of “sticks”. Each stick represents an individual right (Klein and Robinson, 2011).  




preferences. This makes a high-risk financing deal more marketable at the funding stage than 
it otherwise would be. Similarly, LBOs also raise funds using securities with contingency 
provisions. Based on CapitalIQ records, most LBO deals offer convertible debts, preferred 
dividends, and even credit default swaps, to their fund providers. These contingencies 
broaden the scope of the accredited social capital of various risk-return preferences thus 
facilitating the fund-raising. 
 
1.2. The Economy of PE Financing 
Given the complexity of the business model in private equity financing, various valuation 
techniques assess the outcome of PE-backed financing deals. Most such models focus on PE 
fund returns. In venture capital deals, valuation models such as discounted cash flow (DCF) 
are applied in which the discount rate may be subject to open market parameters such as beta 
(Fisher, 1930; Sharpe, 1964). In LBOs, where structured debt (e.g., collateralised loan 
obligations; collateralised debt obligations) or equity-like instruments are applied, the 
valuation model can be complicated given the embedded contingent provisions such as 
warrants or options as well as special covenants (Kolb, 2010).  
 
A number of PE studies have a social-economic view investigating the relationship between 
the presence of PEs and PE-backed companies’ financial outcomes, employment, and 
innovation. In a recent comprehensive study covering over 4,000 firms in Asia, Europe and 
the US (Bloom et al., 2015), PE-backed firms, on average, are the best-managed ownership 
group in the sample. Empirical studies have shown that the financial and operational 
performance of PE-backed enterprises is improved when measured in nominal dollar 
accounting profit terms (Bernstein et al., 2016; Harris et al., 2014; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
 




1.3. Institutional Environment 
Though there is a natural tendency to focus on the earnings approach to determine investment 
performance, I argue that neither the PE fund-level performance nor PE-backed enterprises’ 
performance is an ideal indicator of economic efficiency. The mathematisation of the 
financing deal performance is inevitable in denotation logic that relies on a series of 
assumptions such as the rational economic man (REM) and efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH). As a result, the indicators are inevitably logically limited, though pure mathematical 
abstraction is always true. The denotative definition of parameters does not secure the 
meaning of the complete enumeration of the financial world neither is it capable of 
explaining participants’ behaviour. As commented by Fabozzi et al. (2014), (mainstream) 
finance theories and approaches are subject to artefacts that are context-specific and depend 
on social or political objectives.  
 
This study is motivated by the speculative nature of financing institutions as well as 
entrepreneurs. Evidence in the US market shows that when a certain business type is 
prohibited by regulations, financial institutions tend to innovate their way around the 
regulatory barriers to speculate in investment opportunities (in their words, “improve market 
shares”) (Kolb, 2010). Financial innovation is especially active when the institutional 
environment favours innovative financing activities.  
 
In a country such as the US, regulators and judges tend to tolerate creative reading of 
regulatory statutes without intervening in market innovation such as hybrid investment 
vehicles applied by PE investments (Garten, 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Conversely, 
in a bank-dominated nation like Germany, the growth of equity financing or even hybrid 
financing is actively discouraged by a burdensome regulatory environment. Evidence shows 




that the regulatory burden shapes PE investment strategies (Courtois, 2009). For example, 
many equity-like instruments at the acquisition vehicle level locate mainly in favourable 
jurisdictions such as Luxembourg, the Channel Islands, the Cayman Islands, or the British 
Virgin Islands. In specific circumstance, PEs inevitably apply creative legal interpretations to 
refashion themselves into hybrid institutions that can no longer be categorised as ‘commercial 
bankers’ (deposit-lenders) or ‘merchant/investment bankers’ (underwriter-dealers). The 
former are deposit-taking businesses that would be subject to government banking 
regulations. The latter are securities underwriting and dealing businesses that would be 
subject to the disclosure-based regulatory scheme (Kolb, 2010). A favourable regulatory 
system for hybrid investment vehicles (such as trusts, limited liability companies (LLC), 
collateralised loan obligation (CLO), collateralised debt obligation (CDO), that are applied in 
PE financing) is critical to reduce the barriers or costs thus encouraging the supply of 
available funds as well as encouraging securities distribution. In previous studies, funding 
resources such as pension funds as a proportion of GDP have been taken into account to 
explain the performance of PE investments (Axelson et al., 2013; Cumming and Johan, 2007; 
Kortum and Lerner, 2001; Poterba, 1989).  
 
So far, the institution literature has primarily concentrated on the development of traditional 
equity/credit markets, even though the PE market is an important segment of the capital 
market. In summary, innovative financing instruments are widely used in the PE market. The 
laws or regulations, as well as a broad sense of institutional factors such as social value or 
ideology that shape the enforcement and interpretation of above laws or regulations, are 
expected to play a key role in explaining the efficiency of PE financing. Table 1.1 
summarises the key papers in the literature on PE financing and related topics, such as the 
performance of PE funds, PE-backed financing deals and correlation with institutional factors.




Table 1.1 A Summary of the Literature on the Performance of PE Funds, PE-Backed Financing Deals and the Correlations with 
Institutional Factors 
Author (s) Sample Data Source Dependent Variables Key Independent Variables Main findings 
Barry et al. 
(1990) 





IPO under-pricing Pre- and post-IPO equity holding of 
VC, lead VC’s selling intensity at IPO, 
number of month lead venture 
capitalist served on the board, percent 
of life that VC served on the board, 
percent equity holding VC holds after 
IPO, long holding the period dummy 
Quality of VC monitoring service is 
recognised by the capital market through 
lower IPO under-pricing 
Kaplan and 
Stein (1993) 






Number of buyouts, net cash 
flow to capital, net cash flow to 
capital to E/P (%), EBITDA to 
capital, EBITDA to capital to 
E/P (%), market E/P ratio 
Lags of the dependent variable There was a large number of the changes of 
buyouts in the late 1980s relative to earlier. 
Such changes include: price to cash flow 
rise, high price, aggressive investment in 




independent VCs from 
1972-1994 
Venture Economics Natural logarithm of 
commitments 
Value of all VC-backed IPOs in 
previous year, GDP growth, T-bill 
return, ERISA prudent man rule 
dummy, capital gain tax rate 
Regulatory changes affect pension funds. 
capital gains tax rates, overall economic 
growth and fund raising 
Manigart et al.  
(2002) 
over 200 venture 
capital companies 
(VCCs) located in five 
countries (US, UK, 
France, Belgium, and 
the Netherlands)  
Mail survey from 
senior managers of 
VCCs  
 
IRR in an early stage, in the 
expansion, in acquisition/buyout 
Stage diversification, independent 
VCC, percentage lead investments, 
number of investments, the expected 
investment time horizon for early 
stage, expansion and 
acquisition/buyout, age, number of 
offices, number of hierarchical layers, 
the percentage of small-size 
investment, the percentage of early-
stage investment 
Acquisition/buyout specialists require a 
significantly lower return than other VCCs. 
High stage-diversified VCCs require a 
significantly higher return. Independent 
VCCs require a higher return 
Cumming 
(2005) 
12363 Canadian and 
US VC financing of 
Canadian firms from 
1991 to 2003 
Macdonald and 
Associates 
Security’s type of debt, 
convertible, preferred equity 
Firm characteristics of the buyout, 
start-up, expansion, high-tech, deal 
characteristics of deal size, round 
number, VC characteristics of 
partnership, corporate VC governance, 
VC institutional and market features 
of capital gains tax, the trend (learning 
variable) TSX index 
Security design is a response to expected 
agency problems. Capital gain taxation 
affects contracts. Market conditions affect 
contracts. The use of different contracts 
Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) 
VC funds with 
observable returns 
from 1980-2001 
Venture Economics IRR, PME, TVPI fund size, sequence, GP’s experience, 
public market return, vintage year 
Average fund returns net of fees are 
roughly equal to those of the S&P 500. 
Performance increases with fund size and 
GP experience (track record of past 




Author (s) Sample Data Source Dependent Variables Key Independent Variables Main findings 
performance). Funds and partnerships in 







over a five-year period 




websites of VC 
investors, press 
clippings and press 
releases 
Incremental finance events of 
internal equity, financial debts, 
operational debt, external equity 
Information asymmetries associated 
with agency problems: PP&E, 
intangible assets, the age of VC-
backed company, proxy of financial 
risk such as Altman’s Z score 
The asymmetric information and agency 
costs are high; equity finance becomes 
particularly important. VC-backed 
companies raising financial debt have 
considerably more collateral as compared 




Deals backed by 
Canadian tax-driven 




Province-level VC demand and 
supply in the number of 
investment and dollar value 
invested 
Province GDP growth, 5-year 
corporate lending rate, prior-year 
stock market return, trend term, tech 
bubble dummy 
Canadian tax-driven VC vehicle have 
higher agency costs and lower profitability 
than private VC funds 
Beuselinck et 
al. (2007)  
270 unquoted Belgian 
PE-backed companies 
covering 1985-1999 
Belfirst Accounting accruals of PE-
backed firms 
Financial reports variables, years of 
business  
Quality of financial accounts significantly 
improved when a PE becomes a 
shareholder 
Gurung and 




CapitalIQ Citation intensity of patents of 
PE-backed firms 
Post-LBO dummy, event year dummy, 
peer average 
Patent of PE-backed firms in the year after 
the investment is more frequently cited. 
Cumming et al. 
(2009) 
50 VC and PE funds 
from 17 countries 
Galante Database, 
Regional and national 
VC association, 
management firm and 
PE fund website 
Fixed fees, performance fees, 
clawbacks, cash-only 
distribution  
Fund manager characteristics, fund 
characteristics 
Legal conditions have the most statistically 
economically significant effect on 
compensation across countries. Poor legal 
conditions are correlated with higher fees 






backed deals across 20 
industries in 26 major 
nations from 1997-
2007 
CapitalIQ STAN Industry performance of relative 
growth rate of productivity and 
employment cross countries 
PE-backed dummy, a fraction of total 
imputed PE investments divided by 
total production 
PE-backed firms are on average best-
managed ownership group in the sample. 




deals from 1997-2010 
Reuters, LPC, 
Dealscan, Dealogic 
Default, restructuring types, 
outcomes, recovery rates 
PE-backed dummy, financial 
characteristics, financing activities in 
the last 5 years, market and industry 
condition 
PE-backed LBO financing is less likely to 
default. When firms do default, PE-backed 
LBO restructure more often out of court 
and faster 
Driessen et al. 
(2012) 




Abnormal return, NAV Market return VC funds have a higher CAPM β while the 
reverse is true for LBO funds. NAV 
reported by inactive and mature PEs are 




362 investment rounds 
in 180 different 
Belgian investee 
public, commercial 
database, VC annual 
reports and websites, 
Pre-money valuations Dummies of VCs’ business type of 
capital VC, university VC and 
government VC, firm characteristics, 
VC with greater bargaining power 
negotiate lower valuation than independent 
VCs 




Author (s) Sample Data Source Dependent Variables Key Independent Variables Main findings 
companies from 1988-
2009 
press release, Belgian 
Venturing Association 
financial statement variables, cross-
border dummy, IPO market share, VC 
firm size, syndication dummy 
Axelson et al. 
(2013) 
2467 international 
sample of LBO deals 




PME, fund PME 
D/EBITDA, EV/EBITDA, LIBOR, 
high-yield bond spread over LIBOR, 
PME in the previous period, and fund 
size 
LBOs are correlated to the cross-sectional 
factors. Variation in economy-wide credit 
condition is associated with higher 
transaction prices and lower buyout fund 
returns. 
Brown et al. 
(2013) 
12545 LBO and VC 
funds of 5128 PE 
firms by March 2012 
Burgiss NAV bias Fund timing, peer chasing, logarithmic 
fund PME, IRR-tercile of fund 
Underperforming managers inflate reported 
returns of NAV during fund raising process 
Harris et al. 
(2014) 




IRR, Investment multiples, PME Total stock market value LBO fund performance consistently 
exceeds public markets. VC fund 
outperformed public equities in the 1990s 
and underperformed in the 2000s 
Note: The summary of literature is sorted by year of publication from the oldest to the newest. 
 




1.4. Motivation for the Research 
The motivation for this study lies with the value that PE managers, who are financial 
specialists such as accountants, lawyers, and merchant bankers, provide financial services 
vis-à-vis firms producing goods and services (Sahlman, 1990). This study is motivated by the 
existence of singular patterns in assessing the performance of PE financing, such as meeting 
the PE sponsors’ required rate return, or non-monetary profit brought in by the PE managers. 
The study focuses on examining the PE financing cost borne by PE-backed firms. It assesses 
the favourability of formal and informal institutions in financial ease. It investigates the 
association between institutional environment and financing cost. This study involves cross-
disciplinary work in different approaches to capital structure, organisation economy and 
institution. The motivation for this study is also to explore the implication of the theories in 
the scenario of PE financing, a growing alternative financing segment that deserves more 
research attention. 
 
1.4.1 Justification for the study of financing cost  
Diamond (1984) asserts that an entrepreneur must retain an expected return, after netting all 
the fees, at least as high as he/she would obtain by sidestepping intermediaries to contract 
directly with depositors. Based on this proposition, this study assesses the economy of PE 
financing using financing cost from the enterprises’ perspective since we learn little from 
existing studies. The financing cost I apply in this study is the reciprocal of the enterprise 
multiple PE managers offer to their fund-providers (LPs or fund unitholders). I focus on the 
fund-demand side of enterprises because, from a socially optimal view, enterprises are the 
building blocks of the economy and the main source of employment and innovation. 
Anecdotal evidence reveals that PE funding, as measured in nominal dollars, is expensive. 
For example, the required rate asked by VC investors in the EU can exceed 15% (Baeyens 




and Manigart, 2006; PWC, 2015). The rationale for entrepreneurs to choose external 
financing through PEs is that they are informed agents who provide a value-added service of 
signalling, monitoring, and screening (Chan, 1983; Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001). However, the 
service from PE managers is not without cost. Chan (1983) argues that the cost paid to 
professional advisors in PE financing is a critical component of the total financing cost. 
Blyler and Coff (2003) argue that PE firms may take advantage of the centrality of their 
network to accrue rents, regarding brokering information resources.  
 
My study builds on organisational economics that points to transaction cost economising by 
PE financing intermediaries. My argument is that PEs should contribute to real economic 
growth in that they raise fees3 and accrue “rent”. The term economic efficiency is a generic 
label in transaction economics to measure and evaluate the performance of certain activities. 
In this study, I explore a series of precise measurements of transaction cost because of 
perceived financing inefficiency. The measurements include both explicit and implicit costs 
enterprises bear during the process when they finance through PEs: 
 
• How does VC improve market information transparency through voluntary 
disclosure?  
• To what extent do PEs help raise debt through structured and unsecured corporate 
debt in LBO financing? 
• How much do the intermediary fees, if any, add to the overall cost of PE financing? 
 
                                                            
3 Most PE funds use a homogeneous compensation scheme of annual management fees of 1.5% to 2.5% of 
committed capital and 20% carried interest. 




1.4.2 Justification for studies of the institutional environment 
As argued by Bruton et al. (2005), the potential implications of pursuing an institutional 
perspective versus a purely economic-based perspective can be significant; I expect studying 
an institutional environment could enhance my understanding of the financing cost of PE 
financing and the overall economic efficiency. When examining the performance of PE 
financing, it is necessary to apply the existing laws and regulations that presumably shape the 
professional behaviour of PE managers as well as the PE-backed entrepreneurs. The 
argument is that a certain level of shareholder rights or creditor rights contribute to 
addressing adverse selection and the moral hazard problems in firm-level financing choices 
and market-level information efficiency (Cumming et al. 2009; La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 
2000). In the section on institutional background, this study will answer the following 
question:  
 
• To what extent does the content of creditor rights and shareholder rights determine 
the explicit and implicit cost of PE financing? 
 
Considering that the activity to obtain and successfully execute legal rights is highly subject 
to clearly delineated and efficiently enforced rights (Armour and Cumming, 2008), the 
current study will examine the following question about law enforcement: 
 
•  How much does the enforcement of laws strengthen the above effects? 
 
A natural way to tell the difference between formal institutions is to use country borders. 
However, cross-border PE financing is growing rapidly. After the 2000s, 34% of European 
VC and PE firms raised funds to invest in the non-domestic markets (EVCA statistics, 2003-




2007) whereas 35% of all Asian funds in 2004 were invested internationally (Wright et al., 
2005). As a result, the formal institution falls short in explaining the overall financing 
efficiency of PE because it offers the “fundamental tools.” To gain a comprehensive 
understanding of this business, one should also consider informal institutions such as 
business practices, conventions or even beliefs.  
 
Recently, there has been a “sociological turn” in economic studies such as in behavioural 
finance and information economics that challenges the core assumptions of mainstream 
financial theories4. As will be discussed in section 2.6, ample evidence on the institutional 
environment in the literature (sociological literature or legal studies) is based on in-depth 
interviews, observation of natural settings, and surveys, as well as field research (Bruton et 
al., 2005; Manigart et al., 2009). Studies in this stream apply connotation reasoning and 
greatly facilitate our understanding of the PE market. In this study, I explore the 
heterogeneity of the different types of PE professionals as a law-like professional mechanism. 
Such a mechanism includes age and social ties that serve as natural and interesting theoretical 
extensions of this study. Therefore, I examine: 
 
• Holding the formal institution constant, to what extent do certain informal institutions 
contribute to financing efficiency, regarding reducing both explicit and implicit costs? 
 
                                                            
4For example, information economics challenges the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) for “market fully 
reflect available information”, behaviour finance deviates from “rational behaviour” and “risk neutral” (Fabozzi 
et al., 2014).  




1.4.3 Research objectives 
This study aims to expand on previous studies by bringing together both the formal and 
informal institutional environment that presumably determines the economic efficiency of PE 
financing. 
 
The specific objectives are: 
1) To pursue a possible general generic approach for further research in private market 
financing, I investigate the financing nature of such agents/vehicles rather than the 
strategies they take by contingencies (as discussed earlier)5. 
2) To explore the substitution hypothesis of financing cost that consists of both explicit 
and implicit costs. 
3) To examine the formal institutions of the legal environment, which includes creditor 
rights, shareholder rights, and law enforcement. The formal institutions that I 
examined cover distinct regions of the world (Asia Pacific, the US, the EU, and the 
emerging markets of China, Brazil and Russia). 
4) To identify a series of critical informal institutional features that presumably shape PE 
professionals’ business practice, which determines the financing cost. 
 
Several key choices were made at the study’s outset. Considering the diverse subcategories 
within the PE asset class, and the availability of research data, this study focuses on dominant 
PE investment strategies6: venture capital and leveraged buyouts. The study is based on 
available data that draw on an existing database as well as information from a complementary 
                                                            
5 For example, venture capital (VC) transactions generally include three types of investing: seed, start-up, and 
expansion investment.  
6 There are many PE financing strategies. A common categorisation identifies leveraged buyouts, venture 
capital, development capital, and distressed investing. 




database. This implies the study is based on a large sample and is conducted at the deal level. 
Inevitably, the study focuses only on transactions from the most developed markets where PE 
transactions have taken place.  
 
1.5. Contributions of the Research 
The study focusses on financing cost from the perspective of fund-searching enterprises. I 
provide a unique insight into not only explicit costs but also the implicit costs that 
entrepreneurs bear when financing through PE. My measurement of financing cost addresses 
the calls by Chan (1983) and Diamond (1984) for more research on the optimal fee level 
when financing through financial intermediaries. Although the methodological framework is 
based on other studies, this study focuses on the private placement market rather than the 
public market that has been studied by many scholars. This study contributes to the literature 
with some new findings about PE-backed financing. It is the first to categorise the costs of 
this financing activity into the explicit and implicit costs and investigate what factors drive 
those costs. The quantified implicit cost I provide in this study will help academics develop 
intuition relative to PE performance that will be applicable in further empirical analyses.  
 
Examining the financing cost also contributes to the capital structure approach. In an ideal 
Miller-Modigliani world, the firm value is independent of the leverage ratio (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1963). In the real world, transaction costs are a problem, which suggests there is an 
optimal mix of debt and equity for a company. The pecking order theory highlights that the 
agent problem can be a main cost source when searching for external equity financing (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). While investigating PE financing cost, I also develop the literature in 
corporate governance by contributing to the debate on whether professional investors’ 
monitoring and activism are effective and serve shareholders’ interests. Summing the 




financing cost of each fund-searching company, we will be able to see a bigger picture of 
economic efficiency around the PE market. 
 
Agent studies in the PE market show that an agent cost arises not only from competing 
interests between shareholders and lenders but also from within shareholders and lenders. 
The uniqueness of a PE-backed deal is that it raises social capital through a fiduciary contract 
and transforms the capital in an investment fund or partnership investment company. This 
financing model raises a conflict of interest between GPs and LPs (or fund unitholders), 
between external investors and internal shareholders, and between secured debt holders and 
unsecured debt holders. In this setting, a cross-country comparison of creditor rights and 
shareholder rights is integral to improve my understanding of the agency problem in the 
private market. In the process of investigating agency problems, this study borrows the theory 
framework from the finance and law literature. I extend the theory, the majority of which has 
focused on financing activities in the public market, to a new field, the PE market. Existing 
law studies do not distinguish the multidimensionality of shareholder rights and creditor 
rights. In this study, I make a thorough effort to decompose legal rights into different sticks 
and test the individual impact of each stick as well as that of law enforcement. To my 
knowledge, my study is among the first to show how the institutional and agency theory 
framework work in the private market.  
 
As regulatory obsolescence is widely expected in an ever-evolving financial market most of 
the time, the informal institution works as a complement to formal institutional laws. The 
earliest studies applying the informal institutional approach to explore enterprises’ financing 




activities are those focusing on the individual transition economy7 (Nee and Opper, 2009, 
2012). This study uses the same analytical framework in a cross-country context to improve 
my understanding of the boundaries and robustness of this framework. Research on 
institutional organisations categorises informal institutions as cognitive and normative 
institutions (Manigart et al., 2002; North 1990; Scott, 1995), which can be creatively 
interpreted in a dynamic financial world. This study investigates informal institutions using a 
new set of criteria in the context of PEs’ professional practice, reputation bonding, and social 
ties. Holding a unique sociological perspective, I examine the informal institutions and 
examine their relationship to PE financing efficiency. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature 
and develops a series of fundamental concepts. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology 
used in the study. Chapter 4 provides the data specification. Chapter 5 discusses the empirical 
results. Chapter 6 concludes and gives the implications and limitations of the study. 
                                                            
7 Transitory Economies (those reformed from a central planning economy) such as China, Soviet Union or 
Eastern Europe. In La Porta et al.’s (1999) classification of legal origin, they belong to the Socialist group. 




Chapter 2                CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
This chapter discusses PE financing in the light of economic efficiency. The chapter starts 
with the critical review of literature that assesses PE financing outcomes with distinct views. 
This is followed by the conceptual specification of the term PE. Based on the view that PE 
institutions are financial intermediaries, this chapter suggests a transaction cost-focused 
cross-country institutional analysis framework to assess the efficiency of PE financing. These 
discussions serve to broadly set the stage for more detailed conceptual and empirical 
discussions in subsequent chapters.  
 
2.1. Capital Structure and the Emergence of PE Financing 
2.1.1 General background of capital structure 
The capital structure literature looks for the best financing choice for a company using 
different approaches. The trade-off theory suggests that companies will trade-off the benefits 
of debt, especially agency and tax benefits, against the cost of debt financing, namely the 
transaction costs (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modigliani and Miller, 1963), 
whereby the optimal capital structure can be achieved. When asymmetric information and 
agency costs are high, equity finance becomes more important than other finance sources 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). The pecking order theory argues that companies 
will use external equity financing only as a last resort (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, 




recent studies argue that the trade-off theory and rank order of financing preference are not 
applicable to financing types such as high growth ventures (Fama and French, 2002). 
 
The choice between debt financing and equity financing is also subject to the risk-return 
preference of the fund providers. Specifically, debt providers’ claims are interest and 
principal payments whereas equity investors share in the firm’s upside potential. As a result, 
compared with equity providers, debt providers consider more the borrowers’ debt capacity 
based on historical financial information, collateral, guarantees, and covenants (Fan et al., 
2012). Firm characteristics such as age, size, industry type, and corporate governance 
practices are essential information used to determine historical performance and future 
business growth. These characteristics are highly correlated and are critical variables in 
moderating the relationship between a firm’s strategy and performance which, in turn, 
determines a firm’s choice of finance, especially when information asymmetry is a concern in 
the financing process (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). Harris and Raviv (1991) find that firms 
in different industries are subject to different competition levels as well as accounting 
principles but show similar capital structure. Regarding firm size, large firms have 
advantages such as economies of scale and scope, experience, brand name recognition, and 
market power (Hambrick, 1982), which reduces the risk for the perpetrator of opportunism 
(Nooteboom, 1993). 
 
Conversely, small firms have proportionately less debt than large firms because there is high 
asymmetric information. In these cases, the agency theory is applied to explain the financing 
choice. The agency theory asserts that small ventures are especially sensitive to problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Gompers, 1995; Nooteboom, 1993; Verwaal and 
Donkers 2002), hence use less debt to mitigate agency conflicts because of high information 




asymmetry (Myers, 1977). For example, most start-up firms lack tangible assets that can 
serve as collateral. Also, because small ventures have a limited or non-existent credit history, 
even relationship lending is not applicable (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
 
The tax treatment of interest and dividend payments has a great impact on capital structure 
choices (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Firms in countries such as China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia and Ireland with a classical tax system can benefit from tax gain by using debt 
financing, whereas firms in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Taiwan 
with a full dividend imputation tax system have no tax gains. As a result, firms with a 
dividend imputation tax system are expected to use less debt financing and more equity 
financing. Regarding PE financing, Gompers and Lerner (2000) state that decreases in capital 
gains tax rates increases the demand for venture capital because more workers are 
encouraged to become entrepreneurs. Similarly, Michaelas et al. (1999) find that lower 
marginal corporate tax rates account for the choice of equity financing. 
 
2.1.2 Emergence of PE financing 
Entrepreneurial ventures often face financing constraints that negatively affect their 
investment decisions (Hubbard, 1997) and constrain growth (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
In addition, positive net present value projects may be denied financing, or companies may be 
able to obtain only certain types of funding in the presence of market imperfections and 
agency risks (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Despite theoretical and empirical work stressing 
the role of debt providers’ screening and monitoring in reducing information asymmetry, the 
instruments used by debt providers do not always work, particularly for firms in their early 
growth stage. The ability to find willing, and risk bearing, funders is essential to success for 




an entrepreneur (Green, 1984). The adverse selection approach argues that growth-oriented 
firms are induced to finance with PE (Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001). ` 
 
Given the need for financial intermediaries for certain firms and entrepreneurs and the 
ineptness of banks in this role, PEs fill this void (Jeng and Well, 2000). Studies at the 
industry level find that venture fundraising is encouraged by facilitating industrial and 
research and development expenditure. In practice, it is widely recognised that firms 
receiving private financing are in a dynamic industry with rapid growth potential (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2000). The high-tech, biotech, and medical sectors have a higher probability of a 
successful exit than new ventures in other industries (Das et al., 2003). Based on the World 
Economy Forum research covering 13,884 PE deals from 1991 to 2008 (Gurung and Lerner, 
2010), the most popular industries for PE funds are real estate, renting and business activities 
(2,737 deals), wholesale and retail trade (1,725 deals), machinery and equipment (1,316 
deals) and community, social and personal services (1,162 deals)8. 
 
The capital market size positively impacts funds raised by firms. Compared with a bank-
centred economy, capital markets cultivate a conservative approach to lending and investing 
(Groh et al., 2011). Well-developed stock markets that allow financial innovation and 
securities liquidity, are essential for PE undertakings (Black and Gilson, 1998). Also, firms in 
countries with a large population of institutional investors, such as pension funds, use 
relatively more equity and long-term debt (Fan et al., 2012). Previous studies show that cross-
border syndication also serves as an important source of PE capital. For example, Spain and 
New Zealand attract a considerable proportion of foreign PEs but their PE firms seldom 
invest internationally (Barkoczy, 2009). This trend is positive for owners and managers who 
                                                            
8 The statistics used an aggregate industry classification based on four-digit SIC codes. 




have valuable investment opportunities in countries with relatively minor PE markets. They 
increasingly benefit from internationalisation, enabling larger and more buyouts in these 
countries where the domestic PE industry is less developed (Vanacker et al., 2011).  
 
2.2. The Economic Role of PE 
2.2.1 The PE term  
The term “private” implies “non-public” or “untraded”. In the context of company law, PE is 
an ownership interest in companies provided outside the public market. The earliest traceable 
history of PE (at that time not labelled PE) was solely about venture capital. In 1920, the term 
“venture capital” was documented in a report by The Industrial Securities Committee 9 . 
Before 1920, venture investment was executed “informally” between family members10. The 
founder claimed he and his partners “risk capital” and “our business is the adventure” to first 
describe the industry as “private venture capital” in 194611. Shortly after WWII, formal 
venture organisations started to develop. Among them, non-family venture models began 
with the American Research and Development Corp (Rao and Scaruffi, 2011). The first 
leveraged buyout deals were purchased by Malcolm McLean's Industries Inc. of the Pan-
Atlantic Steamship Company in January 1955 and the Waterman Steamship Corporation in 
May 1955. Under the transaction terms, McLean borrowed $42 million and raised an 
additional $7 million via preferred stock. The deal was not then labelled as PE (Rao and 
                                                            
9 The Industrial Securities Committee submitted a report on “The enlistment of venture capital is necessary for 
the development and growth of the country, as well as for the safety of all investment securities” (Rao and 
Scaruffi, 2011). 
10 For example, a few wealthy families, such as the Phipps and Whitneys, informally invested in new ventures. 
Whitney had been investing since the 1930s, founded Pioneer Pictures in 1933 and acquired a 15% interest in 
Technicolor Corporation with his cousin Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney (Rao and Scaruffi, 2011). 
11 The organisations were J.H. Whitney and Company, Rockefeller Brothers and Company (later Venro), the 
American Research and Development Corporation, and two in Silicon Valley, Industrial Capital Corp. and 
Pacific Coast Enterprises (Rao and Scaruffi, 2011). 




Scaruffi, 2011). In the 1980s, leveraged buyout firms still did not refer to themselves as PE 
firms (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). 
 
In recent decades, the PE business was invented in the US and expanded to other areas such 
as the EU and Asia. However, a common, consistent terminology for this financing term is 
still absent. In the US, the term PE does not include venture capital (Jeng and Well, 2000). 
Outside the US, the term venture capital is often used as a synonym for PE (Lerner, 1997). In 
recent cases, practitioners sometimes use PE to refer to investment buyout funds rather than 
venture capital funds (Ivashina and Kovner, 2008). In the literature, some authors use the 
terms interchangeably (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001; 2009). The term “private equity”, in 
practice, resembles “investment strategies” that includes, but is not restricted to, leveraged 
buyouts, venture capital, development capital, and distressed investment. In academia, there 
are two dominant definitions of the PE term: one views PE as an asset class and the other 
views PE as principal. The following subsections summarise the literature on these two 
distinct views.   
 
2.2.2 PE fund as an asset class 
A large number of studies have examined PE as an asset class of investment funds since PE 
funding has become an important component of the broader category of alternative 
investment instruments. According to Driessen et al. (2012), scholars have extended the asset 
pricing approach on traditional debt and equity to the non-readily realisable securities of PE 
to evaluate the performance of PE funds.  
 
A traceable way to measure the performance of a PE fund is post- investment realised returns 
for limited partners (LPs) and general partners (GPs), in terms of cash flow, the so-called 




realised and unrealised internal rate of return (IRR) or discounted net cash inflows of PE 
funds (Cumming et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2014; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Another 
measurement of return is the multi-period risk-adjusted return of the Multi-Period Sharpe 
Ratio (MPSR) of a VC fund at the end of the lockup period (Terhaar et al., 2003)12 or a 
specific quantity measurement such as the public market equivalent (PME) (Kaplan and 
Schoar, 2005; Sorensen and Jagannathan, 2015).  
 
2.2.3 PE firms as principal 
A corporate governance system consists of groups of stakeholders. Among them, PEs usually 
play the role of a shareholder. This is especially true for venture capitalists. Venture 
capitalists typically invest in young or emerging companies and typically do not obtain 
majority control. In certain cases, venture capitalists serve as active stakeholders who 
carefully observe the firm to track its business potential and monitor agent behaviour to 
protect against opportunism (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). Conversely, in leveraged buyout 
transactions, the PE firm buys majority equity of an existing or mature firm with the fund 
having anywhere from 60 to 90 per cent debt collateralised by the target company’s assets 
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). As a result, venture capitalists, as equity holders, are 
interested in the strategies and investments that will increase the company's value and grow 
earnings per share. They then compare that earnings power and growth potential with that of 
other companies in the given industry. In contrast, credit holders such as LBO fund providers 
look more at the downside risk by assessing the sustainability of a company's cash flow 
relative to its debt levels and the interest expense such as debt to enterprise value (D/EV) and 
debt to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (D/EBITDA).  
                                                            
12 Some analysts do not view illiquidity as a risk and may refer to an illiquidity premium in addition to the risk 
premium when estimating the required return on an illiquid asset (Calverley, 2008). 




The literature on PE as principal largely aims at VC transactions, because VC managers serve 
as principal based on the level of the VC transaction where the PE fund provides financing 
(as investors) and the entrepreneurs serve as agents who need financing (Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2001). Since VC managers have a claim on the firm’s residual income and their 
potential return depends on the firm’s upside performance, VC managers have a dominant 
incentive to deal with the problems of investees (Baeyens and Manigart, 2006). Although not 
strictly serving as principals, the leverage applied in LBOs is obtained using equity-like 
instruments (see Figure 2.1). In practice, LBO firms make important decisions such as 
cashflow monitoring, strategic and business planning. Most research interests focus on 
LBOs’ role in company restructuring, which includes insolvency risk and business distress 
(Stromberg et al., 2011; Lerner, 1997).  
 
[Image removed for Copyright compliance] 
 
Figure 2.1 A Typical LBO Funding Structure 
Source: Courtois (2013). 




2.2.4 The PE industry as a financial intermediary 
According to Adam Smith’s Wealth of the Nations, specialisation encourages the exchange 
of goods or services (Smith, 1937). Researchers holding this view argue that the emergence 
of the PE industry has been associated with the specialisation of financial markets (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003). In recent decades, the meaning of this term has evolved and expanded to the 
area broadly defined as “unlisted shares” or “unlisted debt securities” such as P2P financing 
and crowdfunding. This study uses a new definition of “non-readily realisable securities” 
from The Financial Conduct Authority of UK (FCA) to more clearly describe the scope of the 
study into PE. I submit a general definition of PE as “any non-readily realised security” by 
which equity capital is raised via a private placement rather than through a public offering.  
 
This study assumes that PE firms are financial intermediaries that act as design and pricing 
consultants, as well as marketing agents, and enterprises that raise capital. To support this 
argument, the following three reasons are important: 
1) Functions and contributions of PE professionals agree with Diamond’s (1984) 
explanation of the function of financial intermediaries. Diamond (1984) asserts that 
financial intermediaries that raise funds from lenders (in the context of PE financing, 
the LPs or PE fund unit holders), promise them a given pattern of returns, lend to 
entrepreneurs, and spend resources monitoring and enforcing, with entrepreneurs, less 
costly loan contracts than those available without monitoring. 
2) The network view argues that PE managers have a central network position between 
otherwise unconnected actors (e.g., investors, entrepreneurs) in the capital market, 
which might put them in a better position to “broker” information or resources (Blyler 
and Coff, 2003) and grant them access to more shareholders, different stock markets, 
levels of efficiency and market “hotness” (Cumming and Knill, 2012). 




3) Sources of return in PE-financed projects such as GDP, input prices, and interest 
rates, are observable. Under such circumstances, there is a futures market for the 
value of the projects whereby PEs could hedge changes in a project’s profit in these 
markets. If there are no active futures markets, then the intermediary can write 
contracts with investors (especially in VC-financed projects) that depend on the value 
of the potential return of the investment projects, rather than being responsible for all 
risks. In either case, the intermediary retains responsibility for all risk that is not 
observable (Diamond, 1984). 
 
2.3. Assessment of the PE Financing Outcome 
As the meaning of the term “private equity” differs, the assessment of PE financing outcomes 
varies accordingly. Scholars holding an “asset class view” apply asset pricing theories and 
argue that the return for a PE investment is determined by risk-return trade-off of fund 
providers (Cumming and Walz, 2010; Megginson, 2004). They serve as investor-side 
advisors for institutional investors (PE fund unitholders or LPs) such as pension funds, 
endowments, and foundations, that are concerned with asset allocation, portfolio 
diversification and further fundraising (Cumming, and Walz, 2010; Kaplan and Schoar, 
2005), or as investment advisors for high-net-worth individuals (in most cases, accredited 
investors). Scholars holding a “principal view” regard PE as managers of the invested 
companies. Researchers in this stream hold shareholder wealth maximisation value thus 
serving the investee-side benefit. 
 




2.3.1 Assessing PE financing outcome with an asset class view  
2.3.1.1. Cash flow based absolute return of PE funds 
The primary method to calculate the return of a PE fund is the internal rate of return achieved 
over a period. Alternative measures such as net asset value (Cumming and Maclntosh, 2006; 
Kaplan and Scholar, 2005), the total value to paid-in capital (TVPI), internal rate of return, 
and value-to-EBITDA have been proposed and developed (Axelson et al., 2013; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2009). Some of these measures have already been applied to the dataset. The 
principles underlying the model coincide with the input and output framework of Diamond 
(1984). Diamond (1984) defines the required initial amount of inputs to be normalised into 
one. Thus, the output expectation at the end of the period could be presented as a percentage 
return for every unit of input. Return measurement in PE finance takes the above form partly 
because the observations are easily available from the dominant financial databases (such as 
VentureXpert and Capital IQ).  
 
2.3.1.2 Relative return performance of PE funds 
Researchers focusing on relative return usually use public market return as a benchmark. In 
such cases, public market information is important because it is used as a basis for 
comparable company valuation analysis, such as the value of existing investments (such as 
through initial public offerings (IPOs) and sales), as well an indication of the value of future 
investments (Brown et al., 2013). As a result, the public equivalent approach (Sorensen and 
Jagannathan, 2015) is widely applied in this research area.  
 




1. Return decomposition of PE funds 
The drawback of absolute performance measures, as discussed above, is that they do not 
adjust for the market return or the risk of the investment. Existing studies observe the value-
added effect of PE funds by decomposing the PE return (unrealised return based on cash 
flows measurements such as IRR) into systematic risk and alpha. The theoretical models 
include the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and the Fama-French 1- and 3- factor 
models. The market benchmarks applied include the S&P 500, the Europe Index and 
NASDAQ (for VC cases) (Driessen et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2014), and the Russell 2000, 
3000 (Harris et al., 2014) (see Table 2.1). Harris et al. (2014) also find that, when the small-
growth portfolio benchmark is applied, the beta is 1.62 and alpha turns positive. These 
findings show the assessment of PE fund performance is largely subject to the choice of 
market benchmark. 
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The relative return performance is usually conducted at the PE fund level where the 
Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF)13 is employed to calculate the dynamic, multistage return 
performance named the Public Market Equivalent (PME)14. A PME greater than 1 suggests 
that the investment is profitable for LPs. Based on a large sample from 1984 to 2011, Brown 
et al. (2013) find PMEs of 1.27 (LBO) and 1.26 (VCs). Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use an 
earlier sample set (1980-2001) and find PMEs of VCs and LBOs as 1.21 and 0.93, 
respectively. The PME value is highly subject to the chosen benchmark, which is usually in 
the form of the expected return of the market (see Table 2.1). 
 
The above findings provide useful investment advice for PE fund providers in indicating the 
required rate to ask from the fund-supply side. However, the benchmark return rate derived 
from CAPM and the Fama-French model that specifies the conditions (such as risk and 
return) fits better for actively-traded securities. In the secondary market, the above strategies 
require frequent purchases and sales. Each transaction incurs costs in the form of brokers’ 
commissions and taxes (Bradfield, 2007). 
 
2. Mispricing in LBOs  
Unlike VC deals, LBO deals take place in mature industries like chemicals, machinery and 
retailing (Gurung and Lerner, 2008). The debt or loan provided by LBO financing is a high-
                                                            
13 The SDF is calculated by  ( ) 1 ( )t M tm s a b r s= − + , where a and b are calculated for each time t (Kaplan and 
Scholar, 2005; Sorensen and Jagannathan, 2013). In the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator, SDF 
is calculated by
1/ (1 )F Mm r r =  + + + , where a and b are constants (Driessen et al., 2012). 























where X(t) is the cash flow for LP at 
time t; dist.(t) is the positive cash flow stream that is the return to LPs; call(t) is the cash flow stream that LPs 
invested in the fund. The dist. (t) and call (t) are then discounted using market returns (rM) (realised or 
expected). A PME greater than 1 suggests that the investment has been profitable for LPs. 




yield one. The cost of LBO financing is directly observable from interest paid by investees 
for the loan provided. In the context of general risk-free debt financing, the real interest rate 
plus an expected inflation rate and a maturity premium constitute the total financing cost 
named the yield. When a risk factor is taken into consideration, the yield will include a yield 
spread intended to compensate investors for the additional risk as well as for the expected 
level of credit losses. Investors in corporate bonds focus primarily on the yield spread relative 
to a comparable, default-free bond, which is composed of the liquidity premium, credit 
spread and tax issues.  
 
Some studies in LBO finance examine the LBO’s role in deal pricing (bid against the 
invested companies) by using the price indicator of D/EV or D/EBITDA (Axelson et al., 
2013; Kaplan and Stein, 1993). In practice, LBO deals are mainly recorded as highly 
leveraged with average D/EV and D/EBITDA of 67% and 5.4, respectively (Gurung and 
Lerner, 2008). A large research effort assesses the fairness of LBO fund pricing by 
comparing the yield spread with comparable benchmark spreads. For example, Kaplan and 
Stein (1993) examine the median spreads over both prime rate (value-weighted term loan and 
revolving credit loan spreads) and London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) in the 1980s and 
find that the statistical spread ranges from 112.5 to 150 bps. Yago and McCarthy (2004) 
show that leveraged loans generally apply a spread greater than 200 to 250 bps above 
LIBOR.  
 
2.3.2 Assessing PE financing outcome using a principal view  
The return-based approach given in section 2.3.1 provides investment advice for PE fund 
suppliers. However, the return-based approach could not answer how much financial benefit 
has been accrued from the demand side. PEs are well known to perform as active 




shareholders who also serve as managers of the investment firm. PEs not only strongly 
influence the board of directors of funded firms but also play an important role in the process 
of selecting, monitoring and further creating new public companies (Barry et al., 1990; Fried 
and Hisrich,1994; Gompers and Lerner,1999). On the empirical front, a typical PE financing 
contract explicitly states the number of board seats that investors may elect (Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2009). Cumming (2005) and Jensen (1991) suggest that PE can improve firms’ 
operations by providing “managerial input” into their investment.  
 
Studies regarding PE as principal hold the view that firms using external financing are 
maximising shareholders’ interests. To support that proposition, a large number of PE 
financing studies applied agency theory to try to evaluate the performance of PE-backed 
enterprises regarding both ex-post financial and operating performance and compared with 
peers.  
 
There are studies that find that monitoring by external investors can help alleviate 
information asymmetry, thus minimising agency or moral hazard costs (Manigart et al., 2002; 
Wright and Ken, 1998). Birmingham et al. (2003) argue that venture capitalists in the US are 
known to have a strong impact on monitoring the investees compared with debt providers. 
With LBO financing, Stromberg et al. (2011) argue that PE sponsors had developed unique 
skills that enable them to understand restructuring. Unlike public firms, Axelson et al. (2013) 
argue that PE funds optimise the capital structure in companies they acquire to take full 
advantage of the tax and incentive benefits of leverage (trading these benefits off against the 
costs of financial distress). A finding about 76 buyouts of manufacturing firms in the 1980s 
showed that the impact of these transactions on cumulative innovation is marginal (Kaplan 
and Stein, 1993). A recent study by Lerner (2011) showed that innovation activities are more 




frequently cited after PE involvement. Tom et al.’s (2015) recent analysis of the UK PE 
industry from 1945-2010 finds that when firm-specific resource characteristics are 
complemented by governance skills from dedicated PEs, the firm’s performance will be 
enhanced. A cross-nation and -industry study by Stromberg et al. (2011) showed that the 
productivity of PE-backed industries measured by a variety of measurements such as stock 
performance and subsequent financial performance, had grown more rapidly in the past five 
years. Sorensen et al. (2014) report that once a company is in the hands of PE funds its free 
cash flow increases. In a recent study of PE participation in restructuring transactions, 
Stromberg et al. (2011) suggest that PE-backed firms restructured roughly 40% faster than 
average firms. The firms also move more rapidly through filings than average firms, which 
means they survive more often as an independent entity, either by reorganising the firm 
directly or through a sale to a financial buyer. They reorganise at a higher rate and liquidate 
piecemeal at a lower rate.  
 
2.4. PE Financing in Light of Economic Efficiency 
By far, the natural starting point to judge the efficiency of the financing sector is based on 
financing facilitation, regarding transaction volume or market capitalisation (as a proportion 
of GDP) (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Lerner, 1997). However, neither transaction volume nor 
market capitalisation serves as an ideal proxy for efficiency. Economists have produced a 
large volume of theoretical and empirical knowledge about economic efficiency (see Table 
2.2). In this section, I address economic theory to some extent because classical finance and 
economic theory share the same principles. The analysis of efficiency in financing a deal 
applies microeconomics, whose fundamental principles include utility maximisation and the 
Nash equilibrium. Under certain optimistic or restrictive assumptions, economic efficiency 




for one unit can be generalised into a socially efficient equilibrium (Koopmans, 1951; Lange, 
1942). As discussed in section 2.2, this study regards the PE industry as intermediaries that  
 
Table 2.2 The Concepts of Economic Efficiency 
Definition Argument Initiator 
Allocation 
Efficiency  
The price is equal to marginal cost. At this point, the social surplus is maximised 





A situation in which the economy could not produce any more of one good 











A state of allocation of resources in which it is impossible to make any one 






In general, an economy is not dynamically efficient if the real interest rate is 
below the growth rate of the economy (sum of the growth rates of population and 
per capita income). 










are presumed to promote economic efficiency for the entire financial market. As a result, it is 
necessary to consider the economic efficiency of PE financing using macro-level principles 
such as the law of one price and the general equilibrium.  
 
2.4.1 A review of the efficiency of traditional financial intermediaries 
In a literature review, a number of financing intermediaries-relevant studies cover the topic of 
“efficiency” though not by that name. I first briefly review studies that examine the efficiency 
of traditional financing intermediaries (e.g., banks and the public financing markets) before I 
present my argument.  
 




2.4.1.1 The input and output approach 
The input/output approach was first applied to measure the efficiency of the banking system. 
This approach argues that an efficiency measurement is straightforward if one knows 
precisely the inputs and outputs a bank produces. In practice, there are two different 
approaches to define the inputs and outputs. The first is the cost production approach. Under 
this approach, the number of deposit and loan accounts plus the number of the financial 
transactions recorded over a period would be taken as the appropriate definition of the 
outputs; the inputs are purely labour and fixed assets (as a measure of capital in neo-classical 
production theory) (Mitchell and Onvural, 1996). The second is the cost intermediation 
approach that, like the cost production approach, allocates interest expense for deposits 
(Bradfield, 2007). In the literature, the observable output variables are conducted in the 
context of (net) return to the banks’ shareholders. Event studies have been used to assess the 
return on equity and further determine which parties gain and which parties lose in contests 
for the control of corporations (Carbo et al., 2003; Mester, 1996). 
 
2.4.1.2 Residual approach 
The residual approach assumes that the operation of the financial market is to allocate 
resources to set prices. If there is a delay in the adjustment of a security’s price to new 
information, there will be nonzero residuals around the time that the new information appears 
(Bradfield, 2007). The persistence of nonzero residuals means a persistence pricing of the 
security away from its equilibrium value. Consequently, examining the residuals helps to 
assess the inefficiency of the financial market. The problem in using residuals as the basis of 
an investment strategy is that calculating residuals is costly. Explicit costs are incurred to 




collect the data and perform the calculations, and opportunity costs are incurred to analyse 
those data. 
 
2.4.2 Intermediation equilibrium approach 
The input-output approach holds a shareholder’s (or intermediary’s) interest maximising 
value, whereas the residual approach holds a law of one price value. This study takes the 
view that PE managers are financial specialists such as accountants, lawyers, and merchant 
banks, providing financial service vis-à-vis firms producing goods and services (Sahlman, 
1990). In assessing the efficiency of PE financing, one should examine the fair pricing of PEs’ 
services, regarding deal pricing and other non-price services, rather than the financing profit 
of either PE firms or the invested companies. 
 
An ideal parameter analytical framework developed by Chan (1983) highlights the 
contribution of the VC industry in improving efficiency in a market with imperfect 
information. Chan argues that financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents who 
induce a Pareto-preferred capital allocation, leading investors to a higher welfare state. In an 
intermediation equilibrium world (CI), there is a set of equilibrium combinations such as 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 2 2, ; , ; ; ,kp q p q p q where p is the enterprise’s share in the invested project (thus 
the intermediary holds a share proportion of ‘1-p’), and q represents the quality of the project. 
Assume there are h intermediaries who work to connect investors and entrepreneurs and that 
charge a fee of d. Under the assumption of endogenous utility and law of large numbers, the 
CI equilibrium is given as
( ) , ; ; ;p q d h 
, where φ (p, q) is the distribution of sets (p, q), and 
γ is the proportion of investors with search cost μ.  
 




In conclusion, Chan (1983) suggests in the existence of a competitive market (equilibrium 
allocations) where resource allocation is efficient or Pareto optimal; there is no way to 
redistribute resources and make some agents better off without making others worse off. 
Based on the CI framework from Chan (1983), I explore whether PE contributes to optimal 
capital asset allocation by examining the 
( ) , ; ; ;p q d h 
universe, where:  
1) PEs increase the possible share proportion of ‘1-p’ by connecting investors and 
investees through dual-class partnership and by raising funds through innovative 
financing instruments; 
2) PEs strengthen the projects’ quality q by performing as active shareholders; 
3) PEs alleviate the information asymmetry of quality of investable projects q by active 
analyst coverage hence also decrease the searching cost μ for a certain proportion 
investors γ; and  
4) financing through PEs incurs an optimal fee level of d given the distribution of sets (p, 
q). 
The following subsections give examples from the literature and practice that illustrate the 
above points.  
 
2.4.2.1 The agency problem in dual-class partnership  
Corresponding to the high-risk business nature, the agency relationship in a PE-backed deal is 
complicated. As noted by Diamond (1984), the functions of financial intermediaries are: to 
raise funds from lenders; promise them a given pattern of returns; lend to entrepreneurs, and 
spend resources monitoring and enforcing loan contracts with entrepreneurs who are “less 
costly” than those available without monitoring. However, potential inefficiencies arise from 




the dual-class partnership recognised by Walker (2007) between the following two pairs: 
investor-PE and PE-investee.  
 
1. The investor-PE pair 
PE funds or firms are usually structured in a limited partnership. The funding contributors 
(limited partners, LPs) have limited liability, i.e., they do not risk more than the amount of 
their investment in the fund. Such a limited liability feature is attractive to investors with less 
risk tolerance hence expanding the potential investor group (see Figure 2.1). However, 
though LPs (or holders of PE fund units) serve as outside shareholders of invested 
companies, they can hardly impose as much influence as GPs could on invested companies. It 
is the GPs who discuss the specific proposal in person with the directors (of invested firms), 
and this makes them accountable for important proposals. The potential principal-agent 
conflict could also lie in the proxy voting that GPs execute on behalf of LPs at the annual 
meeting of the invested companies (SEC, 2003). Evidence covering a long-time span 
supports the statement by Sahlman (1990) that PE firms structure deals to maximise portfolio 
returns, minimise agency risk, and maximise efficiency in the operation of the PE firm 
“itself”. It is reasonable to expect that LPs and GPs are separate, independent entities. 
 
2. The PE-investee pair 
Given that there are expectations of financial results and programme outcomes for the various 
stakeholder groups in a single company, Stout (2001) argues that the shareholders’ interests 
can be “team specific”. A PE fund is essentially a closed-end fund with a finite life, rather 
than entrepreneurship whose life is infinite. The GP has an agreed period, usually of the order 
of 10 to 12 years, in which to return capital to the LPs. PEs are generally financial investors 
who search for financial gains (Hellmann, 2002). The State Small Business Credit Initiative 




(SSBCI, 2014) states that scarcity of capital allows VCs to invest opportunistically rather 
than engage in the risks/rewards of company building and they are less inclined to engage in 
the “missionary work” of mentoring entrepreneurial leaders because VC focuses more on 
“wins” rather than “mistakes”. Agency problems have also been found at both the transaction 
and fund level given that LBO firms have different incentives from managers of typical large 
public firms (and LPs) (Axelson et al., 2013). LBO studies find that when the price rises, GPs 
undertake buyouts in riskier industries and with somewhat higher leverage ratios. Managers 
who “cash out” a large fraction of pre-buyout holdings at the time of the deal may have a 
greater incentive to take part in an overpriced or poorly structured transaction (Kaplan and 
Stein, 1993).  
 
Also, PEs activeness in exercising their rights are different from those of other shareholder 
groups such as firm founders and investment partners. In practice, PE financing contracts 
usually enable PEs to separately allocate cash flow rights, voting rights, board rights, 
liquidation rights, and other control rights (Fater, 2009). The implications of the separation of 
financial ownership and control could raise the concern about agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
2.4.2.2 PE financing contract with embedded contingencies 
Most PEs provide financing in the form of hybrid securities, such as convertible preferred 
equity or structured debt (Lerner, 1997). The evidence coincides with the comment on 
financial intermediaries by Diamond (1984): “When there are no future markets for the value 
of the projects, financial intermediaries will write contracts with investors whose promised 
return is contingent to investment project.” In business practice, direct VC investments are 
generally structured as convertible preferred stock rather than common stock. Indirect VC 




investment takes the form of funds or an LLP, which is a hybrid of the corporate and 
partnership forms with a contingent claim on investees’ residual interest15. The widely used 
convertible security also contains restrictive covenants whose violation triggers the rights of 
the investors to redeem their investment (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). If all goes 
according to plan and the business is wildly successful, the holders convert their notes and get 
to participate as owners when success has been achieved. Thus, the holders of convertible 
notes get the best of both worlds. Fater (2009) finds that start-up and early-stage corporations 
can make extremely effective use of convertible instruments, including those with provisions. 
Given that LBOs can result in excessive defaults (Toms et al., 2015), in responding to the 
high credit risk, LBOs capital is financed mainly by structured debt with banks serving as 
senior secured debtholders and risk-seeking investors, or GPs themselves, serving as 
unsecured debtholders. Mezzanine financing is also widely applied in LBOs that attach 
warrants or conversion options in debt or preferred shares (Courtois, 2013) (see Figure 2.1). 
 
I argue that the above innovative securities issuance serves the well-known promotion 
purpose (Mahoney, 1995) for two reasons. First, it decomposes the risk into different layers 
(such as loan tranches A, B and C in Figure 2.1) to make funding available to a wider range 
of investors of different risk aversion (especially pension plans and insurance funds that are 
now restricted from investing in lower-rating securities). Secondly, it pools small amounts of 
funding from a number of individual investors (such as pooling LPs altogether to form a VC 
fund or LBO fund) thus raising a larger amount of capital.  
 
                                                            
15 Source: Zephyr.  




2.4.2.3 Analyst coverage 
Chan (1983) argues that there is an economy of scale in intermediaries’ operations because 
intermediaries introduce the entrepreneurs to provide clients with higher return projects. 
Except for compulsory disclosure requirements enforced by public agencies such as stock 
exchanges and security regulatory commissions, financial intermediaries can contribute to 
information efficiency through “non-price services” of voluntary disclosure or analyst 
coverage. Studies of such “non-price services” provided by financial intermediaries in IPOs 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between analyst coverage and price premium 
(Burns et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2013). Although the PE market has been widely 
acknowledged as having an asymmetric information problem (Brown et al., 2013), studies 
have shown that information disclosure helps improve information transparency in the PE 
market. Cumming and Knill (2012) argue that disclosure creates investment opportunities 
visible to the broader community thus providing opportunities to celebrate progress. SSBCI 
(2014) suggests that it is important to find ways to communicate progress through early 
success stories.  
 
Information transparency is of key importance in deal/asset pricing. Without it, the law of one 
price does not hold. In practice, the equity risk premium is specifically defined as the 
expected excess return over and above a long-term government bond yield. In other words, 
the fund sponsor asks for a higher risk premium (under-pricing) thus offers a lower price for 
PE offerings than otherwise equal investment tools. In the next section, I explore in detail PE 
managers’ contribution to market information transparency in the three pricing stages of PE 
financing: fund-raising from LPs (marketing), negotiating the deal price with invested firms 
(drawdown/investment), and liquidating the investment at a fair price (realisation of returns 
and exit) (see Figure 2.2). 




[Image removed for Copyright compliance] 
 
Figure 2.2 A General Funding Stages of a PE Fund  






1. Fund raising stage 
PEs play the role of a prudent investor16  who is responsible for the fund investors (or 
financing providers). Under this condition, adverse selection is expected to be addressed 
through intensive screening, which includes due diligence and market segmentation research, 
before investment (Lerner, 1995). Firm-level selection criteria for PE funds include 
successful exit, innovation, and growth (Cumming et al., 2014). In this stage, the 
entrepreneurs need to be able to generate sufficient interest from diverse capitalists to 
negotiate higher valuations; top-tier capitalists are better able to identify high-quality 
entrepreneurs or the most promising ventures (Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012; Sorensen, 
2007). However, evidence shows that the information disclosed by VC managers is not 
specific or investment valuable because they are more likely to overvalue their fund returns in 
the VC’s fund-raising stage. (Cumming and Johan, 2009) 
 
                                                            
16 One policy decision that potentially had an effect on commitments to venture funds through supply changes is 
the US Department of Labor’s clarification of the "prudent man" rule in the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act. The 1978 rule states that pension managers had to invest with the care of a prudent man. 
Consequently, many pension funds avoid investing in venture capital entirely. 




2. Investment and exit/liquidation stage 
Toms et al. (2015) argue that PEs are more effective in processing information than 
individuals and adjust corporate valuations accordingly when new information reaches the 
market from the firm. Such “knowledge assets” (Toms et al., 2015) grant GPs advantages 
over entrepreneurs in the process of valuing a certain deal. In practice, a certain component of 
material operational and financial information that PE-backed firms file is vital for asset 
pricing and goes beyond simple “veracity” in accounting terms, since they require certain 
estimates, assumptions and, as a whole, are vulnerable to professional judgements. In this 
case, PE managers encourage price discovery through “expert” use of information as part and 
parcel of fair pricing at liquidation (Schacht, 2014). There are limited studies covering 
voluntary disclosure of PE-backed companies at the post-investment and liquidation stage. 
An industrial level survey shows that after investment, VCs increase their expenses to release 
influential soft information such as prototyping, market presence, and distribution channels. 
Unfortunately, such a cost has a weak causal relationship with subsequent productivity 
(Manigart et al., 2002).  
 
As discussed in section 2.2.2, asset pricing methods are widely applied in PE deal valuation 
and PE fund performance measuring. The fairness of asset valuation (e.g., D/EV, D/EBITDA 
in LBO deals; paid-in capital, bidding price in VC deals), as well as the liquidation valuation 
(e.g., IPO stock pricing in VC deals), is subject to complete and unbiased information. As a 
result, information efficiency is crucially important at the investment and exit/liquidation 
stages. 
 
Further, both the absolute and relative return analysis are based on theories and models such 
as present value models, multiplier models, and asset-based valuation (Basu, 1977; Block, 




1999; Fama and French, 1995; Sharpe, 1964). The models are, by nature, simple numerical, 
analytical tools. The choice of the models and the derivation of inputs require skills and 
judgement. Given the scarcity of reliable information and the divergence of professionalism, 
pricing of the deal and liquidation of a PE investment have a high level of uncertainty. 
However, the PE fund’s role in promoting information efficiency in these two stages remains 
inconclusive.  
 
2.4.2.4 Advisory fees 
As noted above, PE financing is arranged as a partnership structure (see Figure 1.1). Lerner 
(1997) addresses partnership investment behaviour in two ways; one increases the size of the 
“pie” and the other simply changes the relative size of the pie. Based on the parameter 
analysis framework of Chan (1983) and Diamond (1984), in a Pareto-optimal allocation of 
resources, it is impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one 
individual worse off. In other words, entrepreneurs must benefit more than the fee of level d 
for financing through intermediaries; the term V* > r must hold for depositors; the 
intermediary must receive an expected return net of monitoring costs and any deadweight 
penalties incurred, which are at least zero. As long as depositors and entrepreneurs pay a fee 
that is not optimal, intermediaries add limited value to the economy. As a result, 
understanding how the productivities are distributed among different interested parties is 
essential for further understanding of the economic efficiency of PE financing. Researchers in 
this area refer to the alignment of interests between two pairs of counterparties who share the 
productivities in PE transactions: PE fund holders and invested firms (sharing the residual 
returns); and PE fund holders and the new investors (sharing potential upside performance or 
reduced financing costs) (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). 
 




From the perspective of VC fund stakeholders, the investment return can be defined 
regarding various fund performances. Further, VCs rarely pay dividends but rather capitalise 
them until liquidation time when the profit becomes available to the founders (Cumming, 
2005). There are some studies that focus on quality indices such as the probability of fully or 
partially exiting through an IPO or merger and acquisition (M&A) (Cumming et al., 2014; 
Wang and Wang, 2012), or “better terms” for the IPO process (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). 
 
From the perspective of the invested companies, the benefits PE bring to the companies are 
not translated into superior returns for their principals (i.e., the investors). A related issue is 
that the fees that PE funds charge their investors may be too large (Driessen et al., 2012). 
Thus, they may outperform before fees but underperform after fees. Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) find that VC can result in lower net-of-fees returns than the market index. Sometimes, 
exiting itself can lead to financial distress for entrepreneurs (Lerner, 1997). Statistics from the 
British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) support the above arguments. The IRR on all 
funds since inception in December 2014 is 13% per annum. Given that the average enterprise 
multiple during the same period was 54.43, in the context of equity pricing, this multiple 
suggests an annual return of only 1.8%. Other return measures such as TVPI suggest a yield 
of 167.9%, and that DPI yields a return rate of 110.6%, which demonstrates that VC funds 
have, in aggregate, returned more than all the initial capital and fees back to investors (PWC, 
2015).  
 
2.5. The Transaction Cost Approach 
When firms search for external financing via financing intermediation, financial 
intermediaries are expected to reduce the transaction cost or make use of their cost advantage 
in certain tasks (Diamond, 1984). Contrary to the limited explanatory power of return-based 




measurement discussed in section 2.3, I expect the transaction cost approach to contribute 
more to the understanding of economic efficiency in this area.  
 
The term transaction cost was proposed by Coase (1937) and further developed by William 
(1981) who used it to explain the economy of traditional goods transactions. Most classical 
economic theories consider transaction costs; classical Keynesian and neo-Keynesian theories 
assume transaction costs are high in the capital markets (Keynes, 1936) whereas the efficient 
market theory (Malkiel and Fama, 1970) and arbitrage pricing theory (Ross, 1976) neglect 
transaction costs. In the context of financing theory, the Modigliani-Miller proposition 
excludes transaction costs, information heterogeneity, or taxes; the value of the firm remains 
constant regardless of the financial decisions made by management (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). In corporate governance theory the ideal state assumes that there is no agency cost 
(Copeland et al., 1983). Game theory assumes high information and enforcement costs for 
some but not all transactions (Nash, 1950). Similarly, when analysing Nash behaviour vis-a-
vis entrepreneurs searching for VC financing, Chan (1983) includes transaction costs, which 
take the form of searching cost μ as well as the service fee d charged by intermediaries. 
 
Transaction cost theory has been widely applied in research areas of entrepreneurship, 
institutional economics, industrial economics, and transition economy. In empirical studies, 
the transaction cost is quantified as a proportion of the price (e.g., Bhardwaj and Brooks, 
1992; Stoll and Whaley, 1983) and takes either the form of cost-effectiveness (Bruining et al., 
2005; Nee and Opper, 2010) or time saved (Nee and Opper, 2010). Few studies in PE 
financing cover the transaction cost theory. The limited examples are restricted to VC 
transactions, which include tax and capital transaction tax provided in VC fund-raising (Jeng 
and Well, 2000) and syndicated VC-investment advantages/disadvantages (Bruining et al., 




2005). Because individuals and groups in PE transactions face different transaction 
arrangements, the law of one price does not apply. Borrowing ideas from the literature on 
general financing intermediaries as well as PE, I argue that the transaction cost of PE 
financing includes agency cost, opportunity cost and illiquidity. 
 
2.5.1 Agency cost  
Studies relevant to agency cost mostly target the general means of external financing. In 
general, agency costs arise from the moral hazard, cost of administration, information 
gathering, and search efforts (Fama, 1985; Mayer, 1988; Myers and Majluf, 1984). It is 
assumed that the agency costs of external equity increase as the percentage of financing 
supplied by external equity goes up (Copeland et al., 1983). PE financing, especially VC-
backed financing, will result in a dual-class partnership and subsequent principal-agent 
conflict. New shareholders will have to incur monitoring costs of one form or another to 
ensure that the original owner-manager acts in their interest (Copeland et al., 1983). Agency 
cost is not directly observable in research studies. However, the efficiency of governance can 
be observed in productivity or advisory fees d (see section 2.4). 
 
2.5.2 Opportunity cost  
In an efficient allocation of capital resources, there will be no further opportunities for 
mutually beneficial exchanges (Bradfield, 2007). At the transaction level, Diamond (1984) 
suggests viable conditions for financing through intermediaries: 1) the depositors must 
receive an expected return of r; 2) the financial intermediaries must receive an expected 
return netting service cost; and 3) the entrepreneur must retain an expected return at least as 
high as he/she would get by sidestepping intermediaries and contracting directly with 
depositors. As discussed in section 2.3, the visible opportunity costs pertaining to VC 




financing are market returns such as the S&P 500, Europe Index, and NASDAQ (for VC 
cases) (Driessen et al. 2012; Harris et al., 2014) but the opportunity cost is mostly set as 
market yield of LIBOR (Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Yago and McCarthy, 2004).  
 
2.5.3 Illiquidity 
As described by the Private Equity Growth Capital Council, the business model for a typical 
PE fund relies on an exit of three to seven years from the time an initial investment is made 
(Levine and Mangiero, 2014). Illiquidity raises the required rate of return of PE fund 
providers and further increases the financing cost. Risk premium logic asserts that market 
value accounting in the presence of asymmetric information biases market prices downward 
and increases liquidity risks (Calverley, 2008). The PE’s role in addressing the illiquidity 
premium lies in the active analytical coverage of their investees. As discussed in section 
2.4.2.3, both pre-investment screening and post-investment information disclosure services 
provided by PE managers contribute to information transparency. To what extent liquidity 
can be addressed depends on how much the PEs make the investment opportunity 
(objective’s quality q in the CI framework) available to potential investors γ (in both the 
fund-raising and exit stages) with a given searching cost μ. 
 
2.6. Institutional Environment  
The transaction costs regarding agency cost, opportunity cost and illiquidity discussed in 
section 2.5 are largely associated with information asymmetry. However, to gain a full 
representation of transaction costs in PE financing, one should consider the institutional 
environment. As Benham and Benham (2001) suggest, once researchers have access to 
credible information on transaction costs across various institutional settings (e.g., laws, 




regulations, and law enforcement), the information would be highly useful in providing an 
answer to the fundamental question of economic efficiency. 
 
The term institution refers to a complex mixture of rules, norms, conventions and behavioural 
beliefs that together form the way in which people operate and determine how successful they 
are in achieving their goals (North and Weingast, 1989). To find a theoretical foundation that 
could better explain PE financing efficiency, previous studies show that institutional 
environment factors are helpful and worth further development. There are reasons for the 
importance of the institutional environment. 
 
Most of the literature summarised in section 2.4 considers the institutional background 
though not in uniform terms. Most existing studies focus on a certain aspect of PE funds’ (or 
invested firms’) performance or GPs’ activities within (or across) country border(s) (i.e., 
institution border) or simply transform the institutional factors as control variables. As 
recommended by Busenitz et al. (2000), Wright et al. (2005) and Scott (1995) similarities and 
differences in PE behaviour around the world are the result of the configuration of regulatory 
institutions, cognitive and normative behaviour in each country. The next section discusses 
the institutional analysis of the literature on PE financing activities. 
 
2.6.1 Formal institutional factor 
Regulatory factors refer to the widely recognised law and finance factors (La Porta et al., 
1998) and the quality of their enforcement (Cumming et al., 2014). Regulation reduces 
transaction costs through a system of rules, regulations, and governance (e.g., registration, 
record keeping, and disclosure) (McCaffrey and Hart, 1998). Existing studies concerning 
securities laws mainly cover transaction activities for over the counter (OTC) products in 




public broker-dealer markets (Bradfield, 2007; Lo, 2008). However, the basic principle is 
helpful when applied to the PE market.  
 
Like other financing intermediaries, PEs are subject to extensive regulation by a variety of 
regulatory bodies. It is clear that the regulations regulating PE financing are not uniform. The 
section next summarises the existing legal literature about PE financing. 
 
2.6.1.1 Fund raising stage 
Judge-made common law matters in the PE context in a way triggered innovation in both the 
law and trading venues that mutated into modern security markets (Morrison and Wilhelm, 
2007). The regulatory environment that encouraged the emergence and growth of enterprises, 
especially in emerging markets, produces better governance structures (Cumming, 2005), 
more syndication (Bruining et al., 2005), international capital flow (Cumming et al., 2009; 
Wang and Wang, 2012), cross-border labour flow (Bozkaya and Kerr, 2014; Cumming and 
Li, 2013), and more high-tech investments (Hua et al., 2016). Cumming and Fleming (2015) 
acknowledge financial deregulation as a driving force of the emergence of new legal entities 
such as LBO partnerships. Also, regulations that enhance or permit pension fund participation 
as limited partners in PE funds stimulated venture capital markets in the US (Poterba, 1989) 
and Europe (Cumming and Johan, 2007). Based on the arguments that major stimuli to 
financial innovation and new securities design come from incentives to circumvent ever-
changing tax codes and regulations (Finnerty, 1992; Miller, 1986; Tufano, 1995), my study 
observes the thriving of LBOs that occurred in the 1980s, reaching its peak in the early 1990s 
(Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Stromberg, 2008). The phenomenon paralleled the emergence of 
structured financing instruments and further evoked refinements of regulations in the private 




placement market (see Table 2.3), i.e., asset-backed securities (ABS) or collateralised 
mortgage obligations (CMOs). 
Table 2.3 Economic Events, Innovative Securities and Amendments to the Securities 
Act (the US market) 




Federal Reserve discount rate rises to 13 %    
Inflation rate at 13.5 % for the year    
Home purchase revenue bonds    
1981 
Interest rates peaked at 21.5 %    
Price of oil peaked at $39 a barrel    
Foreign currency swaps bonds with detachable warrants offered    
The first offering of an original-issue discount convertible    
The invention of the first debt-for-equity swap portfolio insurance    
1982 
Shelf registration started   Regulation D  
Unemployment rate at 9.7% for the year   
Second mortgage pass-through securities   
Extendable notes with rates adjusted at holder's puttable option   
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation offers zero coupon bond   
1983  
CMOs    
Libor-based floating rate notes    
Swap equity of American company for foreign debt    
1984 
Dutch auction rate preferred stock    
Fannie Mae zero coupon    
Fannie Mae 35 zero coupon subordinated cap debenture    
Synthetic bonds    
Eurobond discount mortgage-backed bonds    
Zero coupons by mortgages    
1985 
Zero coupon sterling issue new hybrid bond-dual series discount bonds  
Flexible Credit Account   
 
Floating rate securities-capped, mini/max, mismatched, partly paid nondollar 
FRNS   
 
Collateralised securities-multifamily pass-through, leaseback commercial 
mortgage pass-through, cross-collateralised pooled\financing pooled nonrecourse 
commercial mortgage daily adjustable tax-exempt securities, municipal put option 
securities   
 
Periodically adjustable rate trust securities    
1986 All interest rate ceilings had been eliminated except for the ban on demand 
deposit interest, which was then the only remaining substantive component of 
Regulation Q.  
Regulation Q 
1990  Rule 144A 
Source: Black (1991). 
Note: Regulation D specifies various rules prescribing the qualifications needed to meet exemptions from 
registration requirements for the issuance of securities. 
 




2.6.1.2 Post-investment stage 
In the post-investment stage, the mechanism that securities laws use to reduce the cost of 
agency and resolve disputes is to apply standardised securities contracts (describing the 
obligations of various parties and burdens of proof, thereby encourage equity financing of the 
firms) (La Porta et al., 2006). North and Weingast (1989) provide evidence showing better 
contracts generate more credible commitments and thus should reduce the cost of the 
contract. An example is the emergence of tailor-made financial contracts, among which 
convertible debt and preferred equity were widely applied in PE financing (Cumming, 2005; 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001, 2003). Cumming et al. (2008, 2015) argue that better 
shareholder protection laws result in lower agency costs between the entrepreneurs and 
outside shareholders (e.g., venture capitalists). 
 
2.6.1.3 Exit or liquidation stage 
Cumming (2008) and Cumming and Johan (2008) argue that better shareholder protection 
laws contribute to certain exit vehicles (e.g., IPOs) by reducing the cost of liquidation. 
Regarding liquidation at a fair price, a certain level of market transparency helps clarify the 
liability rules for inaccurate or incomplete disclosure to investors. Djankov et al. (2003) 
comment that an efficient financial market system provides information providers with 
incentives to collect and present information to investors and holds them liable if they do not. 
As a result, regulation helps to apply fair valuation clauses in PE contracts (Cumming and 
Walz, 2010) and prevents rent-seeking behaviour, which arises from mispricing and 
adjustments towards equilibrium (Toms et al., 2015). Existing markets with low capital gains 
tax rates positively impact VC markets in the US (Gompers and Lerner, 1999), Europe 
(Armour and Cumming, 2008) and the rest of the world (Jeng and Wells, 2000).  
 




Figure 2.3 illustrates the regulations covering most PE financing regulation activities at 
different stages. In summary, the securities regulations fall into two categories: health-safety-
environment (H-S-E) (regulations involve mandated changes in production processes and 
product qualities or types), and information regulations (involve the requirement that sellers 
attach specific types of information to the goods and services that they sell) (Lo, 2008). The 
above regulations help solve market inefficiencies such as market power, externality effects, 
uncertainty and absence of complete knowledge, individuals who are unable to know their 
own best interests17 (individuals who are overwhelmed by the complexity of choices), and 
asymmetric information (corporate managers who know more about their activities than do 
shareholders or bondholders) (Lo, 2008). 
 
[Image removed for Copyright compliance] 
 
Figure 2.3 The Regulations Covering Most PE Financing Activities 
Source: Courtois (2013); Lo (2008). 
 
 
The quality of law enforcement (also named “the rule of law”) varies systematically by legal 
origin as is emphasised by Djankov et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (1998) in their studies on 
capital market efficiency. Common law tradition developed in Britain, characterised by 
independent judges and juries, gives preference to contracts and private litigation as the 
means to deal with social harm. The civil law tradition developed in France, characterised by 
state-employed judges, gives preference to state regulation over private litigation (Djankov et 
al., 2003). Judge-made common law matters in the PE context because it triggered the 
                                                            
17 Some theoretical models include investor costs of evaluating potential investments and assume that investors 
are particularly well-informed (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001). 




innovation in both the law and in the trading venues that transformed into the modern 
security markets (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007).  
 
The literature in PE-relevant regulation shares the value of preferring financing ease over 
financing risk. To be specific, Mahoney (1995) supports a “market reaching” efficiency that 
includes lowering the barriers to investment, facilitating contract arrangement and easing 
fund liquidation. Consistently, Jones and Tsutsumi (2009) argue that the highest priority of 
regulation is to enhance efficiency in the financial sector that would expand and improve 
capital markets. The second priority is to expand the range and quality of financial products. 
 
2.6.2 Informal institutional factors 
Informal institutions refers to a combination of sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and 
codes of conduct (North, 1990). They can be further categorised as normative and cognitive 
institutions (Scott, 1995). The earliest studies applying the informal institution approach to 
explore enterprises’ financing activities in private markets are those focusing on transition 
economies18. Representative studies in this area examine the activities of entrepreneurs under 
uncertain market conditions, access to scarce capital resources (in the form of public equity) 
as well as the subsequent corporate performance (Nee and Opper, 2012).  
 
There is a growing literature that reveals informal institutions as driving forces that shape the 
activities of PE market players. However, as I will review in the next section, studies in this 
area mainly focus on the discretionary behaviour of PE managers. Few studies discuss the 
efficiency of PE financing. 
                                                            
18 Transition economies (those reforming from a centrally planned economy) are such as China, the Russia 
(previous Soviet Union) or Eastern Europe. In La Porta et al.’s (1999) classification of legal origin, they belong 
to the Socialist group. 





2.6.2.1 Normative institutions 
A normative institution has the behaviours and values expected of individuals or 
organisations (March 1981; Scott, 1995). The norms that determine the appropriate 
professional setting of the PE market can be found in the literature with diverse emphases 
such as: 1) based on the agency theory approach, PE managers should protect the investment 
of the principal (VC) against the harmful behaviours of the agent (entrepreneur) (Arthurs and 
Busenitz, 2003); 2) based on the functional perspective, PE firms as financial intermediaries 
should be cost-effective in the areas of moral hazard, cost of administration, information 
gathering, and search effort (Fama, 1985; Mayer, 1988; Myers and Majluf, 1984); 3) based 
on the legal nature of the fund sponsors, investors can be long-term, short-term, large block, 
small block owners (Johnson et al., 2010); and 4) pressure-sensitive or pressure-resistant 
(Brickley et al., 1988). Stromberg (2008) employs over 20,000 cases worldwide and finds 
significant changes in board size and composition following an LBO. In his study, Stromberg 
does not take a country’s border as an institution border but rather focusses on the legal 
nature of certain sponsors. 
 
The earliest record of a VC business is documented in Rao and Scaruffi (2011). The practices 
of the PE industry are invented, tested and then exhibit appropriateness (e.g., a high level of 
cooperative behaviour among VC firms during the early years of the industry, capital 
syndication in early years, and risk diversification in later years). PE funds were then 
exported to other parts of the world such as the EU and Asia (Bruton et al., 2005; Manigart et 
al., 2009; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Manigart et al. (2009) show that GPs follow the 
originators intention to replicate what the others had done, regardless of whether it is rational. 
The fact that the dominant normative logic may be US based does not imply that the local 




environment is not important. Local regulatory and cognitive institutions further shape the 
behaviour of PEs (Wright et al., 2005).  
 
2.6.2.2 Cognitive institutions 
Cognitive institutions consist of influence that develops over time through social interactions 
among the participants (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Previous studies describe cognitive, 
institutional factors (e.g., culture effect) as sources of coordination costs, time costs and 
information problems that influence the profit deal (Bruton et al., 2005; Cumming et al., 
2014; Djankov et al., 2003). The costs or profits are similar to what Nee and Opper (2012) 
call social rewards or punishment, in responding to the social rewards or punishment, 
cooperative behaviour arises from rational actions. One important cognitive difference 
worldwide is the strength of social networks. The relationships and connections provided by 
the networks are alternative means to enforce contracts or sanction violators (Perkins, 2000). 
One outcome of the importance of these relationships is that the parties often focus more on 
maintaining inter-firm and interpersonal relations than on immediate profits (Chen, 2001; 
Pye, 2000). Their findings imply that PE managers’ relationships with investment banks 
grants them “better terms” for the IPO process (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) or helps to 
“facilitate” a specific exit route (Cumming et al., 2010).  
 
Previous studies also show that the level of interconnections between business people in 
different countries is different. Social connections in Europe are often much stronger than in 
the US (Wells and Grieco, 1993). In Asia, the difference is even greater. Asian economies 
espouse different institutional logics from Western economies, ones rooted in connectedness 
and relationships (Biggart and Hamilton, 1992; Nee and Opper, 2010). Manigart et al. (2002) 
document that US-based empirical models developed to examine the interactions between the 




VCs and entrepreneurs are not valid in Asia. Asian VC s are less concerned with “efficiency” 
in dealing with portfolio companies and more concerned with creating and maintaining a 
strong relationship than their US or EU counterparts. Meyer and Rowan (1977) explain why 
Asian cognitive forces impacting GPs must be seriously considered when exploring the local 
market. The cognitive institution also explains that PE funds tend to invest in either 
regionally closed markets or markets with similar institutions (Megginson, 2004). The most 
interesting target for the international capitalist is continental Europe. Less developed 
markets, such as Asia and Latin America, can be challenging for PE firms because of the 
geographical distance and institutional differences (Manigart et al., 2009). 
 
There are a number of research gaps and limitations in the theoretical and methodological 
approaches involved in previous studies. For example, studies solve the absolute and relative 
return of PE funds through adjusting the assumptions in asset pricing models. The 
mathematical presentation of PE fund returns varies without solving the question of how 
much, in dollar value, the PE-backed firms are better off. Another shortfall of asset pricing 
models of PE fund returns is that they do not factor in law or regulations. The law or 
regulations reflect normative judgements about the efficacy that not only shapes the 
contracting choice of the PE-investee pair but also the enforcement of the contract. This line 
of reasoning helps to explain the outcome of PE financing in heterogeneous expressions of 
innovation (Gurung and Lerner, 2008; Hua et al., 2016), employment entrepreneurship 
(Cumming, 2005), and cross-border capital flow (Cumming et al., 2009; Wang and Wang, 
2012). Regulations have to catch up when the markets evolve their way around regulations 
(Black, 1991). Informal institution research thus provides the cognitive and normative 
explanation of the gap between regulation ideology and reality in the expression of home bias 
(Manigart et al., 2009; Megginson, 2004; Wright et al., 2005); social ties (Cumming et al., 




2004; Gompers and Lerner, 1999); and reputation bonding (Chen, 2001; Pye, 2000). A novel 
aspect of this thesis is that I review and synthesise this contrasting literature.  
 
My findings complement research on the history of regulatory changes in the private 
placement market and the role of financial intermediaries. I provide further insight into how 
the institutional environment impacts on the economy of PE financing by focusing on an 
important but seldom researched indicator, namely, PE financing from the perspective of PE-
backed firms. 
 
2.7. Conceptual Framework  
In summary, the discretionary behaviour of PE managers under certain institutional 
environments largely determines the efficiency of FE financing. Figure 2.4 shows the 
conceptual research model that examines the influence of the institutional environment on 
economic efficiency in PE financing while controlling for other determinants such as market 
condition and investee’s business characteristics.  
 





Figure 2.4 The Conceptual Model to Examine the Influence of the Institutional 
Environment on Economic Efficiency in Private Equity Financing 
 
I argue that one should assess the financing efficiency of PE from a market-level, cost-
minimum approach. Based on the framework of Chan (1983) and Diamond (1984), the linear 
programming problem of my study can be defined as follows: 
 
 ( ) 0,max max ( )V s VE V D S  
 − −
                                                    (2.1a) 
 
while subject to  0,
max ( )
s V
V D S Ir

− − 
                                 (2.1b) 
 
Where V is the utility from a PE-backed project with the lowest equilibrium expected return; 
I is the financing volume; and S is the maximum financing volume. If there is an economic 
return to scale, S>I is possible. D is a uniform fee, the transaction cost function that at least 
equals 0. To an extent, a PE market is Pareto preferred, which reduces the transaction cost at 




varying levels. Optimal PE financing maximises the economic utility (Equation 2.1a) under 
the condition that PEs improve efficiency. Equation 2.1b shows the net utility after excluding 
uniform fee d; transaction costs are larger than Ir, which equals the financing volume times 
the cost rate.   
 
2.8 Conclusion  
Dual-class, dynamic partnership arrangements surround the PE-investor. The PE-
entrepreneur makes the efficiency of PE financing a challenge to explore. In this literature 
review, I find the traditional return-based performance analytical framework falls short in 
explaining the efficiency of PE financing in the forever-evolving financial market. The 
transaction-focused cross-country institutional analysis framework shifts attention to examine 
the nature of the institutional arrangements in which PE financing players compete and 
cooperate to secure rewards. I advocate that this framework provides a solid theoretical 
foundation for the above two partnership pairs. 
 
Based on a comprehensive knowledge and critical analysis of existing measurements, this 
study explores the quantitative interpretation of both direct and indirect transaction costs and 
formal and informal institutions in PE financing. Statistical models will be developed as 
hypotheses are generated for each of the predicted relationships. 




Chapter 3               CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the quantitative analysis of the unique regulatory constraints and 
economic norms PE financing confronts. Statistical models will be developed based on a 
critical discussion of the conceptual development in Chapter two. Hypotheses are developed 
for the hypothesised relationships. Section 3.1 gives the measurements for both the implicit 
and explicit costs of VC and LBO financing. Section 3.2 defines the formal and informal 
institutional factors and section 3.3 illustrates the empirical models applied in this study. 
 
3.1. Transaction Cost of PE Financing  
This study attempts to apply transaction cost concepts in the field of PE financing to clarify 
economic efficiency. I borrow the general framework from Greif (2006) and Homans (1974) 
that a transaction is any action that involves an exchange of an entity, such as a commodity, 
reward, sentiment, opinion or information, from one actor to another. I further define the 
transaction cost of PE financing as a bundle of costs that includes both explicit and implicit 
costs. The former refers to the direct costs of trading, such as broker commission, taxes, 
stamp duty and fees paid to exchanges19 that are observable from the returns at the PE fund-
level. The latter refers to the costs of inefficiency such as searching time, information costs, 
opportunity cost, credit or equity mispricing, and costs incurred from illiquidity that are not 
captured in the formal fee structure. 
                                                            
19 Most VC funds used a homogeneous compensation scheme of annual management fees of 1.5% to 2.5% of committed 
capital and a 20% carried interest. 




3.1.1 Explicit financing costs 
The financing cost is directly observable from the capital cost of the fund-searching firms 
that, from the fund supplier’s side, is the return required for providing the fund. In LBO 
financing, the required return is the interest burden. It provides the maximum price that can 
be paid from the demand side while satisfying the target returns for the finance providers. In 
VC financing, the price is the enterprise multiple offered to acquire a certain amount of the 
equity of the investee firms. The offered enterprise multiple reflects investors’ outlook of the 
enterprise’s future profit. 
 
When measuring the financing cost of an LBO, one popular measure is the value to earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EV/EBITDA). In previous studies, such 
measurements average 8 to 10 times the EV or EBITDA (Axelson et al., 2013; Gurung and 
Lerner, 2008) indicating a yield of 10% to 12.5% (the reciprocals of 10 and 8). Considering 
that my study distinctively focuses on the financing cost of debt in LBO financing at the 
marketing stage (see Figure 2.2), I use the yield of issued debt securities as a measure of 
financing cost. Given that each LBO transaction is financed by a number of debts, each debt 
security consists of several seniority tranches (a combination of junior/senior and 
subordinate/secured or unsecured) (see Figure 4.2), the yields of LBO loans differ from 
tranche to tranche. In practice, financial advisors such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor 
apply the weighted offering yield (WOY) to measure the financing cost of the debt portfolio. 
The WOY is expressed as follows:  
 
𝑊𝑂𝑌𝑗 = ∑ 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1                                           (3.1) 
 




Where the 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑗  is the yield that issuer offered to the fund providers for each 
security i issued in transaction j, the 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗 represents the issue amount of that specific 
debt i as a proportion of the total issuance volume consisting of n debts in transaction j. I also 
consider another measure of LBO financing cost, the weighted yield spread (WAS), which is 
the spread of a bond over the on-the-run government benchmark (Geske, 1977). The WAS is used to 
verify the robustness of regression results from the total yield. 
 
Regarding VC financing, the study will not consider multistage, portfolio-level measures 
such as IRR or PME but, instead, measures the financing cost using the enterprise multiple 
because the study focuses on deal-level observations. The return of a PE fund (the flip side of 
the fund return is the cost to the investee) relies on self-reported data that can be obtained 
from dominant commercial databases such as VentureXpert, Venture Economics or the 
database partner of the National Venture Capital Association such as Venture Economics 
(Cumming and Zambelli, 2013; Harris et al., 2014; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Although 
these databases allow for larger and broader samples, researchers have expressed concern that 
these data are subject to self-reporting bias (Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012). Given the 
long locked-in and illiquid nature of PE financing, cash flow data by quarter frequency also 
raises an appraisal bias. Further, because the integrity of the data in this field is very 
important, the researcher is obliged to keep strict confidentiality of the raw data (Cumming et 
al., 2004; Cumming, 2008; Robinson and Sensoy, 2013). The confidentiality of PE business 
precludes researchers from verifying existing findings. Finally, the measurements above are 
the aggregated returns of all portfolio firms of a PE fund. From the perspective of a fund 
unitholder, such a measurement is of return-assessment value. However, for other VC fund 
providers, such as individual angel investors or existing shareholders, financing is a single-




stage, one-to-one transaction, where multistage, portfolio-level return measurements are not 
applicable. 
 
Like P/E and P/B are pricing multiples for public equity, EV/EBITDA or EV/TA (total assets) 
are commonly applied in private equity pricing, especially in LBO transactions (Axelson et al. 
2013; Gurung and Lerner 2008). Stromberg et al. (2011) point out that such an enterprise 
multiple has been proposed and developed in a growing number of datasets. This study 
applies them as the main measure of financing cost in the VC samples. 
 
The enterprise multiple indicates the premium general partners of PE funds/firms are willing 
to pay to the target firms (Axelson et al., 2013; Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012). The 
enterprise multiple (equation 3.2) used in this study is the enterprise value divided by the 
revenue or book value of the target firm. Zephyr provides a variety of enterprise multiples 
that includes enterprise value as a multiple of EBITDA, TA and operating revenue turnover. 
 
Enterprise multiple = total value of the enterprise / EBITDA                     (3.2a) 
 
I apply the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of investment and the Gordon (1962) theory 
of stock price in the public market. I see the price offered by investors reflects investors’ 
outlook of an enterprise’s future profit. Inversely, the reciprocal of price times the investees’ 
earnings is the cost for enterprises that search for external equity financing. Therefore, I use 
the reciprocal of the enterprise multiples of EV/EBITDA before the completion of VC 
financing20 as a measure of the financing cost of enterprises.  
                                                            
20 Pre-deal multiples are multiples created using the enterprise value and company financials of the latest 
available year before the deal. The post-deal multiples relate to the same enterprise value created using the 
financials of the enterprise in the year the deal took place. 














                                   (3.2b)  
 
In most cases, the GP acquires only a small proportion of the target firm’s shares. To provide 
a greater possible number of options, Zephyr solves the total value of the target company by 
the paid-in capital and the number of the acquired shares. The total value of the enterprise is 
formed assuming 100% of its shares have been acquired and can, in some circumstances, be 
the same value as the paid-in capital (if the general partner invests 100% of the target 








, will be used in robustness tests.  
 
Table 3.1 The Correlations of Fund Performance Measures 
 
IRRVE IRRCF PME TVPI 
IRRVE 1 
   
IRRCF 0.98 1 
  
PME 0.88 0.88 1 
 
TVPI 0.74 0.75 0.65 1 
Note: IRRVE is based on realised IRR of funds started in each period as reported by Venture Economics; PME 
observations are obtained from the S&P 500 during the same period.  
Source: Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  
 
3.1.2 Implicit financing costs  
In the context of PE financing, the added-value is directly related to the return from the 
entrepreneur’s project. When netting the pure financing cost to gain the measure of net return, 
one should consider implicit trading costs. In this study, I define the implicit financing cost as 
an intermediary service fee.  
 
The complexity and ambiguity of PE financing tools evoke a myriad of financial/legal risks, 
which is one of the critical due diligence concerns of any participant in the transactions. PE 
managers are perceived as the most sophisticated investors given their wealth of experience 
in finance and law; they play a role of buy-side advisor for LPs (the holders of PE fund units) 




in the financing and follow-up stages (Cumming, and Walz, 2010; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
The financial/legal services provided by PEs can greatly smooth the transactions by applying 
their in-depth understanding of the respective rights and obligations in specific contracts 
(e.g., some contracts require complex bilateral settlements or multiple credit exposure) 
(Bortuzzo et al., 2004). An ideal legal advisor group also helps to keep up with the 
progression of the law as compliance requirements evolve.  
 
Chan (1983) argues that the fee paid to professional advisors (see service fee (d) in section 
2.4.2) in PE financing is an important component of the financing costs. Unfortunately, the 
record of intermediary service fees is not subject to the mandatory disclosure requirement. 
The commercial databases CapitalIQ and Zephyr provide substitute observations of the 
number of legal and financial advisors involved in a single PE-backed transaction, which can 
serve as a proxy for intermediaries’ service fees. The definitions of a financial advisor and 
legal advisor are as follows:  
1) Financial advisor: Specific advisors who help clients gain access to PE financing 
and provide fair opinions and other financing solutions to assist clients in their 
transactions. Typically, an investment bank provides advice to its clients related to the 
planning and arrangement of their financial affairs.  
2) Legal advisor: A law firm that provides advice on PE matters, government 
regulations, litigation, anti-trust legislation and structured finance. A legal advisor can 
represent bidders, targets, financial advisors, merchant bankers and other parties in an 
LBO deal.  
Although there is no record of how much each advisor group charges for its service, it is 
reasonable to expect the larger the advisor group, the more the target firm must pay for PE 
financing. 




3.2. Institutional Environment 
3.2.1 Formal institutions 
A series of regulations can be applied to test the development and structure of the capital 
market where PE financing takes place. Contrary to the quantity variables such as GDP, 
measurement of the constituent variables of the institutional environment is difficult (Benham 
and Benham, 2001); most need to be quantified or be mathematically transformed21 . A 
meaningful index, in principle, should be constant and accurate. However, it is likely that 
legal experts reviewing the same laws have difficulty reaching a consensus. Other issues 
concerning a reliable index’s design include the selection of indicators and aggregation 
methods (Nardo et al., 2005). Assessing the index quality is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
The most influential empirical work examining the effect of securities on the capital market 
(La Porta et al., 2006) developed an index system based on the key dimensions of laws and 
regulations at the national level. The key dimensions of regulatory systems cover areas such 
as company law and bankruptcy or insolvency law, and the public and private enforcement of 
those laws. In a recent study of PE financing in Europe, the index of the legal and tax 
environment was used to proxy the “private equity environment” (Gurung and Lerner, 2008).  
 
As discussed in section 2.4.2, the issuance of innovative financing tools in PE transactions, 
such as CDS, and ABSs in LBO transactions, or convertible debt and a Valuation Adjustment 
Mechanism (VAM) in VC deals, contain contingent rights or obligations. The contingent 
rights or obligations provide options for fund providers when certain events occur. Because 
                                                            
21 The OECD handbook suggests a 10-step guide to building a composite index (or indicator): data selection, 
imputation of missing data, multivariate analysis, normalisation, weighting and aggregation, robustness and 
sensitivity analysis, back to the detail, links to other indicators, and visualisation of the results (Nardo et al., 
2005). 




the possible options add uncertainty to the financing cost, the extent to which the legal system 
is capable of enforcing contracts or keeping the unforeseen liability under control is expected 
to determine the overall financing cost (as measured by a variety means of paid-in capital, 
issuance, success, spread, etc.). This study quantifies the laws and regulations related to PE 
financing such as creditor and shareholder rights. The former presumably shape the financing 
cost of highly leveraged LBO transactions whereas the latter largely determine the cost of 
equity when financing with VC. 
 
3.2.1.1 Laws and regulations 
1. Creditor rights  
One common characteristic of an LBO is the extensive use of leverage. Hence, the LBO 
sponsors are exposed to insolvency risk especially during economic downturns. Gurung and 
Lerner (2010) show that around 6% of all LBOs end in bankruptcy or financial restructuring. 
This implies a higher failure rate than in US publicly traded firms. It is widely acknowledged 
that credit risk remains low under an institutional environment where creditors can easily 
force repayment, while debtors do not have an auto-stay on the assets (Cao, 2015; Fabozzi 
and Vink,2012 ), and debtors are more willing to offer favourable credit terms (Townsend, 
1979). When assessing the financing cost, one should consider the formal institution of 
creditor rights since it is an essential determinant of financing cost (Balcaen et al., 2011; 
Fabozzi and Vink, 2012). 
 
This study applies the index of creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007) to examine how 
much a creditor’s rights determine the financing costs in LBO transactions. The credit right 
index was first introduced by La Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007). It has been 
widely accepted as a benchmark index to examine creditor rights in bond and loan markets. 




The index is an aggregated value of the following four aspects of the rights of secured 
lenders: 1) an automatic stay on assets; 2) secured creditors paid first; 3) restrictions on going 
into reorganisation; and 4) management does not stay in a reorganisation (La Porta et al., 
1998). Within each country, the examined dimension is scored as one if it is legal. The higher 
the aggregated score, the higher the creditor rights in that country.  
 
It is worth mentioning that some LBO financing deals are of an equity nature with 19 
issuances of preferred stock, and 124 issuances of convertible debts among a total of 2,093 
(see Figure 3.1). Given the small proportion of equity-like securities, this study does not 
consider the shareholder rights index when examining LBO transactions





Figure 3.1 Financing Securities in LBO Transactions 
Note: In the left of Figure 3.1, the purple bars represent innovative financing securities, the blue bars represent equity-like securities. In the right of Figure 3.1, the purple bars represent 
unsecured /subordinated tranches.  
Source: CapitalIQ
a. Security types of LBOs 
 









2. Shareholder rights.  
The most-cited aggregate index system that evaluates shareholder rights is the anti-director 
rights index of La Porta et al. (1998). The anti-director rights index examines an exhaustive 
bundle of shareholder rights: voting rights (share-vote pair), voting the proxy, share blocking, 
cumulative voting, oppressed minorities mechanism, pre-emptive rights, and capital to call.  
 
This study applies the newly issued survey of shareholder rights from CFAI (2013). This 
survey covers a narrower sample of 28 markets as opposed to 49 markets in La Porta et al. 
(1998). However, it extends the sample to emerging markets including Russia, Poland and 
China, which are not covered in La Porta et al. (1998). This study composes the shareholder 
rights index manually based on this newly-issued survey with sub-index and the method 
presented in Table 3.2. Unlike most studies using the aggregated score system of La Porta et 
al. (1998, 2006), this study uses the sub-index as explanatory variables and interprets them 
one by one, because shareholder rights embrace a bundle of rights with certain rights 
affecting certain sectors to varying degrees. 




Table 3.2 Shareholder Rights Scoring Systems 
Laws Sub-Index 
1. Control Limitation 
 
Are there share ownership limitations in this 
market?   
Equals six, five, four, three, two and one if the answer 
is “yes”, “yes, usually”, “yes, sometimes/sometimes”, 
“no, mostly”, “no, usually”, “no”. 
2. Voting Rights The score of proxy voting right equals the arithmetic 
mean of scores 1) and 2). 
1) Are there (other) common restrictions on the 
proxy vote? 
Equals five, four, three, two and one if the answer is 
“yes”, “yes, sometimes/sometimes”, “yes, somewhat”, 
“no, mostly”, “no, usually”, and “no”. 
2) Are there (other) common restrictions on the 
rights of shareowners to vote in person or by 
proxy? 
Equals five, four, three, two and one if the answer is 
“no”, “no, mostly”, “yes somewhat/somewhat”, “Yes 
sometimes”, “yes”. 
3. Class Action / Derivative Suit The score of class action equals the arithmetic mean 
of scores 1) and 2). 
1) Shareholders who represent at least 5%-10% 
of the total number of voting rights of the 
company the right to bring a derivative suit 
against directors or executives on behalf of the 
company. 
Equals three, two and one if the answer is “yes”, “yes 
but very uncommon/not unheard of”, is 
“uncommon/allowed but rarely used”, and “no”. 
2) The lawsuit filed on behalf of a group of 
shareholders who share the same complaint. 
Shareholders in such cases are usually 
represented by the same lawyer or group of 
lawyers. 
Equals four, three, two and one if the answer is “yes”, 
“yes, but only under certain conditions”, “no, mostly”, 
and “no”. 
Bylaws Sub-Index 
4. Voting Policy The score of voting policy equals the arithmetic mean 
of scores 1), 2) and 3). 
1) Must shares be deposited or blocked from 
trading in order to vote?   
Equals five, four, three, two and one if the answer is 
“no”, “rarely”, “no, mostly”, “yes, 
sometimes/sometimes”, and “yes”. 
2) Do companies adhere to a majority voting 
standard in the election of board members?   
Equals five, four, three, two and one if the answer is 
“yes”, “yes, mostly”, “sometimes; yes, but adherence 
is company specific; varies”, “no, usually”, and “no”. 
3) Do companies allow cumulative voting in the 
election of board members?   
Equals five, four, three, two and one if the answer is 
“yes”, “sometimes”, “no, mostly”, “rarely “and “no”. 
5. Oppressed Minorities Mechanism The score of oppressed minorities mechanism equals 
the arithmetic mean of scores 1), 2), 3) and 4). 
1) Are shareholders able to affect a company’s 
remuneration policy through shareholder 
approval? 
Equals five, four, three, two and one if the answer is 
“yes”, “yes, sometimes/sometimes”, “no, mostly”, 
“rarely “and “no”. 
2) Are shareholders able to affect the remuneration 
policy through binding shareholder approval? 
Equals five, four, three, two and one if the answer is 
“yes”, “yes, usually”, “yes, mostly/mostly”, 
“sometimes”, and “no”. 
3) Are shareholders permitted to introduce 
dissident resolutions?   
Equals four, three, two and one if the answer is “yes”, 
“sometimes”, “no, usually”, and “no”. 
4) Do shareholders have a right to convene a 
general meeting of shareholders outside the annual 
meeting process?   
Equals four, three, two and one if the answer is “yes”, 
“yes, usually”, “yes, but only under certain condition”, 
and “in some cases”. 
Source: CFAI (2013) 
Note: The law or bylaw is given a higher score if it is minority-friendly. 
 




Figure 3.2 The Quartile Ranking of Ownership Level Grouped by Financing Type 
Source: Zephyr 
 
A close focus on the minority-friendly nature of shareholder rights is important given that VC 
providers usually hold a small proportion of target companies (Bruton et al., 2005). Figure 
3.2 illustrates a quartile ranking of ownership among different PE fund providers. The 
statistic shows that most VC fund providers, compared with average PE fund providers, are 
mostly minority shareholders. Table 3.2 shows the applied survey examines a comprehensive 
bundle of shareholder rights that highly-overlap with those in La Porta et al. (1998). It also 
examines other minority-friendly dimensions in the bundle of shareholder rights: control 
limit, action suits, and derivative suits. 
 
Another advantage of this survey is that it provides detailed information on proxy voting 
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target firms (La Porta et al., 1997). However, it is uniquely significant in PE financing, 
because the shares acquired by PEs (‘1-p’ in a random set of (p, q)) are jointly owned shares 
whose beneficiaries cast their voting rights through proxy voting. The proxy voting 
arrangement is prevalent in private placement memoranda at the fund-raising stage. On the 
empirical front, shares from LPs are consolidated into a voting block through a trust or the 
holding company of a PE firm. Having the deposit of proxies concerning beneficiaries’ 
voting rights, LPs could retain a certain level of discretion over important issues for 
investees, such as appointing an executive and overseeing implementation of the strategy. If 
not, no voting powers of the trust are allocated to the LPs (Deangelo and Deangelo, 1985), in 
my case, the PE fund-providers. Voting rights ensure a predictable alignment of cash flow or 
profit from investees thus encouraging the LPs to write bigger cheques to GPs who may offer 
higher enterprise multiples thereby lowering the financing cost from the enterprise side. This 
study also considers the shareholder rights of voting policy and oppressed minority 
mechanisms, which are generally “unrestricted” by local company law or left as uncovered in 
case “otherwise stated in the company deed”. By this definition, they are not formal state-
mandated rules but bylaws (CFAI, 2013). Like previous studies by La Porta et al. (1998) and 
Spamann (2010), I treat both state-mandated laws and bylaws as formal institutions. 
 
This study suggests that the legal environment of a country could facilitate PE financing by 
reducing explicit and implicit financing costs. The following relationships are hypothesised:  
 
H1a: LBO financing enjoys lower weighted average yield and lower advisory fees in 
countries with higher creditor rights standards. 
H1b: VC financing enjoys lower enterprise multiple and lower advisory fees in countries 
with higher shareholders right standards. 




3.2.1.2 Law enforcement 
The basic principle of financial law is the direct reduction in the costs of private contracting 
(La Porta et al., 2006). Unlike standardised financing contracts such as loan agreements or 
IPO prospectuses, PE financing contracts are tailor-made. This is especially true in VC 
financing. Reliable information on the bidding price or the acquired stake is very scarce and 
can be detected only in a highly incomplete manner from compulsory disclosures such as 
M&A (mergers and acquisitions) announcements or IPO prospectuses from the stock 
exchange. Filing information on PE financing is very time-consuming and usually requires 
access to professional terminals (e.g., Bloomberg, Reuters), thus worsening the asymmetric 
information problem in this market.  
 
To explore how law enforcement contributes to information transparency in the PE market 
and further reduces the financing costs, the following relationships are hypothesised: 
 
H2a: Law enforcement reduces LBO financing costs (weighted average yield) and advisory 
fees. 
H2b: Law enforcement reduces VC financing costs (reciprocal of enterprise multiple) and 
advisory fees. 
 
In each country, there is a jurisdiction procedure to enforce creditor rights, e.g., the Chapter 
11 reorganisation procedure in the US and the administrative receivership procedures aimed 
at the liquidation of the debtor’s business in the UK (Couwenberg, 2001). Judicial 
enforcement in each country has a different socially optimal preference. For a cross-country 
study of creditor rights enforcement, the most cited indicators are from Djankov et al. (2007) 
and La Porta et al. (1998) where the insolvency litigation procedure is categorised into three 




classes: foreclosure, liquidation, and reorganisation. Among them, reorganisation holds a 
going-concern preference whereas the foreclosure and liquidation solutions both hold a re-
possess preference.  
 
The three distinct jurisdiction procedures warrant separate analysis when we investigate 
creditor rights in LBO financing. For LBO financing, creditor rights do not work indifferently 
on all PE fund sponsors as they do on creditors in other financing deals. In an LBO deal, 
creditor rights work in favour of LPs rather than GPs. The GPs, labelled as a distressed asset 
investment firm, view themselves as the legitimate owner of the companies thus having an 
incentive to work with the distressed firms to bring about an orderly and timely restructure 
(Cumming and Fleming, 2015). In a GP-LP partnership, the GP controls the pool of PE 
capital. It is fair to say that LBO financing is more about debtor-in-possession financing 
rather than debtor-in-repossession financing. Moreover, compared with credit rights in other 
financings, those claimed in LBO deals are more complex because LBO transactions are 
financed by innovative securities such as CDS and ABS. These structured financing tools 
involve multiple creditors with different seniority levels that are ensured by an absolute 
priority rule. Whereas the absolute priority rule holds in liquidations, it has not always been 
upheld by the courts in reorganisations (Kim, 2016; Miller and Reisel, 2011).  
 
I use three dummy variables for the following types of enforcement of debt: foreclosure, 
liquidation, and reorganisation. Among them, foreclosure aims at recovering money owed by 
secured creditors without the involvement of the court; liquidation means winding up a 
company under court supervision; and reorganisation rehabilitates companies through a 
court-supervised procedure. For countries where creditor rights are higher, the resolution of 
creditors’ rights favours creditors and not the target company’s managers or other unsecured 




creditors, especially in a reorganisation. The advantage of these measures is that they capture 
both laws on-the-books and the efficiency of debt contract enforcement (Djankov et al., 
2008). 
 
With regard to the law enforcement test based on the VC sample, I use the law enforcement 
index from La Porta et al. (1998). According to La Porta et al. (1998), law enforcement can 
be categorised as public enforcement and private enforcement. Public enforcement by 
independent, third-party entities (e.g., government executive branches, stock exchanges) can 
regulate markets through subpoena, discovery or other means such as imposing sanctions 
(Landis, 1938; Seligman, 1995). Private enforcement includes disclosure requirements and 
liability rules that make it cheaper for investors to recover damages when information has 
been wrong or was omitted.  
 
Unlike the compulsory disclosure and liability rules that are regulated through independent 
parties such as the stock exchange, the monitoring and support of PE financing relies on 
contracts, i.e., the allocation of a bundle of shareholder rights (e.g., cash flow and control 
rights), between the entrepreneur and the PE fund providers. Such incentive arrangements 
embedded in financing contracts lack private enforcement, which is driven by the honesty of 
the issuers/sellers (La Porta et al., 2006). In such circumstances, financing contracts are 
subject to the supervision of public enforcement. It is necessary to assume that countries, 
where public enforcement is high, are expected to explicitly describe the various parties, 
thereby reducing the financing cost. The following relationship is hypothesised: 
 
H3: Public enforcement dominates private enforcement in reducing financing costs in VC 
and LBO transactions. 




To measure enforcement of the law, I apply two main indexes to represent public 
enforcement: A Private Enforcement Index and a Public Enforcement Index (La Porta et al., 
2006) in both the VC and LBO samples. 
 
3.2.2 Informal institutions  
Legal rules cannot respond to market development; they only provide “fundamental tools” for 
addressing social concerns (La Porta et al. 2008). The existing legal index, focusing on 
formal financing activities, provides little information about informal workouts (Gilson et al., 
1990). An acknowledged weakness of studies in this area is that they are almost entirely 
based on cross-sectional data because of the non-availability of comparative time series 
(Armour et al., 2009). There are many ways to address the potential drawbacks of the existing 
legal index. For example, Armour et al. (2009) added critical issues to the process of 
gathering and aggregating legal data. This study examines informal institutions in the form of 
PE industry norms and considers them additional factors. Informal institutional factors 
regarding the social network or reputational bonding are available but have not been applied 
in this field of study. Although most of these indexes can be challenged as “Formalism” 
(Djankov et al., 2003, 2008, 2010) or lacking a conceptual background22, they have still been 
widely used in and help to enlighten the empirical findings. 
 
3.2.2.1 Economic norm 
Normality analysis involves hermeneutic, or interpretative, judgements; thus it is inevitable 
that opinions may differ over particular provisions (Amour et al., 2009). To address this 
issue, I examine the handbook of best practice from the PE associations of both the US and 
                                                            
22 The Formalism index for each examined topic is just the weighted sum of its sub-index.  




the UK and use the extensive dataset that covers 38,293 PE funding cases to provide 
behavioural explanations for the selected factors. 
 
Table 3.3 A Summary of Target and Acquirer Country of PE Financing to August 2015 
Target country Acquirer country 
Country Number of Deal Per cent Cum. Code Number of Deal Per cent Cum. 
Total 39,731 100.00  Total 51,573 100  
US 5,551 13.97 13.97% US 11,966 23.2 23.20% 
FR 5,447 13.71 27.68% FR 7,888 15.29 38.49% 
GB 4,736 11.92 39.60% GB 5,994 11.62 50.11% 
ES 2,322 5.84 45.44% CN 2,544 4.93 55.04% 
CN 2,029 5.11 50.55% ES 2,414 4.68 59.72% 
Note: The first column represents country names in the ISO Alpha-2 code. 
Source: Zephyr. 
 
Table 3.3 shows that over 40% of PE deals took place in or were initiated from the US, 
France and the UK. These latest numbers support statements in other studies that note that the 
practices of the PE industry were invented, tested and found appropriate in the US and then 
exported to other parts of the world such as the EU and Asia (Manigart et al., 2009; Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001). Table 3.4 shows that the top 10 PE players (measured by deal numbers) 
made 602 transactions of 1,555 recorded deals, with an HHI index of 38.71%.  
 
Table 3.4 The Market Share of the Top 10 PE Firms to August 2015 
Acquirers Obs Mean Sum Market share 
Industry Total  1555* 146,652.21 228,044,189.21 In deal In value 
3i Group PLC 122 45,839.83 5,592,459.48 7.85% 2.45% 
Industrifonden AB 86 5,217.22 448,680.83 5.53% 0.20% 
Business Growth Fund PLC 66 7,006.00 462,396.00 4.24% 0.20% 
Accel Management Company LLC 54 29,414.19 1,588,366.31 3.47% 0.70% 
Carlyle Group P 50 139,236.54 6,961,826.94 3.22% 3.05% 
Gimv NV 49 18,047.35 884,320.23 3.15% 0.39% 
Auriga Partners 46 8,808.26 405,179.77 2.96% 0.18% 
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers 44 40,415.06 1,778,262.45 2.83% 0.78% 
European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development 
43 26,602.26 1,143,897.31 2.77% 0.50% 
Turenne Capital Partenaires SA 42 2,120.50 89,061.00 2.70% 0.04% 
Note: * Deal number is the summary of the number of deals with valid valuation information. 
Source: Zephyr. 
 




This study argues that the business practices of PE firms from the US and the UK represent 
most, if not all, the industry norms. Therefore, borrowing from previous studies that covered 
PE norms from the US and the UK, the proposed informal institutions in this study are as 
follows:  
 
1. Shareholder primacy norm 
VCs are presumably in charge of improving the corporate governance of target firms. 
However, the “dual-class”, “multiple-shareholders” nature of VC-backed firms gives birth to 
principal-agency problems. There is a combination of managerial tools that VCs use to 
minimise agency risk. The most widely used tools are financing contracts and provisions. In 
addition to formal contracts, the level of VCs’ commitment also contributes to minimising 
agency problems thus maximising the shareholders’ interests. One widely recognised method 
for testing whether VCs are working in the shareholders’ interests is recording how much 
time they devote to the sponsored firms through a survey (Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012). 
The VC managers’ time is a valuable commodity that is invested only as necessary to add 
economic value (Gifford, 1997). Time spent with investees is considered as a cognitive 
institution on the status of the entrepreneur. The higher the status of the entrepreneur, the 
more the VC managers desire to be associated with the entrepreneur. Conversely, VC 
managers in low-status countries would expect not to value spending time with the 
entrepreneur. Studies suggest that VC managers’ time spent with the CEOs of portfolio 
companies will, in turn, contribute to the VC firm’s financial performance, given that the 
performance is maximised by the efficient use of the VC manager’s time (Bruton et al., 2005; 
Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012).  
 




Different from existing studies that examine the correlation between time and the subsequent 
productivity of VC-backed firms, I examine how the time VCs devote to target firms 
contributes to financing cost. Based on available data, this study uses analyst coverage as a 
proxy for “time” that VC managers invest in each transaction to explore the shareholder 
primacy norm. Borrowing an idea from studies on cross-country equity financing (Burns et 
al., 2007; Chang et al., 2013), I use a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction 
information is released through analyst submission and media scrutiny and zero otherwise. 
 
Because LBO managers cannot be regarded as principals, few studies have addressed the 
shareholders’ primacy norm in LBO deals. However, as discussed in Chapter two, as a 
general principle, LBO managers make important decisions. One important decision is 
optimising investees’ capital structure using leverage. This study anticipates that the issuance 
of innovative debt securities is more demanding for LBO-backed cases. Innovative debt 
securities mainly take the form of structured debts (see Figure 3.1) with PE managers 
purchasing the unsecured debts. I compute the total number of unsecured debts using the 
number of senior subordinate, junior subordinate, and subordinate securities23. I also calculate 
the total number of structured securities by summing the total issuance of convertible debts, 
preferred stocks, CDS and ABS in each LBO transaction. I assume more issuing of structured 
securities represents more time that PE managers have devoted to each financing transaction. 
Thus the following relationship is hypothesised: 
                                                            
23 According to Basel III, we define a senior unsecured tranche as “secured” because all senior claims enjoy a 
claimant priority as high as that of bank loans (see Figure 3.3). 





Figure 3.3 The Tranches of Typically Structured Debt Securities 
 
H4a: In LBO financing, there is a negative correlation between the innovative financing tools 
and the weighted average yield and intermediary fees. 
H4b: In VC financing, there is a negative correlation between analyst coverage and 
financing cost (reciprocal of enterprise multiple) and intermediary fees. 
 
2. Social ties  
The network approach argues that PE managers have a central network position between 
otherwise unconnected actors (e.g., investors, entrepreneurs) in the capital market (Blyler and 
Coff, 2003; Judge et al., 2011). The State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI, 2014) in 
its best practice handbook also emphasises the importance to “establish professional 
management and professional networks”. Social ties translate into increased power in two 
main ways: they grant stakeholders access to strategic information (Burt, 2009); and they are 
based more on personal relationships than formal authority. In principle, the value of the PE 
professional lies in market knowledge and contacts with a broad range of potentially 
interested buyers and sellers, thereby decreasing the search cost as well as the wait time for 
the investors (Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012). PE professionals may also better facilitate 
PE financing by enforcing contracts or sanction violators (Perkins, 2000). In LBO financing, 




it is plausible that PE sponsors are uniquely positioned to arbitrage debt markets versus 
equity markets because of superior access to debt financing (Ivashina and Kovner, 2011). VC 
professionals are like what Blyler and Coff (2003) defined as “rainmakers” and “social 
capital-rich individuals”. Based on the social network approach, the following relationship is 
hypothesised:  
 
H5a: LBO managers with larger social networks offer a lower weighted average yield but 
charge higher intermediary fees. 
 
PE firms’ social ties, at the organisational level, are likely to be embedded in multiple 
dimensions of a firm’s organisational structure. It is reasonable to expect PE managers with 
larger professional groups, larger asset size, and social capital-rich founders/owners have 
better social connections to potential sellers and buyers. Since I obtain the study samples 
from two different databases, I measure the social ties of PE managers in LBOs and VCs 
differently. The social ties of LBO managers are measured by the number of registered 
professionals and the number of prior and current investments in CapitalIQ. The social ties of 
VC managers are defined by the business type of the ultimate owner of the VC managers. I 
use a dummy variable to capture three distinct types of VC firms: financial-institutions-
backed, government-affiliated, and individual VCs. 
 
Our categorisation of VCs’ social ties is taken from Heughebaert and Manigart’s (2012) 
study. They observe that VCs’ norms are from four distinct groups: independent VC firms, 
bank VC firms, captive VC firms, and government VC firms. The authors find that bank VC 
firms seek to establish lending activities and invest in larger investment rounds. Captive VC 




and independent VC firms pick up investees from a different pool, the former are more 
competitive bidders than the latter. 
 
A competitive bidder in VC deals usually offers higher enterprise multiples (lower financing 
cost from the target firm’s perspective), and I expect social ties with a bank or bank 
equivalent institutions (financial institutions) helps to reduce VC financing costs. The 
relationship is hypothesised as:  
 
H5b: VC managers’ affiliation with financial institutions offers a higher VC enterprise 
multiple and charges lower intermediary fees. 
 
3. Age  
PE managers are repetitive players in the capital market where reputation enhances 
economies of information production and mitigates the risk of opportunistic behaviour by 
either party. This generates a high-level reliability in favourable terms of credit (Stromberg et 
al., 2011), total capital in LBOs (Barry et al., 1990), and a buyout alpha benchmarked to a 
market index (e.g., MSCI, Russell 2000/3000, S&P 500) (Harris et al., 2014) of identical risk.  
 
Institutional studies suggest two types of financing efficiency can be determined by the age of 
a financial intermediary. The first is maximising the deal value because the PE manager who 
has worked longer in the industry has more experience in monitoring the executives of an 
investee company (Blyler and Coff, 2003). The second is the possible service cost resulting 
from the “reputation capital” (Krishnan, 2011) or “name recognition” (Gompers, 1995) or 
“bargaining power” of PE managers (Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012). Thus, I expect PEs 
with seniority could offer better financing conditions but charge higher intermediary fees for 




the potential rewards they bring to the invested companies. I define the age of PE firms as 
their business years at the completion date of the deal. The following relationships are 
hypothesised:  
 
H6a: Older PEs help reduce the LBO weighted offering yield but charge higher intermediary 
fees.  
H6b: Older PEs help reduce the VC financing cost (reciprocal of enterprise multiple) but 
charge higher intermediary fees  
 
Finally, to test the core hypothesis of this study, I weigh the contribution of informal 
institutions against that of formal institutions. Informal institutions matter because the causal 
sequence in the rise of political and economic institutions both in the West and some 
representative Eastern countries (e.g., China) show that the norm often precedes laws and that 
only after a private enterprise economy is well established did the state begin to enact formal 
rules (Nee and Opper, 2012). Globally, the inception of securities markets does not usually 
precede or is even accompanied by formal state-mandated rules24 (Nee and Opper, 2012). In a 
sector where legal coverage is scarce and is still evolving, norms determine the majority, if 
not all, interactions of PE managers in the business environment. Even outside the PE circle, 
the broad scope of the financing sector is ruled, to a certain extent, by norms. Armour et al. 
(2009) suggest that there are self-regulatory codes and other norms with a status that makes 
them the functional equivalent of “hard” laws.  
 
                                                            
24 Company stocks were traded informally and transactions were treated as gentlemen’s agreements, often 
conducted in local coffee houses or open market places (Nee and Opper, 2012). 




In a PE market where the legal system is inferior or unreliable, I suggest economic activities 
are facilitated by some informal norm beyond the shadow of the law. Thus, with the 
following hypothesis, I explore whether informal norms at the professional level outweigh 
official norms at the country level:  
 
H7: Informal norms play a more important role in reducing the financing cost in both LBO 
and VC transactions. 
 
3.2.2.2 Statistical economic norms 
Table 3.5 summarises existing studies related to economy norms that shape the behaviour of 
market participants. The literature in economic norms obtains observations supported by the 
research network of PE professionals. Advisors or academics who collect primary data on PE 
professionals usually have no incentive to reveal this information to the public. One 
advantage of the survey method is based on the straightforward idea that it is a direct way to 
uncover a person’s behaviour. Such studies have presented a clear picture of local PE 
practices (Bruton et al., 2005; Manigart et al., 2009) that are intuitive and likely to be further 
examined in other market conditions when possible. In a cross-country laboratory study, it is 
not feasible to collect reliable primary data through a survey without any support of 
professional associations. Thanks to the work of a commercial database (Capital IQ) and the 
World Economic Forum, examination of economic norms has been increasing since 1999 
(Gurung and Lerner, 2010).  




Table 3.5 Proxies of Economy Norms in PE financing 
Contractual structure 
(Bruton et al., 2005; 









(Cumming and Johan, 
2009) 
Corporate board seats Common equity IPO 
Formative stage: angel 
investing, seed-stage, 
early stage 
Non-compete clause Preferred equity MBO Later-stage 
Preferred dividends and 
liquidation preference 
Convertible debt Secondary market Mezzanine-stage 
Reserved matters - Liquidation - 
Earn-outs - - - 
 
Table 3.6 summarise the hypotheses of this study. The research design with the empirical 
model and variable construction will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 3.6 A Summary of the Study’s Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
H1a LBO financing enjoys a lower weighted average yield and intermediary fees in countries with 
higher creditor rights standards. 
H1b VC financing enjoys lower enterprise multiple and intermediary fees in countries with higher 
shareholder rights standards. 
H2a Law enforcement reduces the LBO weighted average yield and intermediary fees. 
H2b Law enforcement reduces VC financing costs (reciprocal of enterprise multiple) and 
intermediary fees. 
H3 Public enforcement dominates private enforcement in reducing financing costs in VC-backed 
transactions. 
H4a In LBO financing, there is a negative correlation between innovative financing tools and 
weighted average yield and intermediary fees. 
H4b In VC financing, there is a negative correlation between analyst coverage and financing cost 
(reciprocal of enterprise multiple) and intermediary fees. 
H5a LBO managers with larger social network offer lower weighted average yield but charge higher 
intermediary fees. 
H5b VC managers’ affiliations with financial institutions offer a higher VC enterprise multiple and 
charge lower intermediary fees. 
H6a Older PEs help reduce the LBO financing (weighted average yield) but charge higher 
intermediary fees. 
H6b Older PEs help reduce the VC financing cost (reciprocal of enterprise multiple) but charge higher 
intermediary fees. 
H7 Informal norm plays a more important role in reducing financing cost in both LBO and VC 
transactions. 




3.3. Research Design and Empirical Testing 
Studies regarding institutions (e.g., legal) and their determinants in varying financing 
behaviours generally apply the mean-test (Cumming and Walz, 2010; Djankov et al., 2007; 
La Porta et al., 1998). Mean-test is ideal for a dataset whose explanatory variables are 
grouping dummies. Unlike previous studies, this study applies a legal index as an explanatory 
variable of formal institutional and original observations of PEs’ years of business and a 
social network as informal institution variables. With such a panel dataset, I can conduct an 
ordinary least-squares linear regression. Unlike the mean test, which provides only a group 
comparison, the estimated coefficient from linear regression tells exactly how much 
institutional environment contributes to financing cost regarding the enterprise multiple and 
weighted average yields. 
 
Previous studies show concern about the endogeneity issue because PE-enterprise pairs are 
unlikely to be random samples. For example, the independent variable of transaction volume 
and number of buyers may be related to the experience of the PE managers and the number of 
legal and financial advisors. In the VC sample, a large advisory group and more experienced 
VC managers are more likely to have access to larger target companies and potential buyers. 
Thus, I use the 2-stage least-squares regression with the instrumental variables (IV) technique 
(Granger, 1969) to address the endogeneity issue.  
 
3.3.1 Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
3.3.1.1 Statistical model  
In the 2SLS model, I regress the comprehensive observations of financing cost detected from 
both LBO and VC financing against the target formal and informal institutions as follows: 
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where: 





Im _ _plicit Financing Costs : includes the number of financial and legal advisors (ADVISORS) 
involved in each LBO or VC transaction; 
'
, _i Creditor Rightsz : the creditor rights index (CREDITOR); 
'
, _i Shareholder Rightsz : the shareholder rights index (SHAREHOLDER); 
'
,i Law Enforcementz − : the law enforcement index (PUBL_ENFORCE, PRIV_ENFORCE); 
'
,i Debt Enforcementz − : the debt enforcement index (FORECLOSURE, LIQUIDATION, 
REORGANISATION); 





,i Informal Institutionz − : includes the number of unsecured debt securities (dummy variable of analyst 
coverage, ANA_COV) in the LBO (VC) transaction; the number of registered 
professionals (PROFESSIONAL) and total investment/subsidiaries (dummy variables 
of financial institution affiliation, SUBSIDIARIES) of LBO (VC) managers; business 
type of parent companies of VCs (BANK, GOVT_EDU and INDIVIDUAL) and 
business years (AGE) of the LBO (VC) managers; 
'
,i Marketz : includes the credit (equity) market benchmark yield (MARKET) of the sample month 
when LBO (VC) transaction is completed; 
'
,i Companyz : is the transaction size of the LBO deal and target company size of VC deal; and 
i  : is the random error term. 
 
The principle I applied to choose the IVs is that they should be exogenous and unlikely to be 
correlated with the error term but at the same time correlated with legal rules or economic 
outcomes. A number of the deal- and market-level variables can be applied as instrumental 
variables (IVs) to probe the endogenous concern. This study considers the financial market 
development index from The Global Competitive Report (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2010; 
2015) and Hofstede Culture Dimensions (Hofstede, 2015) as IVs. Using the former, I obtain 
eight indices from “Financial Market Development”: Availability of Financial Services, 
Affordability of Financial Services, Venture Capital Availability, Soundness of Banks, Legal 
Rights Index, Ease of Access to Loans, Financial through Local Market, and Regulation of 
Securities Exchanges. Using the latter, I obtain six indexes: Power Distance Index, 
Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index, and Long-Term Orientation versus Short-Term Normative Orientation Indulgence 
versus Restraint.  




The Hofstede Culture Dimensions are more related to takeovers and buyouts (Cao et al., 
2015) and have been employed by Stromberg et al. (2011) and Kortum and Lerner (2001) in 
VC studies. Holding other factors constant, financing market size and depth (often in 
response to more LP participants such as pension funds and the successes of earlier 
transactions) leads to an acceleration of deal volume, greater use of leverage and higher 
valuations (see discussion in section 2.1.2). They contribute to the growth of the PE industry 
and are driven by broader socio-economic considerations, not by the PE industry itself. 
Further, La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that the legal variables applying at a macro-level serve 
as instrumental variables in cross-national regressions that can help explain the direction of 
causality in cross-national regressions that exhibit a correlation between legal rules and 
economic outcomes. Furthermore, indexes, such as PDI and VC availability, are closely 
related to the legal and professional normalities I am interested in testing, but they are 
unlikely to be correlated with the error term.  
 
In this study, the transaction volume and number of employees of target firms as a function of 
instrument variables serve as exogenous regressors in both the VC and LBO subsamples. In 
VC subsample, I also consider the operating revenue of the target firm. I will run the 
Hausman F-test to justify that the regressor is instrumented and is treated as exogenous. 
Sanderson-Wanderlei (SW) F statistics will be examined to address the concern of 
underidentification. Considering that I use a group of more than one IVs, the Sargan test is 
also necessarily conducted to address the overidentification concern. Lastly, I will conduct 
other tests to justify my regression is robust to the weak-instruments problems.  
 
Different from firm-level IVs such as transaction volume and number of buyers, country-
level IVs are indexes thus they are inevitably subject to the collinearity problem. As in the 




cross-border LBO study by Cao et al. (2015), I choose the same series of indexes of VC 
availability and that of financial market sophistication from the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) Financial Market Report (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2010; 2015) and the Power 
Distance Index (PDI) from Hofstede Cultural Dimensions (Hofstede, 2015). The other 
indexes will be dropped because of collinearity. The results of the relevant tests of IVs using 
first-stage regression are given in Chapter five. 
 
As my dataset is a cross-section, the cross-country character, the error terms are likely to 
suffer from heteroskedastic problems. As a result, the heteroskedastic-robust option will be 
chosen while running the above equations.  
 
Based on the extensive discussion in section 2.2 and the results from studies by La Porta et al. 
(2006) and Djankov et al. (2007), Table 3.6 provides the expected signs of the independent 
variables.  




Table 3.7 The Expected Signs of the Coefficients of the Examined Variables 
Institutions 










Credit right  - -   
Shareholder Rights 
Control limit n/a n/a - - 
Voting rights n/a n/a - - 
Class action n/a n/a - - 
Bylaws n/a n/a - - 
Law/Debt Enforcement 
Foreclosure n/a n/a - - 
Liquidation n/a n/a - - 
Reorganisation n/a n/a - - 
Public enforcement n/a n/a - - 
Private enforcement n/a n/a - - 
Informal Institutions 
Innovative financing - + n/a n/a 
Analyst coverage n/a n/a - + 
Social ties - + - + 
Age - + - + 
 
3.3.1.2 The Z-test 
I expect that the informal institution dominates the formal institution in both the LBO and VC 
markets and, within all the formal institutional factors, that private enforcement dominates 
public enforcement. Following the Lee et al. (2014) test, I test H3 and H7 by manually 
calculating the z-stats combination coefficients from Equations 3.3 and 3.4. The z-stat is 
given as follows:  
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Equations 3.3a  and 3.3b are used to test H1a, H2a, H4a, H5a and H6a and Equations 3.4a 
and 3.4b are used to test H1b, H2b, H4b, H5b and H6b. Equations 3.5a and 3.5b are used to 
test H3 and Equations 3.6a and 3.6b are used to test H7. The relationship between the 
statistical models and the corresponding hypothesis are given in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The Equations and the Relevant Examined Hypotheses 
 
3.3.2 Dependent variables  
The dependent variables in this study are:  
1. Explicit financing costs: the LBO weighted offering yield and the reciprocal of enterprise 
multiple in the VC transaction.  
2. Implicit financing costs: the number of financial and legal advisors involved in each LBO 
or VC transaction. 




3.3.3 Independent variables  
3.3.3.1 Formal institution 
The formal institution examined in this study includes creditor rights (CREDITOR) (Djankov 
et al., 2007) and the shareholder rights index (SHAREHOLDER) (see Table 4.8). The two 
indexes are based on a scoring system in 2006 and 2013, respectively. Regarding the 
deadline, many transactions are completed and there is a “look-back” bias that cannot be 
avoided for the following reasons. First, a reliable research-quality index is very scarce. 
Djankov et al.’s (2007) work on creditors’ rights has been cited over 2,300 times at the time 
of writing; the survey of CFAI is conducted through a professional association, which means 
its comprehensiveness and reliability are guaranteed. Second, there is no alternative proxy 
more suitable than a scoring system for cross-country, cross-sectional research. Third, the 
index for the institutional environment is less likely to be subject to time regime difference 
than other indexes such as GDP per capita, saving rate, and market size. The two most 
recognisable indexes suggested by La Porta et al. (1998) exhibit little ranking differences 
even after being amended by Djankov et al. (2007) and Spemann (2010). They have been 
recognised as remarkably stable over time (Miller and Reisel, 2011). 
 
3.3.3.2. Informal institution 
I use the following observations to capture professional norms at the PE-level: innovative 
financing activities in LBO transactions (shareholder primary norm); analyst coverage in VC 
transactions (shareholder primary norm); total registered professionals, total 
investment/subsidiaries, asset size and affiliations (social ties); and age. Considering that 
some PE financing providers are individual investors (shareholders, friends or relatives as 
angel investors of invested companies), they do not ideally represent business norms as 




financing professionals. Hence, I leave the informal institutional observations of this sub-
sample as missing values. 
 
3.3.4 Control variables  
It is widely accepted that legal and other institutions governing financing are endogenous to a 
number of general factors, such as the credit cycle (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009); broader 
economic conditions; overall financial market performance, including equities; brokers-
dealers' willingness to provide sufficient capital for market making; and general market 
supply and demand (Axelson et al, 2013; Black and Gilson, 1998; Cumming, 2008). In 
examining the efficiency of PE financing, the following factors will be controlled: 
 
Firm-level characteristics. I use the transaction value of an LBO deal as a proxy for 
transaction size. For VC transactions, I use the target firms’ number of employees from 
Zephyr as a measure of the target firm’s size. I also control the percentage of the acquired 
stake of the target company (Beuselinck et al., 2008).  
 
Financial market characteristics. Borrowing from the approach of Sorensen and Jagannathan 
(2015), I consider the return and cost of the public market as control variables. Because VC 
and LBO transactions are equity and credit financing, respectively, I consider two different 
market–level financing costs: 
1. For debt financing tools in LBO transactions, the benchmark interest rate is generally 
the Treasury bond yield in the sampled country at the time the transaction took place. 
An ideal benchmark interest rate is the appropriate Treasury bond with a similar 
maturity schedule of the sample transaction. Given the diverse duration of LBO 
securities, I do not differentiate the term of each LBO financing but use a 10-year 




treasury bond as a benchmark proxy. The benchmark interest is obtained by averaging 
the monthly average yield of local 10-year treasury bonds in the specific month that 
each transaction takes place.  
2. The firms in my sample of VC transactions are unlisted firms. Thus a comparable 
enterprise multiple is not available. I use the return of the dominating stock market 
index of each sample country as a proxy for the enterprise multiple. The cross-
sectional market return is the reverse of local P/E multiplier and is obtained by 
calculating the average monthly market return in the specific month that each 
transaction takes place.  
 
3.3.5 Robustness tests 
The sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications will be rigorously considered. 
Several robustness tests will be performed. First, I will test for the weakness of the results on 
targeted formal and informal institutions’ characteristics by varying the sub-index in different 
combinations. Second, I will substitute the dependent variable with alternative measurements 








in the VC sample). 
Third, I test formal and informal institution characteristics in different subsamples such as 
transaction status (complete, cancelled, or withdrawn). Finally, I test whether there are 
omitted variables that may explain the financing efficiency. In this step, an index system from 
the WEF global competitive report is applied.  
 
This chapter sets the stage for the empirical evaluation of the economic efficiency of PE 
financing in both targeted formal and informal institutions. Each of the preceding models, 
generated from a literature review, is subjected to empirical validation in Chapter four.




Chapter 4                 CHAPTER FOUR 
Data Specification  
 
This chapter discusses the dataset covering two dominant types of PE-backed financing, VCs 
and LBOs. Section 4.1 describes the screen criteria of the study’s sample data. Section 4.2 
presents the macro-level financing indicators of the sample countries and firm-level operating 
characteristics of the PE-backed firms. Section 4.3 presents the cross-country comparison of 
the institutional environment that presumably shapes the activities of all involved parties. 
Section 4.4 discusses the specification of both the explicit and implicit costs of PE-backed 
financing. 
 
4.1. Sample Selection of PE-Backed Financing Transactions 
For this study, I obtained the LBO transaction data from CapitalIQ, which has been used in 
many pioneer LBO studies by the World Economic Forum and National Bureau of Economic 
Research. CapitalIQ records eight categories of private placement transactions, among which 
I chose the “merger and acquisition” subset and selected all transactions financed by a 
“leveraged buyout”. As the focus of this study is on buyouts financed with anywhere from 60 
to 90 percent debt, I do not consider other buyout transactions such as a “management buyout” 
or “joint venture/leveraged buyout” because they do not face the same level of the investment 
horizon. For financing cost, I include LBO deals with detailed information, such as offering 
yield, benchmark yield spread, and seniorities. CapitalIQ grants each deal one unique 
transaction identity number (ID). Within each LBO deal, there are usually more than one debt 
issuances and each of them is labelled with a unique security ID. The security ID combined 




with the transaction ID enables me to assemble a unique record for one debt issuance in one 
LBO transaction. That is 2,152 debt issuances from 486 LBO transactions. The screen criteria 
of my LBO sample data are attached in the Appendix. Of the 486 recorded deals, 60 were 
cancelled. Of the total, 342 deals had closed, 81 remain active, and three had just been 
announced without further information. The average amount of debt issuance, for those with 
available observations, is €859.71million Such debt securities account for the debt part of 
economic value (EV) paid to target firms. My sample size is significantly smaller than 
previous studies by Gurung and Lerner (2008), which covered 21,397 transactions from 1970 
to 2007, and by Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) with 17,171 PE-sponsored LBOs. The 
difference in the sample size is because of the distinct focus of this study. I do not consider a 
substantial number of transactions that lack observations of benchmark yield spread, offering 
yield, and seniority levels of the debt securities. 
 
The data on VC-backed financing transactions were obtained from Zephyr. The Zephyr data 
set is sourced exclusively from the LPs, which includes the transactions and valuation history 
between LPs and investors. Zephyr provides extensive records of merger and acquisition 
transactions around the world since 1997. Among such transactions, those supported by VC 
and PE funds have been used by a few of studies (Bottazzi et al., 2004; Heughebaert and 
Manigart, 2012; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). In this study, I consider deals at the start-up 
stage whose buy-side is financed via a VC or PE. As for generic VC financing, there are 
several specific financing tags to specify the source of VC funding. They are “angel 
investment”, “corporate venturing”, “crowdfunding”, or “development capital”. These types 
of financing have the same high risk with potentially high returns as VC investments and 
often invest alongside VC firms in financing rounds. Among them, angel investment includes 
“individual business angel”, “business angel syndicate”, “business angel fund”, “co-




investment fund” and “seed fund”. The “corporate venturing” category denotes non-VC/PE 
companies joining a financing round with other acquiring companies that may be VC/PE 
companies. In crowdfunding, a deal receives equity funding via a crowdfunding platform and 
is used in conjunction with development capital and cash. Like Axelson et al.’s (2013) study, 
I delete outliers such as negative enterprise multiples and those with large extreme 
observations such as those whose enterprise multiples are greater than 100,00025. The above 
screening yields 2,595 VC financing deals with 2,551 firms. I winsorised the top 1 percent of 
deal value as well as the enterprise multiple to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
 
Column 1, Tables 4.1 and 4.3 summarises the time period and industry distribution of my 
LBO and VC samples, respectively. Panel C, Table 4.3, presents the sample size grouped by 
investment stage of the VC-backed firms. The transaction size of target firms is much smaller 
in earlier-stage investment. The data also show that VC managers acquire a smaller 
proportion of target shares in earlier financing rounds (16.99% versus 20.70% in later rounds). 
 
Before defining the timeline of the control and dependent variables, it is essential to clarify 
the completion date of each transaction. The completion date of each LBO transaction is 
unambiguous. However, for VC transactions in Zephyr, there is a string of important dates 
for a single deal: dates of the announcement, rumours, completion or expected completion 
date. In this study, I define the completion date of each deal as the date when the deal has 
been announced as completed or, in certain circumstances, has received approval to go ahead.  
                                                            
25 A transaction with a negative enterprise level took place in Hungry on 24 August 2011. The target company’s 
name is Hajdu-bet Baromfitermelo es Ertekesito rt. The acquirer was Wallis Befektetesi Gazdasagi Tanacsado 
es Vagyonkezelo rt. One transaction with over a 546,448 times EV/EBITDA multiplier was the acquiring of a 
15% minority stake of Moby Invest, an Italian ferry service holding company, by Equinox, a Luxembourg PE 
manager on 28/02/02. (Zephyr). 




Table 4.1 The Details of the LBO Transaction Sample 









Foreclosure Liquidity Reorganisation 
1976-1980 4 654.70 0 0 1 
1981-1985 36 977.43 0 0 10 
1986-1990 189 988.69 2 0 47 
1991-1995 203 925.84 0 1 55 
1996-2000 319 711.02 0 1 86 
2001-2005 343 896.04 4 3 81 
2006-2010 419 1,131.15 3 3 95 
After 2011 580 696.20 1 0 41 
Total 
(excluding missing values) 
2,093 859.71** 10 8 416 
Panel B: Business sector distribution of LBO transactions  
























Consumer Discretionary  505 1,021.36 6.07 215.27 299.28 9.43 
Consumer Staples  72 1,067.72 5.64 222.37 240.69 9.13 
Energy  98 1,225.63 6.50 249.01 342.77 8.44 
Financials  137 689.32 6.42 161.90 200.67 7.85 
Healthcare  152 823.41 5.64 172.88 291.33 7.10 
Industrials  295 713.49 5.71 152.77 299.05 9.26 
Information Technology  151 1,151.26 5.77 242.05 280.39 7.95 
Materials  132 729.12 5.93 168.43 347.24 9.85 
Telecommunication Services  39 1,453.24 6.08 329.51 226.80 9.33 
Utilities  60 782.06 6.40 165.05 252.98 8.60 
Total  
(excluding missing values) 
1,641 924.15 5.98 197.55 290.30  8.85 
Note: * The categorisation of business sectors of the LBO sub-sample are the 10 primary business sectors of 
CapitalIQ.  
**The average transaction values of the entire sample 
Source: CapitalIQ.  
 
4.2. Market Conditions and Firm-Level Operating Characteristics 
As discussed in Chapter three, I do not consider nation-wide macroeconomic data such as 
GDP per capita and market capitalisation. Instead, I use market- and firm-level variables as 
control variables. In the LBO subsample, I use the benchmark spread as a proxy for LBO 
firm-level characteristics since it already captures the issuers’ financial/operating 
characteristics as well as the overall credit conditions and liquidity premium. Table 4.2 




presents brief statistics on the transaction volume and price indicators of the LBO deals. The 
data show the transaction volume of my LBO sample averaged $2,884.77 million and the 
total target enterprise value equalled $1,076,019.89 million. The price indicator of 
EV/EBITDA is 10.52 times. This is slightly higher than the sample in the study by Axelson et 
al. (2013) (average 8.8 EV/EBITDA multiple) but is close to the sample in the study by 
Gurung and Lerner (2008) (10.5 times EV/EBITDA multiple). These comparisons show that 
the leverage level of my sample target firms does not differ significantly from previous 
studies although my sample is much smaller.  
 
Table 4.2 The Financial Characteristics of the LBO-Backed Firms 
Valuation Summary  Number of Deals by Transaction Ranges  
Total Deal Value($m) *: 1,076,019.89 > $1 billion 161 
Average Deal Value: 2,884.77 $500 - $999.9mm 52 
Average TEV/Revenue: 2.52 $100 - $499.9mm 127 
Average TEV/EBITDA: 10.52 < $100mm 33 
Average Day Prior Premium (%): 18.18 Undisclosed 113 
Note: *According to the original data from CapitalIQ, the currency unit of each offering amount of debt is in 
millions of euro (see Table 4.1); the data summary is in millions of US dollars. 
Source: CapitalIQ 
 
Panels A and B, Table 4.3, present the sample details of my VC-backed companies. Because 
I obtained the VC sample deals from a different database, the currency unit of this sub-
sample is different from that of the LBOs. A brief view of the numbers in Table 4.3 shows 
that the sample transactions from Socialist countries comprise a significant proportion of the 
overall sample (567 deals), followed by the English- and French-origin groups. The time 
regime distribution of transaction records in Panel A, Table 4.3, shows a geographical shift of 
VC capital after 2011. After 2011, more VC funds have been searching for investment 
opportunities in Socialist countries from English and French legal origins. Among the 
socialist family, Chinese companies are the most favoured targets; there were 477 VC 




financings that took place in China in the past five years (not reported here, but available 
upon request). The German group sample is small (49 with available records). When 
measured in paid-in capital, the transaction size in the German group (€50,444.01million) is 
over four times those of the Scandinavian (€7,335.28million) and English groups 
(€12,147.93million) and over double the French group (€22,534.74million) (not reported here 
but available upon request). In Table 4.4, I present the financial/operating characteristics of 
VC-targeted firms. The summary shows that the average total assets of the target firms are 
around €43million and the number of employee averages 260. The number in column 2, 
Table 4.4, shows that 2,172 of the 2,595 deals in my sample are smaller than €100,000. 




Table 4.3 The Details of the VC Transaction Sample 




Number of Transactions across legal origin 
English French German Scandinavian Socialist 
1997-2000 33,896.54 49 15  3  
2001-2005 20,534.34 35 144 4 13 9 
2006-2010 21,711.85 89 164 13 15 60 
After2011 33,195.37 299 157 32 51 567 
Panel B: Business sectors distribution of VC transactions 
Business Sectors * 









Banks 29,075.04 13 16.85 13 1.46 13 
Chemicals, Rubber 10,605.51 160 17.32 160 3.33 160 
Construction 24,127.59 43 25.67 43 2.14 43 
Education, Health 16,879.68 26 28.77 26 1.68 25 
Food, Beverages, 7,202.15 115 19.93 115 1.47 111 
Gas, Water, Elect 24,698.47 45 24.23 45 2.13 45 
Hotels and Restaurant 4,503.23 44 24.31 44 1.14 43 
Insurance Companies 19,568.99 22 22.06 22 1.77 22 
Machinery, Equipment  8,291.30 478 18.45 478 2.95 473 
Metals and Metal Product 10,449.85 62 17.43 62 2.51 61 
Other Services 7,585.70 1,039 19.23 1,039 2.03 1,029 
Post and Telecomm 35,725.74 33 31.84 33 2.03 33 
Primary Sector  15,729.88 31 24.03 31 3.94 31 
Public Administration 71,541.01 1 20.00 1 1.00 1 
Publishing, Print 3,704.54 145 17.70 145 1.99 143 
Textiles, Wearing 11,413.45 55 20.89 55 1.72 54 
Transport 28,527.47 35 33.76 35 2.14 35 
Wholesale and Retail 10,608.90 161 21.71 161 1.69 158 
Wood, Cork, Paper 16,784.09 15 20.32 15 4.60 15 
Total Average  
(excluding missing value) 
9,700.16 2,523 19.89 2,523 2.26 2,495 
Panel C: Investment stage of VC transactions 
Early Stage 5,054.04 396 16.99 396 2.46 389 
Non-early stage 10,581.16 2,199 20.70 2,199 2.20 2,178 
Total Average  
(excluding missing value) 
9,737.71 2,595 20.14 2,595 2.24 2,567 
Note: * The categorisation of business sectors of VC sub-sample are the 19 primary business sectors of Zephyr. 
Source: Zephyr 




Table 4.4 The Financial Characteristics of the VC-Backed Firms 
Target company’s Size  Number of Deals by Transaction Ranges  
Average Total Assets (1,000 €) 43,256.37 > €500,000 185 
Average Revenue: (1,000 €) 38,746.22 €200,000 - €500,000 238 
Average employee 260.13 €100,000 - €200,000 0 
Average acquired stake (%) 20.14 < €100,000 2,172 
Source: Zephyr  
 
Table 4.5 shows the benchmark interest rate in 17 credit markets from 1976 to 2016. The 
benchmark returns of 37 equity markets from 1996 to 2016 are presented in Table 4.6. I 
divide the sample into five sub-groups of five years. Within each sub-group, the right-hand 
column names the cited bonds index (see Table 4.5) or local equity index (see Table 4.6). 




Table 4.5 Benchmark Interest Rate of the LBO Sampled Countries 
Country 
Code 
Benchmark Lending Rate (%) Number of Deals Benchmark* 
1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015  
AR      5.71   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EG358129 Corp 
AU      5.21   0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 GAGB10YR 
BR       14.49  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 GEBR10Y 
CA    7.66 5.61  3.94  0 0 1 2 3 0 2 0 GCAN10YR 
CH    4.54     0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 GSWISS 
DE    6.91  3.95 3.76  0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 GDBR10YR 
FR      4.15  0.84 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 GFRN10 
GB      4.70 4.45 1.98 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 GUKG10 
IE     5.36 5.25   0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 GIGB10YR 
IT      3.45   0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 GBTPGR10 
JP       1.47  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 GJGB10 
LU    6.50   4.72  0 0 0  0 0 1 0 GBGB10YR 
NL     5.02 4.00 3.86  0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 GTNLG10YR Corp 
NZ      5.78   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 GTNZD10YR 
SE     5.79    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 GSGB10YR 
SG      2.76 3.12  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 MASB10Y 
US 7.86 11.90 8.39 6.88 5.94 4.45 3.85 2.32 1 10 46 52 84 76 90 41 USGG10Y 
Other              1 3 1  
Note: The first column represents country names in the ISO Alpha-2 code. 
*The choice of benchmark is discussed in section 3.3.4. The benchmark interest rates of the US and UK were obtained from Bloomberg. For benchmark interest rates before 
2000 in the sample countries, I obtained the quarterly government lending rate from the IMF. The chosen quarter is the quarter during which the transaction took place. 
Source: Bloomberg, IMF. 




Table 4.6 Benchmark Interest Rates of the VC Sampled Countries 
Country 
Code* 
1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016- 
Index 
Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals 
AU 
 
 -1.64% 8 -2.24% 2 -1.96% 7 
 
0 AS51 Index 
BE 
 
3 1.15% 9 3.01% 6 4.31% 5 
 
0 BEL20 Index 
BR 
 
 3.79% 2 3.71% 4 -2.23% 8 
 
0 IBX Index 
CA 
 
 -0.03% 6 0.26% 47 -0.14% 29 
 
5 SPTSX Index 
CH -9.10%  3.53% 1 -1.54% 6 -1.09% 3 
 
0 SMI Index 
CN 
 
 3.17% 4 0.50% 35 2.62% 80 1.47% 4 SHSZ300 Index 
CZ 
 
 4.11% 1 
 
0 2.02% 2 
 
0 TELEC CK Equity 
DE 4.94%  4.14% 4 1.72% 19 0.18% 12 0.92% 1 DAX Index 
DK 
 






0 DESMCOPE Index 
ES 0.11% 6 -0.28% 21 -0.25% 30 3.75% 15 
 
0 IBEX Index 
FI 
 
 4.89% 4 -0.78% 8 -3.14% 5 
 
0 HEX Index 
FR 3.35% 3 1.67% 21 -0.27% 42 -1.82% 10 -4.55% 3 CAC Index 
GB 1.21% 45 -0.19% 11 0.32% 16 -0.05% 36 0.52% 3 UKX Index 
GR 
 













0 HSI Index 
HU 
 
 -3.53% 1 0.31% 1 -0.29% 1 
 







0 -2.24% 1 
 
0 JCI Index 
IE 2.20% 1 4.48% 2 -10.10% 2 -2.29% 2 
 
0 ISEQ Index 
IL 
 






0 TA-25 Index 
IN -1.47%  4.15% 12 2.20% 36 -0.82% 51 -7.73% 1 NIFTY Index 
IT 
 
2 -0.83% 8 -2.35% 32 2.61% 20 2.82% 2 FTSEMIB Index 
JP 
 
 2.91% 6 0.56% 7 2.32% 5 
 





0 3.60% 8 1.37% 6 
 





0 1.49% 3 5.29% 1 
 







0 -2.24% 1 
 
0 MEXBOL Index 
MY 
 






0 FBMKLCI Index 
NL 
 
 -2.35% 3 0.61% 9 0.75% 8 
 
0 AEX Index 
NO 
 
 4.14% 3 -0.25% 7 6.96% 2 
 





0 0.19% 2 2.05% 5 
 
0 NZSE50FG Index 
PL 
 
 5.68% 2 0.91% 18 -2.75% 9 2.28% 2 WIG20 Index 
PT 
 




0 PSI20 Index 
RU 
 
 -2.50% 1 2.13% 5 0.37% 17 
 
0 INDEXCF Index 






1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016- 
Index 
Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals Market Return # Of Deals 
SE -7.09%  2.41% 19 1.74% 24 -0.12% 21 
 





0 0.68% 5 
 
0 2.30% 1 WISGP Index 
TH 
 











0 -2.24% 3 
 
0 XU100 Index 
TW 
 
 -2.24% 1 
 
0 -2.24% 1 
 
0 TWSE Index 
US 0.54%  -0.64% 11 0.87% 46 -0.12% 103 0.69% 11 SPX Index 
ZA 
 
 -0.32% 1 -0.10% 9 -0.15% 1 
 
0 TOP40 Index 
Note: The returns are calculated at monthly frequency in all sampled markets in the month during which the VC-backed transaction was completed. 
The first column represents country names in the ISO Alpha-2 code.  
Source: Bloomberg. 




4.3. Institutional Condition 
4.3.1 Formal institutions 
4.3.1.1 Creditor rights and debt enforcement 
The cross-country comparison of creditor rights is given in Table 4.7. Column 2, Table 4.7, 
shows that 8 of the 20 sampled countries are from the reorganisation group. Among them, 
transactions from the US account for most of the sample. Applying the cross-country index of 
creditor rights in the LBO study can be challenging because LBO financing is more a US 
phenomenon. Statistics from Gurung and Lerner (2008) show that transactions in Europe and 
Asia consist of a small proportion of the deals (12%) and enterprise value (9%) of global 
LBOs. The geographical cluster of my formal institution observations in the LBO sample 
does not fundamentally influence my final result since I take into account the joint impact of 
both formal and informal institutions. 












Argentina 1 Reorganisation France 
Australia 1 Foreclosure Britain 
Bermuda   Britain 
Brazil 1 Liquidation France 
Canada 1 Reorganisation Britain 
Cayman Islands   Britain 
Channel Islands   Britain 
France 0 Reorganisation France 
Germany 3 Liquidation Germany 
Ireland 1 Reorganisation Britain 
Italy 2 Reorganisation France 
Japan 2 Reorganisation Britain 
Luxembourg    
Netherlands 2 Liquidation France 
New Zealand 3 Foreclosure Britain 
Singapore 4 Foreclosure Britain 
Sweden 2 Liquidation Norway? 
Switzerland 1 Reorganisation France 
United Kingdom 4 Foreclosure British 
United States 1 Reorganisation British 
Note: No studies have covered offshore islands such as The Cayman Islands, Channel Islands or Bermuda. 
Source : La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov (2007).  
 
4.3.1.2 Shareholders rights and law enforcement 
Table 4.8 presents the ranking of shareholder rights and law enforcement across countries. 
All sub-indexes are grouped by legal origin. Columns 1 to 3, Table 4.8, shows the sub-
indexes of the three state-mandated formal laws of ownership limit, proxy voting restrictions 
and class actions. Column 1, Table 4.8, shows that an ownership limit is not applicable in 
most sampled countries. Only a few companies in “sensitive” industries, such as aerospace 
and national defence, are legally bound by the ownership limit. This is true for the US, 
Canada, Brazil, France, the UK, Switzerland and Turkey. In China, the limit is imposed on 
foreign investors as well as institutional investors (a maximum 10 percent). Other countries 
that restrict controlling ownership include Italy, Russia and Spain. Column 2, Table 4.8, 




shows that there are 28 countries with no proxy voting restrictions. However, in Brazil, Japan, 
and Thailand, proxy voting is permitted only under certain conditions. Among the sample 
countries, Italy applies the strictest proxy voting restrictions. According to Italian law, votes 
cannot be “disjointed” from the same beneficial owner and the shares must be deposited 
before the end of the general meeting. Derivative suits and class action lawsuits are not legal 
except for India and the US. 
 
The two bylaw sub-indexes also vary across countries. For voting policy, except for Spain, a 
majority voting policy is applied. Cumulative voting is rarely applied in companies in all 
sampled the countries except Brazil, China, Poland, Russia, Spain and Thailand. In the US, 
only a small minority of companies apply a cumulative voting policy. The aggregated score 
of the voting policy is presented in Column 4, Table 4.8. Column 5 presents the sub-index of 
the oppressed minority mechanism. This mechanism grants minority shareholders certain 
rights to affect a company’s fundamental decisions such as the remuneration policy or a 
dissident resolution. Based on the survey by CFAI (2013), almost all 28 countries are in the 
study sample with the exception of Mexico.  
 
For the other usual practices and trends of ownership concentration and corporate governance 
(proportion of independent board members and independent audit committees), the statistics 
in Columns 6 and 7, Table 4.8, show that Indian companies have the highest proportion of 
controlling shareholders (82.6%); the country with the lowest proportion of shareholders is 
Taiwan (2.10%). The US has the highest percentage of independent board members (82%) 
followed by the UK (79.45%) and India (76%). Japan has the lowest proportion of 
independent board member (8.15%). 












































AU 2 5 3 1 3 72.40 4.00 0.90 0.71 
CA 3 5 4 2.5 3.5 79.45 21.20 0.86 0.96 
HK 6 5 1 4.5 3.5 45.30 53.90   
IN 1 5 1 1 4.5 45.65 52.50 0.72 0.79 
ID 3 5 1 1 4 59.75 82.60   
IE 5 5 4 3 4.5 60.85 22.20 0.27 0.61 
MY 3 5 2 2 3.5 63.50 34.50 0.84 0.79 
MX 6 5 2 1 3.5 38.25 56.50   
NL 1 3.5 4 1 3.5 76.30 11.80 0.38 0.75 
SG 3 5 1 1 3.25 59.25 46.20 0.88 0.83 
ZA 1 5 1 1 4.5 64.55 21.70   
TH 3 3.5 1 3.5 3 76.50 33.30   
UK 1 5 1 2 3.75 79.50 7.60 0.67 0.75 
US 6 5 1 3.5 3.75 82.20 8.40 0.88 1.0 
French origin 
FR 6 5 1 3.5 3.75 39.75 36.30 0.80 0.49 
IT 6 1 1 1 4.5 30.05 40.00 0.38 0411 
ES 4 5 4 3.5 3.75 29.80 32.60 0.38 0.58 
TR 3 3 4 2.5 3.5 20.60 72.20 0.56 0.36 
German origin 
AT 3 4 1 1 3.75 25.60 45.80 0.19 0.18 
DE 2 4 1 1 4 19.10 36.60 0.25 0.21 
JP 3 4 1 1 3.25 8.15 6.10 0.00 0.71 










































KR 3 5 1 5 3.75 34.30 12.10 0.29 0.71 
CH 2 3.5 3 1 3 55.80 23.60 0.21 0.55 
TW 3 5 1 1 3.75 20.40 2.10 0.44 0.71 
BR 3 2.5 1 3.5 3 21.35 65.30 0.52 0.29 
Socialist origin 
CN 1 5 1 2 3.75 44.85 61.10   
PL 3 5 1 3 4.5 20.65 50.00   
RU 6 5 1 3.5 2.5 43.70 68.20   
Note: The scoring rule is available in Table 3.2. The first column represents country names by ISO Alpha-2 code. 
*When collecting data, the measurement of controlled shareowners considers the possibility that shareholders are affiliated with each other thus raising the effective 
concentration (e.g., family, government, majority block holder).  
Source : CFAI (2013), La Porta et al. (2006) 




In columns 8 and 9, I present the indexes of public and private law enforcement applied in 
this study. Public enforcement measures the supervisory, investigative and sanctions powers. 
Higher public law enforcement reveals the better ethics standards of government agencies, 
better documenting in equity financing, and effective criminal/civil sanctions on violations. 
Private enforcement measures the disclosure requirements of confidential information such as 
equity ownership structure (e.g., each shareholder who directly or indirectly controls 10 
percent of the voting shares) and irregular contracts (outside the ordinary course of business). 
Private enforcement also measures the burden of proof (the procedural difficulty in 
recovering losses from directors and accountants, distributors) (La Porta et al., 2006). It is 
worth noting that the law enforcement index applied in my study has a distinct focus on 
financing activities in the public market. However, it is common sense that such measures are 
more likely to be consistent than not across the nation-wide capital markets as market 
sophistication and political practices are the same in both public and private placement 
markets.  
 
4.3.2 Informal institutions 
A brief review of the 486 LBO transactions recorded in CapitalIQ shows that each target 
company, on average, issues a total of six securities (see Panel B, Table 4.1). Apart from 
straight debts such as term loans, corporate debentures, or corporate medium-term notes 
(MTN), a certain proportion of LBO financing applies to structured securities of CDS (credit 
default swap) or ABS (asset backed security) (see Panel A, Table 4.9).  
 
4.3.2.1 Innovative financing instruments in LBOs 
I obtain the data securities’ seniority tranches from “Seniority Level” in CapitalIQ. I compute 
the total number of unsecured debts using the total number of senior subordinated, junior 




subordinate, and subordinate securities26. I also consider the structured securities (CDS), 
convertible debts and preferred stock in each LBO transaction from “Fixed Income Security 
Type”. There are 64 transactions in the LBO sample financed by structured securities of CDS 
with a total of 336 tranches. A total of 24 deals were financed using convertible debt (124 
tranches). Of the seniority tranches, 374 issuances are unsecured. Among all debts, 1,637 
have available records of offering yield, whereas 1,763 have a yield spread (see Panel A, 
Table 4.9). 
Table 4.9 Informal Institutions in the LBO and VC Samples 
Panel A: Distribution of debt security types in the LBO samples 
Security types  
Number of 
security types   
Number of security types (%) 
Foreclosure Liquidation Reorganisation 
Structured Securities (%) 1.29 4.62 6.47 1.02 
Preferred Shares (%) 2.38 2.57 0 1.61 
Convertible Debt (%) 4.24 0 10 3.62 
Straight Bonds (%) 92.09 92.81 83.53 93.75 
    Unsecured Securities (%) 16.52 10.74 3.5 13.45 
Total number of securities 
(excluding the missing value) * 
2,131 56 40 2,035 





Number of VC Transactions across legal origin 
English French German Scandinavian Socialist 
Analyst Coverage 1,035 636 278 25 36 60 
Voluntary Disclosure** 870 149 131 34 41 515 
Compulsory Disclosure 208 56 8 19 16 109 
Total (excluding the 
missing value) 
2,088 841 417 53 93 684 
Note: * The statistics number of other debt securities, preferred shares and convertible debt are available in 
Table 4.10. 
** Voluntary disclosure refers to press releases; compulsory disclosure refers to all forms of disclosure made 
through the stock exchange. 
Sources: CapitalIQ, Zephyr 
 
It is worth noting that the observation of security type of convertible debts and preferred 
stock (security) and seniority level are not mutually exclusive. However, my CDS sample has 
                                                            
26 Based on Basel III, I define the senior unsecured tranche as “secured” because all senior claims enjoy same 
claimant priority as high as that of bank loans. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf 




no observation of seniority level. This is because all CDS in “Fixed Income Security Type” 
tab in CapitalIQ do not have matching seniority level under the tab of “Seniority Level” 
because they are not labelled with a unique ID.  















AU 5 0 0 0 5 3 
GB 37 18 1 0 18 2 
NZ 4 0 0 0 4 0 
SG 10 4 1 0 5 0 
Liquidation Domain 
BR 5 0 0 0 5 0 
DE 10 5 0 0 5 0 
NL 25 15 0 5 5 1 
Reorganisation Domain 
CA 37 9 8 0 20 5 
CH 5 4 1 0 0 0 
FR 10 10 0 0 0 0 
IE 15 10 0 0 5 0 
IT 5 0 0 0 5 0 
US 1,963 261 50 119 1,532 367 
Other and offshore islands 
BM 1 0 0 0 1 0 
KY 5 0 0 0 5 2 
LU 15 0 3 0 12 6 
BM 1 0  0 1  
Total (excluding the 
missing value) 
2,152 336 64 124 1,627 386 
Note: The first column represents country names in ISO Alpha-2 code. 
Source: CapitalIQ 
 
I present the cross-country comparison of the issuance of debt securities in Table 4.10. I find 
that in countries, especially the US, where reorganisation is applied, LBOs are most likely to 
be financed through unsecured debt. Among the 1,826 securities issued, 367 are unsecured 
which comprises nearly one-fifth of the study sample. In Australia, the UK and Singapore, 
where foreclosure is applied, the insolvency procedure does not protect unsecured creditors 
since they have no pledged collateral to claim for recovery and reorganisation is not a default 
option (or the first attempt). Most debt securities (90 per cent) in the foreclosure group are 
secured. The proportion of unsecured securities in this group is far smaller than the 




reorganisation group. In the liquidation domain of Brazil, Germany and the Netherlands, very 
few LBO deals are financed with unsecured debt. There is no record of the issuance of 
convertible debt in the foreclosure group. The only sample in the liquidation group financed 
through convertible debt is the LBO deal of the Wright Medical Group N.V. (NASDAQ’s: 
WMGI) in the Netherlands in 2014. 
 
Table 4.10 shows that approximately one-tenth of the debt in the reorganisation group is 
structured; this ratio is less than half of that in both the foreclosure and liquidation groups. 
Among the sampled transactions, all four LBO transactions from France (WFS Global SAS; 
Rexel SA; Groupe ACTi call SAS; and Legrand SA) are financed with CDS with a variety of 
security tranches. Conversely, LBO transactions in Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Italy, 
Luxemburg and the offshore islands (the Cayman Islands and Bermuda) are not financed with 
structured securities debt (see Table 4.10). 
 
4.3.2.2 Analyst coverage in the VC-backed transactions 
I obtain information about the analytical coverage through Zephyr’s “source of 
documentation”. There are four main sources of documentation: target (parent) 
announcement/press release/website, advisor submission/analyst speculation electronic 
publication (financial media and journals), stock exchange and miscellaneous. Given that one 
VC-backed deal has more than one record of the source of documentation, I define a deal as 
having analyst coverage if the documentation is obtained via analyst submission or analyst 
speculation. In the case of a deal with multiple records of analyst coverage, I use the sum of a 
number of records to represent the intensity of analyst coverage. Based on the Zephyr record, 
among the 2,085 sampled companies that disclosed deal information, 950 had records from 
analyst coverage (see Panel B, Table 4.9). The numbers also show that analysts in the English 




group were more active in information disclosure with 636 of 841 sampled deals having 
analyst coverage. On the other hand, analysts in the Socialist group were less active in 
information disclosure. For example, in China, only 12 companies had analyst coverage in a 
large sample of 654 target companies (not reported here). However, the Socialist group is 
significantly active in voluntary information disclosure, using the press releases more than 
the other groups.  
 
4.3.2.3 Social ties 
Both CapitalIQ and Zephyr provide records of the key characters of involved professionals in 
each recorded transaction, e.g., the founding year and number of involved advisors. CapitalIQ 
also provides the number of registered professionals and number of subsidiaries of each 
advisor. Both databases provide the financial performance of active PE managers such as the 
revenue, EBITDA, total assets and a number of employees. Because of a large number of 
missing values, this study considers only the variables with the largest number of available 
observations such as the founding year, number of employees and number of registered 
professionals/prior subsidiaries (for LBO sample only). Since the professional files are kept 
as a distinct sub-dataset in Capital IQ, I manually match the sub-dataset of the transactions 
with professional files by matching the official name of PE managers with that of buyers’ 
names in each LBO transaction record. To obtain as many valid observations as possible for 
this variable, I consider all professional files of “active financial buyers” and all “PE firms” 
in CapitalIQ. I also measure the social ties of LBO managers by the number of employees (or 
their ultimate owner(s) depending on which observation is available) and total 
investment/subsidiaries. If an LBO transaction has more than one PE manager involved, I use 
the average value of all available observations. This process yields 191 observations of the 
business profile of PEs. The summary of social ties is given in Panel A, Table 4.11. 




Table 4.11 The Statistics of the Age and Social Ties in the LBO and VC Samples 
Variable Obs Mean Min Max 
Panel A: LBO Sample 
PE’s Age 183 26.03 2 100.00 
Total Investment/Subsidiaries 191 565.17 30 1,825.00 
Prior Investment/Subsidiaries 191 288.25 0 1,097.00 
Current Investment/Subsidiaries 191 276.92 30 747.00 
Professionals 191 439.50 3 1,623.00 
Current Professionals 191 218.47 3 794.00 
Panel B: VC Samples 
PE’s Age  2,547 5.21 0.00 211.00 
PE’s Affiliations     
    Banker 105    
    Government and Education 64    
    Individual 259    
PE's Revenue (1,000 €) 734 1,468,555.00 -1,174.19 68,300,000.00 
PE's Total Assets (1,000 €) 2,548 3,417,156.00 0.00 1,110,000,000.00 
PE's Number of Employees 2,548 634.68 0.00 225,000.00 
Note: except for the age observation, all measurements are most updated value or those dating back to the “last 
available year” in CapitalIQ and Zephyr at the time of writing.  
Sources: CapitalIQ, Zephyr  
 
I present the business affiliation of the sampled VC investors in Table 4.11. Like Gompers 
and Lerner (1998), I distinguish the social ties of VC managers (or their owners, if any) by 
business type 27. I generate dummy variables representing the following three types of social 
ties: financial institutions related to VC managers refers to those whose ultimate owner is: a 
bank, financial company, hedge fund, insurance company, mutual/pension fund/trust, private 
equity firm, or VC firm. Government-affiliated VC firms are those owned by 
foundations/research institutes and public authorities/states/governments. The rest of the VC 
sponsors are those owned by industrial companies and individuals/families. Because one deal 
could involve more than one VC, the three dummy variables of business affiliation are not 
                                                            
27  Unlike CapitalIQ, Zephyr does not provide observations of managers’ total investments/subsidiaries or 
number of registered professionals. We hence manually match the manager’s company name using the 
CapitalIQ database. This screening yields a total of 143 observations regarding VC manager’s age, 132 and 240 
observations of VC manager’s total investments/subsidiaries and registered professionals, respectively.  




mutually exclusive. Using Zephyr, I further provide the VCs’ size by using their parent 
company’s (or their ultimate owner(s)’, if any) total assets and number of employees. Panel B, 
Table 4.11 shows the most reputable or experienced VC managers have an asset size of 
€1,109,887.741 million (Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC) and a worldwide total of 
employees of 225,000 (JP Morgan). 
 
4.3.2.4. Age 
I calculate the VC firms’ ages using the number of years since the date of incorporation (or 
founding year of VC firm/fund or its parent organisation, if any) by the completion date of 
the transaction. If one transaction has more than one VC manager, I use the earliest founding 
year. The founding year of VC funds/firms is obtained from CapitalIQ. Panel B, Table 4.11, 
shows that the average ages of PE managers for LBO and VC transactions are 26 and 5 years, 
respectively. The data indicate a much younger management panel in my VC sample.  
 
4.4. Financing Cost of PE-Backed Transactions 
I obtain transaction information on the two types of PE from two separate databases; I 
separately discuss the data of financing cost of VC and LBO deals.  
 
4.4.1 Explicit financing cost  
4.4.1.1 Explicit financing cost of LBO-backed transactions 
To obtain the explicit financing cost in LBO financing, I manually assemble data from the 
following separate observations: “fixed income security type”, “seniority level”, “offering 
yield”, “offering amount”, and “yield spread”. I match each debt security’s name, amount, 
and yield using the unique identity code of each specific security. Generally, one LBO 
transaction is funded by a number of debt securities, and the information is aggregated in one 




paragraph. I separate the paragraph using the “text to columns” option in Excel to obtain the 
yield information of every single security. I present the statistics of the various yield/spread 
levels of debt issuance of my LBO sample in Table 4.12. In Panel A, Table 4.12, I compare 
the explicit financing cost by three types of judicial debt enforcement. The numbers show the 
sample of 486 LBO deals with a weighted average spread of 290 bps and an offering yield of 
8.96%. Looking across the countries in Panel A, Table 4.12 I find that LBO deals in the 
reorganisation group pay the second highest spread (292.89 bps) and the highest offering 
yield (9.06%) of the groups. A comparison of debt enforcement efficiency in Panel B, Table 
4.12 shows that the time-efficient group offers a smaller yield spread and offering yield; the 
reverse is true for the cost-efficient group.  
 
Table 4.12 Creditor Rights and Financing Costs in the LBO Sample 
Insolvency 
Procedure 
Transaction Value (€m) Offering Yield (%) Yield Spread (bps) 
Value Obs Value Obs Value Obs 
Panel A: Judicial debt enforcement  
Foreclosure 1,484.35 10 7.23 7 167.60 9 
Liquidation 1,808.04 8 6.02 6 325.46 7 
Reorganisation 820.06 415 9.06 323 292.89 374 
Other 1,068.69 6 8.01 5 262.73 4 
Total 856.59 439 8.96 341 290.28 391 
Panel B: Enforcement efficiency 
Cost Efficient 
Less Than 10 856.93 432 8.99 335 290.45 25 
More Than 10 835.63 7 7.27 6 277.83 366 
 856.59 439 8.96 341 290.28 391 
Time efficient 
Less Than 1.5 Years 1,263.26 29 7.46 20 255.56 386 
More Than 1.5 Years 827.83 410 9.05 321 292.66 5 
Total 856.59 439 8.96 341 290.28 391 
Sources: CapitalIQ, Djankov (2008). 
 
4.4.1.2 Explicit financing cost of VC-backed transactions 
Table 4.12 exhibits the explicit financing cost of VC-backed transactions grouped by the 
three sub-indexes of state-mandated shareholder rights. I rank each shareholder right sub-








)−1 in each panel in Table 4.13 shows that the equity financing cost 
borne by VC-backed firms is, on average, 7.8 percent and that the relationship between 
shareholder rights and financing is U-shaped. It is obvious that the target firms had borne 
lower financing costs in both the most and least minority friendly countries (see Panels A and 
B, Table 4.13). Checking the raw data from Zephyr, I find a few giant VC-backed 
transactions took place in the least minority friendly countries (e.g., Italy). Because of the 
positive skewness of my observations of VC financing cost, the average statistics are 
inevitably biased by the outliers. However, if I take into account the average deal value and 
number of observations in each row in Table 4.13, the cost is, on average, lower in the 
minority friendly countries. The relationship between shareholder rights of class action and 
financing cost are different from those in the previous two sub-index groups. 


















Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs 
Panel A: Proxy Voting 
1 54,579.42 8.45 59 5.15 55 58.82 115 
2.5 198,148.00  - 20.31 3 137.31 6 
3 294,054.00  -  - 80.67 2 
3.5 140,208.09 8.67 4 6.67 10 76.08 35 
4 24,522.00 9.22 2 4.13 2 70.96 7 
4.5 191,796.05 8.63 18 5.26 71 63.32 134 
5 67,908.51 7.45 628 6.12 847 65.07 1,232 
Panel B: Ownership Limit 
1 62,012.14 6.29 57 5.09 56 54.70 118 
2 132,228.90 7.04 3 3.59 3 48.21 29 
3 84,604.07 9.98 39 9.06 44 105.76 98 
4 147,427.96 17.68 7 12.43 6 80.59 24 
5 196,765.06 8.98 17 5.30 70 67.71 112 
6 67,371.57 7.39 588 5.98 809 62.45 1,150 
Panel C: Class Action 
1 69,765.74 7.24 646 6.00 816 65.10 1,189 
1.5 99,958.36 11.51 22 9.68 19 128.79 39 
2 43,215.57 8.78 17 5.65 71 41.56 136 
2.5 136,950.89 16.11 2 8.72 6 66.56 28 
3.5 186,580.90 11.52 24 5.86 76 69.19 139 
Note: * The sub-index of each shareholder right is ranked in ascending order based on minority friendly 
preference (see Chapter 3). 
Source: Zephyr  
 
4.4.2 Implicit financing cost 
As discussed in Chapter three, I apply the number of advisors, from the target-side, involved 
in PE-backed financing transaction as the proxy for implicit cost. The summary of the 
advisory group in the sample transactions is given in Table 4.14. I categorise the advisors into 
two types: financial advisors and legal advisors. Panel A, Table 4.14 exhibits the advisor 
involvement, regarding the number of advisors of the LBO sample. I notice that the LBO 
transactions in the foreclosure domain, on average, involve more than two legal advisors and 
two financial advisors, a total of four advisors, which is an above average number of 
advisors. LBO transactions in the liquidation domain record the smallest number of advisors 
(fewer than two). Compared with LBO financing, VC financing involves a much smaller 
advisory group. In Panel B, Table 4.14, I see each transaction hires fewer than two advisors 




regardless of the legal origin. VC deals in the French origin group require the largest advisor 
group. In Panel B there is no big difference in the number of advisors between the buyer and 
seller groups.  
 
Table 4.14 The Implicit Cost in the LBO and VC Samples 
Panel A: Number of advisors in LBO sample 
Advisor type Foreclosure Liquidation Reorganisation Obs Mean Min Max 
Target-side advisors 4.17 1.67 3.91 276 3.88 1 13 
    Legal advisor  2.4 1.67 2.13 248 2.13 1 7 
    Financial advisor  2 0 1.9 247 1.89 1 5 
Buy-side advisors 10.86 6.33 5.6 271 5.71 1 69 
Panel B: Number of advisors in VC sample 
Advisor type English French German Scandinavian Socialism Obs Mean Min Max 
Target-side advisors 1.33 1.53 1.00 1.45 1.72 710 1.20 1 2 
    Legal advisor  1.48 1.72 1.00 1.41 1.02 738 1.20 1 2 
    Financial advisor  1.22 1.40 1.00 1.16 1.02 584 1.13 1 4 
Buy-side advisors 1.38 1.60 1.14 1.31 1.35 266 1.45 1 9 
Note: The statistics exclude the missing value. 
Sources: Data in Panel A were obtained from CapitalIQ; Data in Panel B were obtained from Zephyr. 




Table 4.15 A Summary of the Variables (Abbreviations and Descriptions) 
Abbreviation Financing costs 
Page 
No. 
WAS The weighted average spread 63 









Total number of both legal and financial advisors for the buyer 
side 
66 
 Formal institution  
CREDITOR La Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007) 68 
SHAREHOLDER CFAI (2013) 71 
PUBL_ENFORCEMENT 
PRIV_ENFORCEMENT 




Dummy variable equals one if the county applies 
foreclosure/liquidation/reorganisation proceeding in the case of 
bankruptcy, zero otherwise. Djankov et al. (2008) 
75 
 Informal institution  
pct__Unsecure 
The number of unsecured securities issued in a single LBO 
transaction as a proportion of total issued securities 
81 
pct_CDS 
Number of credit default swaps (CDS) issued in a single LBO 
transaction as a proportion of total issued securities 
81 
pct_Preferred 
Number of preferred stocks issued in a single LBO transaction as a 
proportion of total issued securities 
81 
pct_Convertible 
Number of convertible bonds issued in a single LBO transaction as 
a proportion of total issued securities 
81 
ANA_COV Number of records of analyst coverage 80 
VOLUNTARY Number of records of voluntary disclosure 80 
MEDIA Number of records of media coverage 80 
COMPULSORY Number of records of compulsory disclosure 80 
BANK 
Dummy variable equals one if the business type of ultimate owner 
of VC manager is a financial institution, zero otherwise 
82 
GOVT-EDU 
Dummy variable equals one if the business type of ultimate owner 




Dummy variable equals one if business type VC manager’s PE 
fund, a hedge fund, zero otherwise 
82 
SUBSIDIARIES Total investments/subsidiaries 90 
PROFESSIONAL Total registered professionals 90 
AGE 
Years passed since the PE manager was founded by the completion 
date of the transaction 
84 
BUYERS Number of buyers in an LBO deal 91 
 Control variables  
MARKET 
10-year Treasury bond yield 30 days before the completion date of 
the LBO transaction; average equity market return in the sampled 
country 30 days before the completion date of the VC transaction 
96,97 
Ln (TRANSACTION) Total transaction value of LBO deal 96 
STAKE Percentage of the acquired stake of the target company 96 
Ln (TARGET_SIZE) The logarithm of the target firm’s number of employees 96 
 




Chapter 5                  CHAPTER FIVE 
Results Discussion 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the study. The chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 5.1 describes the model specification. Section 5.2 discusses the impact of legal rights 
and law enforcement on PE-backed financing costs. I also compare the significance of the 
two different law enforcement regimes. Section 5.3 presents the analysis of the three informal 
institution factors, and section 5.4 compares the aggregated impact of the formal institutions 
against that of informal institutions. The economic analysis of PE financing is discussed in 
section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes the results discussion. 
 
5.1. Model Specification  
The regressions used in this study are two-stage least squares models (2SLS) (see section 
3.3.1.1). In testing the implicit financing cost of advisory fees against the institutional 
variables in the LBO and VC samples, I apply the ordinary-least-squares model (OLS). I do 
not address the endogeneity of transaction size and target size in these regressions because, 
after conducting the Hausman test, it is not a concern as I previously conjectured. I use 
instrumental variables to address the concern of endogeneity of the transaction size and target 
size in Equation 3.3a and 3.3b, respectively28 . As the dependent variables vary in each 
equation of my model, the instrument regressors differ correspondingly. The instrument 
variables used in Equation 3.3a are the Legal Rights Index, Availability of Financial Services 
                                                            
28 I obtain data from two divergent datasets. The instrumented regressor is tailor-made for the LBO and VC 
samples. The transaction size in the LBO sample is the natural logarithm of deal value in nominal dollars. In the 
VC sample, we use the target size, which is the natural logarithm of the number of employees of the target firm. 




and Financial through Local Market (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2015), Availability of 
Financial Services (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2010) and Long-Term Orientation versus 
Short-Term Normative Orientation (Hofstede, 2015). Those used in Model 3.3b are the index 
of Indulgence versus Restraint, Power Distance Index (Hofstede, 2015) and revenue of target 
firm from Zephyr. I do not claim the instrumental variables (IVs) are perfect in my 2SLS 
regressions. Instead, the endogeneity tests of weak- and over-identification show that the 
instruments in each model have decent explanatory power after exhaustive trials29. First, I test 
the weak identification concern using Wald F statistics. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
value for the Wald F statistic for 10% size distortion is 19.93. Tables 5.1 and 5.3 show that all 
regressions’ Kleibergen-Paaprk Wald F statistic exceeds the critical value of 19.93 suggesting 
a rejection of the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Secondly, I use the Hansen test for 
over-identification restrictions because I have more than one IVs in one instrumental 
regressor. The Hansen test follows a Chi-square distribution. If the test statistic exceeds the 
critical value, I reject the null hypothesis that at least one instrument is not exogenous and 
that the instrumental regressor is correlated with the structural error. 
 
The baseline results of Equations 3.3a, 3.3b, 3.4a and 3.4b are given in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 
and 5.4, respectively. To mitigate collinearity concern, I insert the legal index and law 
enforcement variables one by one in each regression. I treat the regression with one sub-index 
as a single model. Lastly, I present the F-statistic of the first stage regression in column one 
in Tables 5.1 and 5.3. I see that the first stage regression exceeds the critical value of 10, 
indicating that the instrumented regressor is significant. Table 5.5 presents the z-test results 
                                                            
29 As discussed in section 3.3.1.1, I conducted exhaustive trials to find the proper regressor. The Models we 
presented in Chapter three are those addressing all specification criteria. There are, however, a few exceptions in 
that the Hansen test is significant at a marginal level of 10% (for example, Model 3, Table 5.3). I keep these 
Models because they do not materially bias my overall results. The record of overall trials is available upon 
request. 




of hypotheses H3 and H7. The robustness tests given in Tables 5.6 to 5.9 are robust to 
alternative specifications. 
 
5.2.  Formal Institutions  
5.2.1 Creditor rights  
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the baseline results of the LBO sample. In the following two 
sections, I discuss the results of the explicit cost of weighted offering yield (WOY) and 
advisory fees (ADVISORS). 
 
5.2.1.1 Creditor rights with weight offering yield 
The results for Model 1 in Table 5.1 suggest that the estimated coefficient of creditor rights 
index exhibits a significant negative impact on the explicit cost WOY (see row 1, Model 1). 
This finding remains robust after replacing the dependent variable with WAS (see Table 5.7). 
It is worth noting that the creditor rights index I apply comprises a socially optimal value of 
going concern (reorganisation preference) dominating a liquidation value while, at the same 
time, securing the repossession of collateral (Djankov et al., 2008). Based on Djankov et al.’s 
definition, a higher creditor rights index indicates that a secured creditor has the following 
privileges in the case of reorganisation: 1) dissent the petition of reorganisation, 2) an 
automatic stay on the pledged collateral (usually the business) or, 3) run the pledged business 
but do not allow the borrowers to remain on the managerial board. As displayed in Table 4.10, 
the debt securities issued in LBO financing consist mostly of unsecured bonds in the 
reorganisation domain and structured securities (usually with contingencies of redeemable 
rights or voting rights) in the foreclosure domain. Unlike unsecured bonds, the structured 
bonds grant the LBO fund provider a putable option to leave the company with a fixed payoff. 
My result suggests that the most economical choice for those LBO fund providers is to 




repossess or preserve the firm as a going concern because they are better off turning the 
business around. Using LBO financing as a novel example where debt holders share different 
seniority ranking, this study supports the view that the most basic right of a creditor is the 
right to repossess and then liquidate or keep collateral in the case of default (Aghion et al., 
1992; Baird, 1995; White, 1989). 
Table 5.1 A 2SLS Analysis of Explicit Cost in the LBO Sample 
1st stage 2nd stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 𝑳𝒏(𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑵𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵)̂  WOY WOY WOY WOY 
CREDITOR -0.756*** -0.713**    
 (0.190) (0.339)    
FORECLOSURE    -2.605***   
   (0.801)   
LIQUIDATION    1.021*  
    (0.565)  
REORGANISATION     1.772* 
     (1.003) 
Pct_Unsecure -0.575*** 0.701 0.584 2.147*** 0.682 
 (0.0849) (0.619) (0.548) (0.439) (0.642) 
Pct_CDS 1.300*** 0.719 0.675 -3.189*** 0.841 
 (0.182) (1.618) (1.141) (0.701) (1.773) 
Pct_Convertible 0.0653 -2.535*** -2.405*** -2.639*** -2.569*** 
 (0.166) (0.394) (0.427) (0.503) (0.392) 
PROFESSIONAL -0.000208** -0.000750** -0.000844*** -0.000245 -0.000743*** 
 (8.71e-05) (0.000294) (0.000325) (0.000246) (0.000287) 
AGE 0.0145*** 0.0218* 0.0244*** -0.0106 0.0230* 
 (0.00170) (0.0121) (0.00842) (0.00783) (0.0135) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁)̂   -0.216 -1.505 0.218 -1.505 
  (0.870) (0.970) (1.567) (0.970) 
MARKET -0.109*** 0.163 0.139 0.577*** 0.174 
 (0.0336) (0.274) (0.250) (0.154) (0.266) 
Constant 3.424** 13.58* 14.07** -5.531* 11.68 
 (1.393) (8.167) (6.777) (3.130) (7.296) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
R-Squared 0.731 0.417 0.423 0.332 0.399 
1st-stage F Stat 24.75***     
2nd-stage F Stat   61.15*** 71.92*** 22.64*** 41.94*** 
Wald F Stat  17.60*** 32.99*** 25.82*** 10.56*** 
Hansen J  1.391 1.27e-06 1.978 1.486 
Note: This table presents the results of the 2SLS test using the LBO sample. I regressed the financing cost of the 
WOY against the aggregated creditor rights index and three debt enforcement dummies (foreclosure, liquidation 
and reorganisation). I addressed the endogeneity concern of target firm size (natural logarithm of target firms’ 
number of the employees). The first stage regression is reported in the left-end column (only the first-stage 
result of the creditor rights index is reported). The instrument variables in four models include the Legal Rights 
Index, Availability of Financial Services and Financial through Local Market (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2015), 
Availability of Financial Services (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2010) and Long-Term Orientation versus Short-
Term Normative Orientation (Hofstede, 2015). The second stage is regressed using the estimated transaction 
size given in columns 1 to 4. The robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 




5.2.1.2 Creditor rights and advisory fees 
My investigation of the correlation between creditor rights and advisory fees implies that 
higher creditor rights account for higher advisory fees (see Table 5.2). In practice, as 
suggested by Djankov et al. (2008), “seizure and sell” the collateral can be an out-of-court 
procedure or a case under the supervision of the court. Either way, the process of insolvency 
diverges across countries and it inevitably induces costs (see section 5.2.3 for further 
discussion). 
 
Table 5.2 An OLS Analysis of Implicit Cost in the LBO Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ADVISORS ADVISORS ADVISORS ADVISORS 
     
CREDITOR 1,104**    
 (434.6)    
FORECLOSURE   4,839***   
  (1,250)   
LIQUIDATION   -3,610***  
   (1,024)  
REORGANISATION    -2,299* 
    (1,325) 
Pct_Unsecure 1,097 1,197 781.1 1,018 
 (873.0) (842.7) (910.1) (888.8) 
Pct_CDS 196.7 584.6 1,981 279.1 
 (1,239) (1,124) (1,220) (1,270) 
Pct_Convertible 1,360 887.1 1,315 1,535 
 (1,110) (1,125) (1,140) (1,108) 
PROFESSIONAL -0.205 0.683 -1.602 -0.726 
 (2.513) (2.579) (2.702) (2.507) 
AGE 8.086 13.68 9.482 6.130 
 (20.56) (20.70) (22.06) (20.69) 
MARKET  1,387*** 1,515*** 1,136*** 1,305*** 
 (336.6) (350.1) (323.0) (329.8) 
BENCHMARK 666.9*** 684.4*** 654.2*** 658.6*** 
 (67.18) (71.65) (67.21) (65.40) 
Constant -4,047** -3,472** -1,098 -204.5 
 (1,926) (1,698) (1,763) (1,738) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 100 100 100 100 
R-Squared 0.545 0.569 0.534 0.535 
Note: This table presents the results of the OLS test of institutional environments and their impact on the 
advisory fees in the LBO sample. I regressed total advisory fees (standardised number of total advisors every 
$1,000,000 of transaction size) against creditor rights index and three debt enforcement dummies (foreclosure, 
liquidation and reorganisation). The robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Should the dollar sign be where I put it? 




In summary, creditor rights reduce the WOY but at the cost of advisory fees. We, therefore, 
partially accept hypothesis H1a and conclude that creditor rights reduce the explicit financing 
costs of WOY. Given that half of my sample countries and 90% of my sample transactions 
belong to the reorganisation group (LBOs in the US account for the bulk of the recorded 
transactions), the coefficient of creditor rights is inevitably biased by the reorganisation 
sample. However, the above findings obtained from using different explanatory variables of 
creditor rights are fundamentally consistent with each other.  
 
5.2.2 Shareholder rights  
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the baseline results of the VC sample. Model 1 in both Tables 5.3 
and 5.4 exhibits the estimated coefficient of aggregated minority-friendly shareholder rights 
index against the dependent variable of (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1and ADVISORS. Models 2 to 6 in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4 further decompose the aggregated shareholder rights into five sticks and they 
exhibit their individual impact on financing costs. My decision rule on the hypothesis (H1b) 
is that the significance of the estimated coefficient of aggregated shareholder rights index is 
the arithmetic sum of the five sub-indexes. 
 




Table 5.3 presents the results of the 2SLS regression of shareholder rights and the estimated 
relationship with the explicit financing costs of (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1 . I find that the aggregated 




)−1. The estimated coefficient suggests that as the shareholder rights increase by 1, 
the overall financing cost would be reduced by 1.97%. When I consider each stick of 
shareholder rights, I find strong evidence that the relief of proxy voting restriction 




(Proxy_voting) significantly reduces (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1 at 1% significance level. The same is true for 
bylaws on voting policy (Voting_policy) (see Models 2 and 5, Table 5.3). On the other hand, 
with the other three sticks of legal rights: ownership limit (Ownership_limit), class action 
(Class_action), and oppressed minority mechanism (Oppressed), I find consistent opposite 
results. Among them, the estimated coefficient of Oppressed in Model 6, Table 5.3, is 
significant at the 1% level. The possible reason for the significant positive relationship 
between Oppressed and (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1  could be that the oppressed mechanism works 
unfavourably for potential VC investors. Soliciting external shareholders of VCs will bring 
the target firm subsequent corporate or capital structure changes that include nomination of a 
board member or issuance of diluting shares and other comparable proposals. According to 
Manigart et al. (2009), VCs focus on ways to monitor the funded firm to maximise oversight 
and protecting their resources. If the oppressed mechanism is weak, e.g., the board of 
commissioners can only approve the remuneration of board members (e.g., in Indonesia), or 
existing shareholders are not given a vote on general remuneration issues (e.g., in China), or 
existing shareholders need to present a certain percentage of voting stocks before requesting 
an extraordinary general meeting (e.g., in Australia), the VCs are more likely to offer a higher 
enterprise multiple. The reverse is also true. 




Table 5.3 A 2SLS Analysis of the Explicit Cost of the VC Sample 
VARIABLES 
1st stage 2nd stage 
𝑳𝒏(𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑮𝑬𝑻_𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)̂  




















SHAREHOLDER 44.95 -1.970***      
 (39.93) (0.689)      
Proxy_voting   -1.855***     
   (0.674)     
Ownership_limit    3.219*    
    (1.890)    
Class_action     9.451**   
     (4.175)   
Voting_policy      -3.121***  
      (1.092)  
Oppressed       9.906*** 
       (3.596) 
PUBL_ENFORCEMENT 673.4 -24.05*** 3.605 35.09* -5.237 -17.78*** -16.19** 
 (770.0) (8.778) (4.224) (20.96) (4.482) (6.861) (6.595) 
PRIV_ENFORCEMENT -949.8 58.79*** 22.44** -14.12 -18.73 45.33*** 40.16** 
 (698.9) (20.82) (10.73) (14.39) (13.35) (16.56) (15.64) 
ANA_COV 42.89 1.029 0.828 0.0694 0.842 1.039 0.831 
 (57.92) (1.621) (1.619) (1.645) (1.607) (1.622) (1.619) 
BANK 12.28 0.321 0.246 0.0977 0.443 0.326 0.247 
 (60.05) (1.858) (1.855) (1.857) (1.872) (1.859) (1.855) 
GVT_EDU -64.80 3.525* 3.476 3.644* 3.982* 3.531* 3.476 
 (68.49) (2.124) (2.125) (2.169) (2.214) (2.124) (2.125) 
INDIVIDUAL -79.06 -1.610 -1.666 -1.577 -1.238 -1.604 -1.665 
 (57.80) (1.582) (1.604) (1.652) (1.560) (1.581) (1.604) 
AGE 2.557 -0.00559 -0.0104 -0.0345 -0.0188 -0.00540 -0.0103 
 (1.658) (0.0592) (0.0586) (0.0562) (0.0578) (0.0593) (0.0586) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)̂   0.0375 0.0570 0.201 0.156 0.0372 0.0566 
  (0.530) (0.530) (0.525) (0.515) (0.530) (0.530) 
MARKET 593.9* 11.04 9.531 6.260 13.09 11.15 9.549 
 (338.5) (10.64) (10.57) (10.57) (11.14) (10.65) (10.57) 
STAKE 0.766 0.0526 0.0508 0.0498 0.0587* 0.0527 0.0509 
 (1.186) (0.0338) (0.0340) (0.0359) (0.0352) (0.0338) (0.0340) 
Constant -129.8       
 (337.7)       
        
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
R-Squared 0.687 0.157 0.150 0.111 0.134 0.157 0.150 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage F Stat 13.74***       
2nd-stage F Stat (p-value) 0.0438 0.0605 0.390 0.138 0.0442 0.0600 
Wald F Stat  24.61 27.01 31.89 32.54 24.47 26.98 
Hansen J  0.290 1.058 3.176* 1.815 0.228 1.051 
Note: This table presents the results of the 2SLS model using the VC sample. I regressed the (𝐸𝑉 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴⁄ )
−1 
on shareholder rights index and law enforcement dummies. I addressed the endogeneity concern of target firm 
size (natural logarithm number of the employees). The first stage regression is reported in the left-end column 
(only the aggregated shareholder rights index is reported). The instrument variables are the index of Indulgence 
versus Restraint (Hofstede, 2015) and the revenue of target firm from Zephyr (not reported here). The second 
stage is regressed using the estimated target size given in columns 1 to 6. The robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Although the impact on (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1 by each stick of shareholder rights contradicts the others, 
the arithmetic sum exhibits an overall significant impact of a lower(
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1. The result 
remains robust with the alternative dependent variable of the (
𝐸𝑉
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
)−1(see Table 5.8). 




Across all regression models in Tables 5.3 and 5.7, the variable of proxy voting restriction 
stands out. This finding, combined with those in Table 5.4 (discussed in subsection 5.2.2.2), 
is consistent with the assertion that a voting mechanism is essential for shareholders to secure 
their desired outcomes and to form their valuation of the firms (Deangelo and Deangelo, 
1985; La Porta et al., 2000). My finding supports this assertion using evidence from the 
private placement market and argues that minority friendly voting rights increase LPs’ (or 
fund unithoders) confidence thus reducing the financing costs for entrepreneurs. For example, 
if Brazil were to release the common restriction on proxy voting one step further, from 
“sometimes” to “no mostly”, the score in my index would increase by 0.5. This change 
reduces the financing cost by approximate 0.9% (0.5 times -1.855%). 
 
5.2.2.2 Shareholder rights and advisory fees 
The aggregated shareholder rights index exhibits a non-significant negative impact on 
ADVISORS (see Model 1, Table 5.4). Consistent with the statistical estimates in Table 5.3, I 
find that tightening the proxy voting restriction is significantly correlated with lower advisory 
fees (see Model 2, Table 5.4) suggesting a strong influence on lowering financing costs. In 
contrast, Ownership_limit has a positive impact on advisory fees at the 10% significance 
level (see Model 3, Table 5.4). It is worth noting that the control limitation is subject to 
public market regulations whereby founders achieve previously promised business milestones 
such as an IPO or M&As. Based on anecdotal evidence recorded in Zephyr and the results of 




my models, I conjecture that the control limit will likely increase the enterprise’s advisory 
fees in preparing regulatory filings especially when the VCs are foreigners or in syndication30.  
 
Similarly, Oppressed is significantly related to higher advisory fees. The oppressed minority 
mechanism, by its definition, works conversely compared with proxy voting rights. The VCs 
could put nominee proposals in proxy ballots only when the oppressed minority mechanism 
is valid. This, however, requires the target company’s compliance or verification cost to reach 
a congruent goal with outside shareholders of the VCs. In a country like Brazil, the oppressed 
minority mechanism is difficult and expensive to execute. I expect that the advisory cost for 
the enterprises is higher when the oppressed mechanism is applied. Based on the results in 
Model 6, if the score of this sub-index increases by 0.25 (e.g., let the shareholders introduce 
dissident resolutions and see the scoring rule of shareholder rights in Table 3.2), it reduces 




of funds raised. However, in a country such as Poland or France, where four oppressed 
minority mechanisms are standard practice, there should be concern about high advisory fees 
from the enterprise’s side.  
 
Class_action shows no significant correlation with advisory fees (see Model 4, Table 5.4). It 
is notable that although class action provides a cost-effective, convenient access to legal 
remedies, it is rarely applied in the real business world. This is the situation in South Africa, 
Spain, Hong Kong and Thailand. In a country such as Turkey, the class action remains just as 
                                                            
30 For example, on 12 December 2014, a syndicated VC-backed transaction took place in China and acquired an 
existing stake of 37.57% from an enterprise named Neusoft Medical Systems. Among the three venture 
capitalists, one registered in the British Virgin Island is Prestige Will Global Ltd. The transaction was pending 
approval from the Ministry of Commerce and other authorities. In the case that Neusoft Medical Systems goes 
public in the future, the ownership of institutional investors needs to be controlled under a 10% ceiling. If this is 
the case, more financial and legal advisory fees will be expected. 




a concept. The plausible explanation for the significant coefficients of Class_action in Table 
5.3 is that it is correlated with other societal determinants that are correlated with financing 
costs.  
 
Table 5.4 An OLS Analysis of Implicit Cost the VC Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ADVISORS ADVISORS ADVISORS ADVISORS ADVISORS ADVISORS 
SHAREHOLDER -0.00746      
 (0.0107)      
Proxy_voting  -0.0483**     
  (0.0211)     
Ownership_limit   0.0315*    
   (0.0170)    
Class_action    -0.0478   
    (0.0546)   
Voting_policy     -0.0254  
     (0.0226)  
Oppressed      0.239*** 
      (0.0890) 
PUBL_ENFORCEMENT -0.0568 0.0336 0.228 0.0434 -0.0986 -0.353* 
 (0.158) (0.128) (0.165) (0.142) (0.163) (0.188) 
PRIV_ENFORCEMENT -0.170 -0.114 -0.424** -0.147 -0.130 0.165 
 (0.206) (0.139) (0.164) (0.217) (0.188) (0.186) 
ANA_COV 0.267*** 0.281*** 0.257*** 0.252*** 0.270*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0672) (0.0701) (0.0736) (0.0695) (0.0681) 
BANK -0.00668 -0.0171 -0.0250 -0.0106 -0.00624 -0.0210 
 (0.0642) (0.0625) (0.0646) (0.0645) (0.0635) (0.0619) 
GVT_EDU -0.151*** -0.158*** -0.163*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.174*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0545) (0.0543) (0.0529) (0.0529) (0.0555) 
INDIVIDUAL 0.0150 0.00807 0.0122 0.0193 0.0139 0.00161 
 (0.0570) (0.0554) (0.0565) (0.0576) (0.0567) (0.0554) 
AGE 0.00367** 0.00413** 0.00368** 0.00345** 0.00383** 0.00415** 
 (0.00163) (0.00168) (0.00155) (0.00158) (0.00166) (0.00167) 
Ln (TRANSACTION) -0.00755 -0.00930 -0.00312 -0.00529 -0.00858 -0.00814 
 (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0159) (0.0157) 
MARKET -0.288 -0.282 -0.331 -0.320 -0.278 -0.280 
 (0.357) (0.356) (0.365) (0.363) (0.353) (0.345) 
STAKE -0.00132 -0.00147 -0.00152 -0.00149 -0.00127 -0.00113 
 (0.00120) (0.00127) (0.00122) (0.00118) (0.00121) (0.00126) 
Constant 0.0826 0.165 -0.144 -0.0543 0.0336 -0.979** 
 (0.218) (0.192) (0.186) (0.170) (0.173) (0.390) 
       
Investment Stage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 
F-test 3.468 3.586 3.486 3.806 3.492 3.730 
R-squared 0.186 0.182 0.185 0.184 0.185 0.182 
Note: This table presents the OLS regressions of the institutional environments and their impact on the implicit 
financing cost in the VC sample. I regressed the total advisory fees (standardised number of total advisors every 
€1,000,000 of transaction size) on shareholder rights index and law enforcement dummies. The robust standard 
errors are in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 








)−1 but the insignificant correlation with advisory fees. Combining the 
baseline results of Model 1 in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, I accept hypothesis (H1b) that higher 
shareholder rights induce lower financing costs based on the view of fund-searching 
enterprises. 
 
5.2.3 Law enforcement 
In this section, I explore the relationship between law enforcement and financing cost based 
on my findings in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.  
 
5.2.3.1 LBO sample 
For the LBO sample, I use the debt enforcement dummies from Djankov et al. (2008) as 
explanatory variables for debt enforcement and present the results of the 2SLS regression in 
rows 2 to 4 in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. My finding for the foreclosure solution (FORECLOSURE) 
is consistent with the aggregated index of creditor rights. In countries where foreclosure is a 
default/preferred settlement of default/insolvency, secured creditors could dissent a 
reorganising petition or seize the collateral immediately before the reorganisation begins. 
However, the results for Model 2 in Table 5.2 also suggest that FORECLOSURE results in 
higher advisory fees. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 4.14 that 
debtors in the foreclosure domain need more advisors. Conversely, I find that debt 
enforcement of LIQUIDATION and REORGANISATION account for lower advisory fees at 
the 1% and 10% significance level, respectively (see Models 3 and 4, Table 5.2).  
 
My findings on the debt enforcement solutions are consistent with those of Djankov et al. 
(2008) except for FORECLOSURE. According to Djankov et al. (2008), the sample countries 




belonging to foreclosure group (the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore) endure 
average insolvency costs of 1-8%31, which is significantly smaller than the average but not 
significantly different from the rest of the high-income level country group. The difference 
between my study and Djankov et al. (2008) is partly because of the computation of debt 
enforcement costs32. Another reason for the different conclusion is that my samples are 
restricted to LBO deals. Unlike a simple bankruptcy case of a hotel (does not expect to 
continue operations), the creditors (usually unsecured debt holders of deal initiators, in LBO 
cases, the PEs) have an incentive to reconstruct the distressed company but rather sell the 
business piecemeal. This creditor “going-concern” preference in LBO deals raises the need 
for additional financing in the future for the target firm to operate. As noted by Djankov et al. 
(2008) overlooking additional financing need may bias their results in favour of foreclosure.  
 
The most important reason why FORECLOSURE accounts for the need for more advisors 
could be that the proportion in the sample of straight bonds in the foreclosure domain is 
larger than the other two domains. LBO deals usually involve a large creditor group with 
various seniority claims. The conflicts of interest among creditors create major complications. 
In the court-supervised domain other than foreclosure, debtors intend to get away from 
formal bankruptcy by using complex financing contracts (e.g., convertible bonds; see Table 
4.10). Contrarily, LBO-backed firms in the foreclosure domain appear to be less adaptable to 
the legal environment so they need more advisors to deal with the complexity of the deal. 
 
                                                            
31 Djankov et al. (2008) apply a wide variety of costs (as a percentage of the value of the estate, borne by all 
parties) such as attorney, notification, publication, administrator, assessor and inspector fees, asset storage and 
preservation costs, liquidation/auctioneer fees, government fees/levies, and other fees. 
32 I use an approximate measure of advisory costs and only consider the cost from the target company’s side. In 
addition, most of my country samples in the foreclosure group are high-income countries (the exceptions are 
Brazil and one offshore island). My sample precludes us from comparing advisory costs between countries with 
different income levels as Djankov et al. (2008) did. 




When taking into the account of the implicit cost of advisory fees, the overall impact of each 
debt enforcement dummy is complicated. The foreclosure solution accounts for significantly 
less WOY at the 1% significance level. This relationship remains robust after replacing WOY 
with an alternative measure of WAS (see Table 5.7). However, FORECLOSURE, at the same 
time, induces significantly higher advisory fees. LIQUIDATION exhibits a significant 
positive correlation with the financing cost of WOY at the 10% significant level (see Table 
5.1) and, at the same time, is significantly correlated with lower advisory fees at the 1% 
significance level (see Table 5.2). My finding on REORGANISATION is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics in Table 4.1. The REORGANISATION results are of higher WOY and 
WAS at the 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. However, this is correlated with 
lower advisory fees at the 10% level. Based on the estimated coefficients of FORECLOSURE, 
LIQUIDATION and REORGANISATION, I cannot reach a conclusion about their overall 
impact on financing cost. 
 
Nevertheless, my study regarding debt enforcement provides new evidence of the correlation 
between LBOs and creditor rights as in Cao et al. (2015). I extend Cao et al.’s (2015) finding 
by highlighting that debt enforcement with different preferences works differently when 
considering advisory fees. I suggest that debt enforcement with a reorganisation (repossession) 
value increases (decreases) a firm’s demand for uncollateralised or unsecured credit, which, 
in turn, raises the offering yield. I also suggested that debt enforcement with a first attempt at 
reorganisation (repossession) will likely decrease (increase) the advisory cost.  




5.2.3.2 VC sample 
1. Public and private enforcement 
In testing law enforcement in the VC sample, I apply the law enforcement index from La 
Porta et al. (1998). The results show that both public and private enforcement impose a 
significant impact on (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1, but work in opposite directions (see rows 7-8, Table 5.3). 
Public enforcement accounts for a significantly lower financing cost across Models 1, 5 and 6. 
However, in Model 3, it is positively related to (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1 at the 10% significance level. A 
plausible reason could be that this variable may be correlated with the error term as discussed 
in Note 29 that this model is the one exception that did not pass all the specification criteria. 
Private enforcement, however, is related to a higher financing cost. This implies that better 
public enforcement, in terms of supervisors’ investigative powers and criminal or civil 
sanctions, encourages the PEs’ confidence thus raising the bidding price they are willing to 
offer to a given target enterprise. The sign of the estimated coefficient of private enforcement 
in rows 7-8, Model 1 in Table 5.3, suggests that private enforcement works unfavourably 
from the demand side of fund-searching enterprises. This argument is coherent with the 
empirical evidence in the private placement market. Private enforcement, to the extent that it 
requires disclosure of detailed equity ownership structure33, of irregular contracts outside the 
ordinary course of business and the higher burden of proof (referring to the difficulty of 
recovering losses from directors and accountants) somehow deprives the information 
advantage of PEs. The information advantage is presumably where abnormal returns come 
from a knowledge resource that financial intermediaries are brokering (Blyler and Coff, 2003; 
Toms et al., 2015). It is reasonable that VCs are less willing to offer a higher bid price to a 
                                                            
33 For example, while VCs search for an exit through an IPO on the main board, the local securities regulation 
committee may require the firm to disclose information about shareholder(s) who directly or indirectly control 
10% of the voting shares. 




given enterprise when private enforcement is tight. My finding regarding private enforcement 
is coherent with that of analyst coverage, which will be discussed in section 5.3. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the test statistics on the correlation between law enforcement and advisory 
fees. The t-statistic in Model 3 indicates at the 5% significance level that in a country with 
solid private enforcement there is less demand for advisory services. However, the role of 
private enforcement is not consistently significant across all models. A plausible reason could 
be that advisory services are more important in public market financing such as the security 
underwriting business, where advisors need to present and advise on the regulatory policy 
recommendations and help prepare related submissions or verifications to public enforcers. 
 
2. A comparison of public and private law enforcement 
To confirm hypothesis (H3), I compare the t-statistics of the two different law enforcement 
regimes (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). The t-statistics show that the two measures of law 
enforcement work in opposite directions; public law enforcement shows a consistent 
significant negative impact on reducing the financing cost of (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1 (see Models 1, 5, 
and 6, Table 5.3) and is insignificantly correlated with advisory fees. I therefore accept 
hypothesis (H3) and conclude that public enforcement dominates private enforcement in 
reducing PE financing cost. My research regarding law enforcement further supports La Porta 
et al.’s (1998) finding using evidence from the private market. Although I hold a transaction 
cost-economising value that is different from that of La Porta et al. (1998), my results are 
consistent with theirs. 
 




5.3. Informal Institutions 
5.3.1 Innovative financing in LBO transactions 
I apply the proportion of structured debt securities (pct_Convertible, pct_Preferred and 
pct_CDS) in each LBO financing deal as a proxy for an innovative financing vehicle and test 
their impact on financing cost. The results are presented in rows 5, 6 and 7, Table 5.1. I find 
significantly lower WOY of convertible debts (pct_Convertible). The observation of preferred 
shares (pct_Preferred) is dropped because of the large missing value. In regressing 
ADVISORS against the various types of debt securities, I did not find any had a significant 
impact (see Table 5.2). This finding implies that debt securities relying on the contractual 
settlement of insolvency risk do not incur significant advisory fees. I conclude that, in the 
case of bankruptcy, a contractual settlement between a debtor and debt holder(s) is 
comparatively cost-effective. This is especially true in countries where reorganisation is the 
first attempt or default settlement for insolvency. This result agrees with business practices, 
e.g., a creditor holding convertible bonds could simply choose not to convert his/her debt into 
equity when a business milestone is not attained as expected. A redeemable preferred 
shareholder in an LBO could choose to redeem the holding when certain events occur. In 
practice, low-cost convertible debts and redeemable preferred equity are issued to risk-averse 
institutional investors whereas most LBO debt securities invested by general partners (GPs) 
are high-yield unsecured debts. I accept hypothesis (H4a) that innovative financing 
instruments facilitate LBO financing by reducing offering yields. 
 
I notice that pct_Unsecure is positively related to the higher financing cost of the WOY in 
Model 3, Table 5.1. Though it is reasonable that unsecured debt usually offers higher yields, 




this cost is not borne by PE fund providers but by the PE managers34. As discussed in section 
1.0, by using the technique of securitisation, PEs can facilitate LBO financing by broadening 
the scope of accredited social capital.  
 
5.3.2 Analyst coverage in VC transactions 
The estimated coefficients of analyst coverage (ANA_COV). in row 9, Table 5.3, show there 
is no significant correlation between ANA_COV and (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1. I also find that the analyst 
coverage is positively correlated with ADVISORS (see Table 5.4). This finding is robust after 
controlling for the information environments of voluntary disclosure (VOLUNTARY) and 
media scrutiny (MEDIA) (see Table 5.9), which suggests the rejection of hypothesis (H4b). 
Although a few studies argue that analysts can help alleviate information asymmetry 
(Cumming, 2008; Manigart et al., 2002; Wright and Ken, 1998), there is no direct evidence 
that analyst coverage accounts for less financing cost from the enterprise view. My finding 
regarding analyst coverage agrees with the survey by Manigart et al. (2002) that the VCs 
increase the target firms’ expenses to release influential soft information, such as prototyping, 
market presence and distribution channnels. My result suggests that, in the private placement 
market where more informed parties have privileged access to better investment opportunities, 
the motivation for analysts to improve information transparency is limited. My finding 
regarding analyst coverage is coherent with the disclosure-based private enforcement 
discussed in section 5.2.3.2. Based on my findings, I conclude that analyst coverage is not 
preferable for PEs and, even if it were, there will be costs from the enterprise’s side. In 
reviewing the detailed deal comments provided by Zephyr, I find that the published deal 
                                                            
34 As discussed in Chapter one, PE managers purchase most of the unsecured securities leaving the debts of 
higher seniority to accredited investors. 




information is limited and is generally restricted to the basic information of managerial board, 
the acquired stake, and rumour dates (available upon request).  
 
5.3.3 Social ties  
I present the coefficients for the social ties of the number of registered 
professionals/employees (PROFESSIONAL) in row 8, Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the ultimate owner 
of the bank (BANK), government and university (GOVT_EDU), and individual PEs 
(INDIVIDUAL) in rows 10, 11 and 12, Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The estimated coefficient of 
PROFESSIONAL exhibits a negative relationship with WOY across all models in Table 5.1. 
This relationship holds in robustness test using WAS as the dependent variable (see Model 2, 
Table 5.7). There is no significant correlation between social ties and ADVISORS. The overall 
relationship between social network and financing cost in the LBO sample partially supports 
hypothesis (H5a). 
 
To investigate the role of social ties in the VC sample, I focus on the business nature of the 
parent organisation. The estimated coefficients in Models 1 to 6, Table 5.3, suggest the 
acceptance of hypothesis (H5b). Consistent with previous studies (Manigart and Wright, 
2013; Wright et al., 2005, 2006), I find that bank-backed and independent VCs are 
competitive bidders who offer higher valuations. In other words, they request lower capital 
returns from the entrepreneur. One notable finding is that university or government-backed 
enterprises pay significantly higher (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1 . A reasonable explanation is the lack of 
competitive bidders in that target investment niche. This is consistent with previous studies 
(Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012; Wright et al., 2006). Universities and governments have 
privileged access to their own start-ups or spin-outs. Appling the measurement of advisory 
fees, my results further reveal that university-backed or government-backed enterprises pay 




lower advisory fees while searching for financing from their parent companies (see Table 5.4). 
A plausible reason is that such fund-searching projects are usually screened by academic or 
expert officers (Wright et al., 2006). As a result, there is less necessity for entrepreneurs to 
hire legal and financial agencies in cooperating with due diligence investigations by outside 
investors in PEs.  
 
5.3.4 Age 
Experience (AGE) exhibits different effects on the explicit costs in the LBO and VC samples. 
With the LBO sample, AGE is associated with a higher WOY (see Models 1, 2, and 4 in Table 
5.1) and ADVISOR, with the former significant across Models 1, 3and 4 in row 9, Table 5.1. 
The coefficient of AGE in Model 1, Table 5.1 shows that one more year experience increases 
the WOY of LBO financing by 2.18%; in other words, 218 basis points. A plausible reason is 
that experienced PE professionals can market high-risk debt securities that offer a higher 
offering yield. This argument is consistent with Chang et al.’s (2013) study that finds that 
PEs are likely to focus on non-pricing services and have a weaker incentive to struggle 
through a “painful” pricing–adjustment process. In the VC sample, the estimated coefficient 
of AGE is not significantly associated with lower (
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)−1. However, Models 1 to 6 in 
Table 5.4, show that it is positively related at the 1% significance level to more ADVISORS. 
A plausible explanation for the higher advisory cost is that experienced VCs are skilled at 
complex contracts for which the target firms need more advisors to provide regulatory 
counselling on various issues. Thus, I reject hypotheses (H6a) and (H6b) and conclude that an 
experienced PE induces higher financing costs. 
 




5.4. A Comparison of Formal and Informal Institutions 
To verify the hypothesis (H7), I conduct the z-test for the two institutional variables groups. 
The results are presented in Table 5.5. The z-statistic suggests that, across all measures of 
financing cost, formal institutions dominate informal institutions in LBO deals. The z-statistic 
of formal institutions is significant at the 1% level. It is worth noting that law enforcement in 
both the LBO and VC samples exerts a significant impact on financing costs although 
working in opposite directions. The informal institution variables in both the LBO and VC 
samples are mostly insignificant. The exceptions are pct_Convertible in the LBO sample 
(consistently significant at the 1% level) and GOVT_EDU in the VC sample (consistently 
significant at the 10% level). Combining these findings, I reject hypothesis (H7). 
 
The results for the formal and informal institutions are noteworthy and generate two 
important new findings. First, informal institutions account for higher explicit financing costs 
in non-formalised financing contracts. This is true for social ties with government and 
university in VC financing. The possible reason for the former outcome is that a VC 
financing contract is private that, in practice, could, to some extent, opt out of formal law 
enforcement. Scott (1995) argues that normative and cognitive institutions are more critical to 
professionals such as VCs. Conversely, informal institution innovative financing instruments 
(pct_Convertible) account for significant and consistently lower financing cost. It is worth 
noting that although the convertible securities have contingencies embedded (e.g., convertible 
rights, redeemable rights), they are, by their nature, securities traded on the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market. Using formalised innovative financing instruments, the desired financing 
conditions are less subject to private negotiation and thus account for lower financing cost.  
 




Second, previous studies argue the rationale for target companies to choose external 
financing through PEs is that PEs are informed agents that can adjust to the formal 
institutional environment using contracts (Cao et al., 2013; Qian and Strahan, 2006). It is 
worth noting that the sophistication of PE professionals (see discussion regarding AGE in 
section 5.3.4) in LBOs results in higher WOY. My study provides new evidence for the 
intermediation equilibrium approach (Chan, 1983) by showing that PE managers do not 
provide a free service and the cost of financing through professional intermediaries is 
significant. My finding of an advisory fee in VC deals also suggests that contracting with the 
external shareholders of VCs, especially experienced shareholders, creates significant legal 
and accounting costs. 




Table 5.5 The Z-test of Hypothesis (3H) and Hypothesis (7H) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝐵𝑂,𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑧𝑖,𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠
′ + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖,𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡− 𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
′ + 𝛽3𝑧𝑖,𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
′ + 𝛽4𝑧𝑖,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡+
′ 𝛽5𝑧𝑖,𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
′ + 𝜉𝑖 
Formal Institution  z-Stats 
Law 𝜷𝟏
𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔








Informal Institution   
Innovation 𝜷𝟑












0.701 -0.000750** 0.0218* 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝐶,𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑧𝑖,𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠
′ + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖,𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡




′ + 𝜉𝑖 
Formal Institution  z-Stats 
Law 𝜷𝟏
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔



































1.029 3.525* -0.00559 
Note: The z-statistics are computed following Lee et al. (2014) with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
5.5. Economic Efficiency Analysis 
I now discuss the economic analysis of PE-backed financing. I apply the theoretical 
framework developed in section 2.7 to evaluate economic efficiency. 
 
5.5.1 Distribution efficiency 
My interpretation of the distribution efficiency of PE financing is driven by asset allocation 
of optimising value, from the perspective of fund-raising enterprises. I see PEs as financial 




















































































































intermediaries who emerge to help fund-raising projects with a quality (q) to access the 
largest possible social capital thus promoting an equilibrium set of φ (p, q). In this process, 
PEs hold a ‘1-p’ proportion of the fund that is generally contracted with embedded 
contingencies to secure a risk-return optimisation for the fund providers. On the empirical 
front, the financial intermediary role is significant since the settlement of such financing 
contracts involves taking advantage of exemptions in laws and speculating investment 
opportunities (Kolb et al., 2011)40. To prove the above proposition, I use the data on LBO 
transactions and rerun my regression with the number of buyers and transaction size as the 
dependent variables. The results are presented in Table 5.6. I find that unsecured debt 
(pct_Unsecure) significantly accounts for a larger buyer group with each holding a smaller 
piece of debt (see columns 5 to 8, Table 5.6). This suggests that the issuance of innovative 
debt securities leads to a larger group of fund providers (γ) who invest through a PE. 
However, there is concern that these investors can be questioned about their accreditation and 
sophistication. This concern was previously documented in detail in the review of Regulation 
D (Campbell Jr, 1985; Warren III, 1983). Instead of interpreting an innovative financing 
contract (those with the convertible rights, redeemable rights or subordination) as a “credit 
enhancing mechanism” (as many marketing brochures did), this study views it in the same 
way as Courtois (2009) who notes that innovative financing contracts mainly serve the 
purpose of market-reaching. I argue that credit risk cannot disappear but can only be 
distributed piecemeal (a larger group of investors with each holding a smaller size of risky 
assets) or is held until the market turns around (issuing risky securities under good market 
conditions).  
                                                            
40 Using the US as an example, there are two issuance exemptions (section 4(2) and Regulation D) and two 
resale exemptions (section 4(1) and Rule 144). One notable exemption in Regulation D is that certain offers and 
sales can be made to an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35 “non-accredited” investors 
(Schwieger, 2007). With such an exemption, the issuers have reason to believe the investor is accredited so long 
as they use “reasonable care”. 




Table 5.6 The Test Distribution Efficiency Using the LBO Sample 
VARIABLES 
Transaction size 
Smaller buyer group (less than 50% quartile) Bigger buyer group (larger than 50% quartile) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CREDITOR 0.0810*    -0.0648    
 (0.0464)    (0.108)    
FORECLOSURE   0.243*    -0.643**   
  (0.139)    (0.249)   
LIQUIDATION   -    1.082***  
       (0.108)  
REORGANISATION    -0.243*    -0.0997 
    (0.139)    (0.290) 
Pct_Unsecure 1.399* 1.399* 1.531* 1.399* -0.302*** -0.322*** -0.237*** -0.274*** 
 (0.804) (0.804) (0.777) (0.804) (0.0813) (0.0809) (0.0814) (0.0826) 








 (0.000424) (0.000424) (0.000399) (0.000424) (0.000148) (0.000151) (0.000138) (0.000145) 
AGE -0.00173 -0.00173 -0.00234 -0.00173 0.0158*** 0.0162*** 0.0163*** 0.0156*** 
 (0.00194) (0.00194) (0.00183) (0.00194) (0.00187) (0.00180) (0.00190) (0.00191) 
MARKET 0.0187 0.0187 0.00424 0.0187 -0.0422 -0.0608* -0.0126 -0.0278 
 (0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0455) (0.0509) (0.0340) (0.0351) (0.0333) (0.0351) 
BENCHMARK -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.0450*** -0.0463*** -0.0424*** -0.0437*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0367) (0.0369) (0.00694) (0.00687) (0.00634) (0.00692) 
Constant 7.857*** 7.649*** 7.329*** 7.164*** 2.619*** 2.987*** 2.765*** 3.167*** 
 (0.183) (0.152) (0.180) (0.188) (0.884) (0.723) (0.702) (0.581) 
         
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77 77 77 77 92 92 92 92 
R-squared 0.372 0.372 0.371 0.372 0.389 0.398 0.389 0.398 
Note: This table presents the result of the robustness test I apply to the OLS model. I regress the transaction size 
from both the smaller buyer group and bigger buyers group against the aggregated creditor rights index and 
three litigation dummy of creditor rights (natural logarithm of deal value). Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively 
 
Our investigation of implicit financing costs and the advisory fees of VC financing is 
consistent with the previous studies by Cumming and Johan (2009), Manigart et al. (2002) 
and Wright and Ken (1998). My argument is that VCs, in their efforts to screen and monitor 
target investable firms, generate monopoly profit. Such monopoly profit could take the form 
of a lower bidding price that results in higher financing cost from the enterprise’s side. This is 
especially true in government and university-backed VCs. Monopoly profit could also incur 
significant advisory fees from the enterprise’s side that searches for agent financing through 
experienced VCs. By examining the implicit cost and its correlation with the informal 
institutions of social networks and reputation binding, I provide evidence for the theoretical 




prediction of Chan (1983) (see section 2.4.2). I show that, given the capital resource 
distribution set of (p, q), the demand side of PE would expect a fee level (d) that is likely to 
deviate from the optimal level. Like Diamond (1984), financing through an intermediary is 
Pareto-optimal only when the entrepreneur retains an expected return at least as high as 
he/she would by sidestepping intermediaries to contract directly with the depositors. 
 
5.5.2 Information efficiency 
In this study, I use VC-backed financing as a sample to explore the role financial 
intermediaries play in improving information efficiency in the private market. My result is 
consistent with the existing finance literature. Finance studies of information efficiency 
generally aim at fair asset pricing since the price serves as a signal of asset value. I find that 
information transparency, which is enforced through the formal institution of public 
enforcement or independent media, reduces the risk premium bid by PEs. Compulsory 




)−1 (see the robust test, row 5, Table 5.9). This supports the argument that 
more signalling precision makes the price more informative about the invested firm/project 
(Harris et al., 2014). I conjecture that information efficiency increases the utility of the given 
combination of {(𝑝1, 𝑞1); (𝑝2, 𝑞2); ⋯ (𝑝𝑘, 𝑞𝑘)}in a competitive intermediation (CI) world.  
 
My argument is for an efficiency gauge in the assumption that financial intermediaries should 
be the lowest cost information provider in an optimal market (Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
There is concern that an intermediary that results from information asymmetry deviates from 
the optimal level and serves as the proxy for efficiency loss. According to Chan (1983), 
search cost from both the investor side μ and the enterprise side d consists of a fee for a given 
distribution of sets (p,q). In this empirical study, although I could not solve the optimal level 




of intermediary costs, I could conclude, with confidence, that there is a significant 
relationship between information disclosure and advisory fees.  
 
Our finding regarding information efficiency extends the existing literature in two ways. First, 
information asymmetry in the private placement market is favourable for PE professionals 
because it is from where abnormal returns or speculative gains come. Second, my finding 
regarding public law enforcement and the information environment indicates that individual, 
third-party information disclosure – as a public good – is socially optimal for improving the 
financing cost for entrepreneurs. Conversely, because the information in a private placement 
is not subject to mandatory disclosure regulations, PEs are better off withholding information 
of investment opportunities. Their disclosure effort is less likely to be motivated by a socially 
optimal purpose but is more likely self-serving (e.g., soliciting investors for later financing 
rounds) (Cumming, 2008; SSBCI, 2014). Considering the information producing cost borne 
by enterprises, my argument is that such disclosure is not socially desirable. 
 
5.5.3 Governance efficiency 
Revisiting the results of the VC sample in Table 5.3, among the three formal legal indices I 
find strong evidence that relief from the proxy voting restriction significantly reduces the 
explicit financing costs for target firms. The same is also true for the bylaw on voting policy. 
This finding agrees with the assertion by Deangelo and Deangelo (1985) and La Porta et al. 
(2000) that voting rights affect investors’ valuation of target firms. My study concerning 
governance efficiency highlights the voting policy remedy of agent problems in PE financing. 
 
Further, I expect that successful execution of voting rights is also subject to the control level 
of VCs because they need certain control rights to monitor the target companies and to track 




their business potential although they do not obtain majority control in the early stage. The 
subsequent alignment of cash flow or profit can be achieved through control exercised by 
VCs over the appointment of executives and in overseeing the implementation of the strategy 
of the target company (Walker, 2000). I note that two sticks of minority-friendly shareholder 
rights, class action and oppressed mechanism, are less favourable for PEs. A plausible reason 
is that in the post-investment stage, changes in the bylaw such as the company code and 
voting policy could be proposed by GPs and the directors. Such changes could work in favour 
of GPs or the target enterprise, depending on the bargaining power of the parties and the 
country-level usual practice and trends.  
 
5.6. Conclusions  
In the final analysis, my findings suggest that stronger protection of creditor and shareholder 
rights, as well as better law enforcement, account for lower explicit financing costs. Judicial 
efficiency, however, can be associated with a higher implicit cost of advisory fees. Informal 
institutions interact with formal institutions positively or negatively and create secondary 
effects on economic outcomes. I find a consistent correlation between years of business and 
higher financing cost in both the LBO and VC samples. This suggests that reputation bonding 
is still significant around regulatory barriers and induces economic inefficiency. 




Table 5.7 Robustness Test Using Different Dependent Variables with the LBO Sample 
VARIABLE 
1st stage 2nd stage 
𝑳𝒏(𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑵𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵)̂  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
WAS WAS WAS WAS 
      
CREDITOR -0.341*** -57.16**    
 (0.121) (25.24)    
FORECLOSURE    -189.2***   
   (49.37)   
LIQUIDATION    10.62  
    (26.60)  
REORGANISATION     101.9** 
     (42.31) 
Pct_Unsecure -0.558*** -46.00 -17.14 93.13** 34.52 
 (0.0906) (71.03) (38.32) (43.39) (36.47) 
Pct_CDS 1.205*** 244.1 171.5** -66.27 69.95 
 (0.143) (155.5) (76.27) (81.63) (60.28) 
Pct_Convertible 0.283 384.2*** 376.5*** 311.8*** 339.0*** 
 (0.181) (52.07) (38.24) (31.25) (30.25) 
PROFESSIONAL -0.00154*** -0.297 -0.246** 0.0771 -0.0961 
 (0.000299) (0.194) (0.123) (0.110) (0.0857) 
AGE 0.0133*** 2.393 1.672** -0.742 0.469 
 (0.00173) (1.586) (0.706) (0.887) (0.647) 
MARKET -0.140*** -46.79** -42.22*** -7.183 -26.75** 
 (0.0307) (19.26) (13.19) (13.85) (10.92) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁)̂   -181.4 -128.4*** 65.75 -31.94 
  (117.3) (48.99) (73.54) (43.02) 
Constant 8.448*** 1,679* 1,244*** -222.5 435.0 
 (1.115) (880.8) (381.8) (549.1) (294.6) 
      
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 
R-Squared 0.629 0.169 0.337 0.327 0.413 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-Stage F Stat 19.36***     
Wald F Stat  9.570 11.25 6.523 31.46 
Hansen J  0.0265 1.241 6.446* 3.169 
Note: This table presents the results of the 2SLS test using the LBO sample. I regressed the explicit financing 
cost of the WAS on aggregated creditor rights index and three debt enforcement dummies (foreclosure, 
liquidation and reorganisation) against explicit financing cost of the WAS. I addressed the endogeneity concern 
of target firm size (natural logarithm of deal value). The first stage regression is reported in the left-end column 
(only the first-stage result of the creditor rights index is reported). The instrument variables are Legal Rights 
Index, Financial through Local Market, Availability of Financial Services and Regulation of Securities 
Exchanges (Schwab and Sala-I-Martin, 2010; 2015). The second stage is regressed using the estimated 
transaction size given in columns1 to 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 




Table 5.8 Robustness Test Using Different Dependent Variables with the VC Sample 
VARIABLE 
1st stage 2nd stage 
𝑳𝒏(𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑮𝑬𝑻_𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)̂  













SHAREHOLDER  -0.0263 -5.013**      
 (0.226) (2.466)      
Proxy_voting   -10.62**     
   (4.213)     
Ownership_limit    5.673    
    (4.990)    
Class_action     4.011   
     (18.11)   
Voting_policy      -7.348  
      (5.131)  
Oppressed       20.17 
       (22.88) 
PUBL_ENFORCEMENT 0.506 -53.62 10.76 51.73 -1.509 -37.78 -31.23 
 (0.598) (35.36) (23.65) (51.37) (24.51) (35.70) (45.02) 
PRIV_ENFORCEMENT 0.0336 139.5** 88.09** 10.79 34.45 104.1* 91.73 
 (0.833) (57.72) (43.82) (58.15) (61.43) (58.84) (72.41) 
ANA_COV -0.0519 -7.599 -6.201 -10.41 -9.292 -8.361 -9.782 
 (0.220) (11.35) (11.29) (11.03) (11.70) (11.44) (11.17) 
BANK -0.0101 -11.18 -13.14 -11.81 -10.96 -11.51 -12.18 
 (0.240) (12.88) (13.11) (12.80) (12.81) (12.91) (12.96) 
GVT_EDU -0.193 30.67* 26.41 26.27 28.61 29.26 27.14 
 (0.274) (18.08) (17.07) (17.67) (18.08) (17.94) (17.60) 
INDIVIDUAL -0.317 -11.81 -13.27 -12.04 -12.06 -12.02 -12.86 
 (0.204) (11.29) (11.27) (11.35) (11.61) (11.32) (11.34) 
AGE 0.00395 -0.00131 -0.00649 -0.0295 -0.0140 -0.00109 -0.00641 
 (0.00936) (0.0559) (0.0548) (0.0516) (0.0537) (0.0559) (0.0549) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)̂   -0.889 -0.683 0.173 -0.0877 -0.642 -0.185 
  (3.210) (3.194) (3.351) (3.242) (3.217) (3.216) 
MARKET 0.987 203.4** 213.7** 209.7** 207.0** 205.8** 209.1** 
 (1.476) (84.51) (85.16) (84.03) (84.09) (84.39) (84.31) 
STAKE 0.0106** 0.405 0.384 0.401 0.429 0.419 0.432 
 (0.00460) (0.308) (0.296) (0.320) (0.330) (0.310) (0.314) 
Constant 2.808***       
 (0.524)       
Observations 232 181 181 181 181 181 181 
R-Squared 0.498 0.283 0.295 0.278 0.272 0.278 0.276 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-Stage F Stat 13.31***       
2nd-Stage F Stat   3.566 3.369 3.117 3.094 3.281 3.566 
Wald F Stat  94.39 84.06 94.27 72.87 92.83 94.87 
Hansen J  0.140 1.509 2.93e-05 0.389 0.0529 0.0461 
Note: This table presents the results of the 2SLS model using the VC subsample. I regressed alternative 
measures of financing costs of (EV/Revenue)−1 on the shareholder rights index and law enforcement dummies. 
I addressed the endogeneity concern of target firm size (natural logarithm number of the employees). The first 
stage regression is reported in the left-end column (only that of the aggregated shareholder rights index is 
reported). The instrument variables are index of Indulgence versus Restraint (Hofstede, 2015) and revenue of 
target firm from Zephyr (not reported here). The second stage is regressed using the estimated target size given 
in columns 1 to 6. The robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
There are several highlights in my results. For example, in reducing the financing cost of 
distressed or restructuring businesses like LBO deals, creditor rights with a socially optimal 
value of a “going concern” value dominates the liquidation value. For shareholder rights, the 
voting rights, among all sticks of shareholder rights, ensure a predictable alignment of cash 
flow or profit from investees thus encourages LPs to offer higher enterprise multiples thereby 
lowering the financing cost from the enterprise side. I note that network ties in VC-backed 
deals account for the economics of information transparency. However, such a knowledge 




advantage raises monopoly profit for VCs that, in turn, increases the financing cost of fund-
searching enterprises. However, within some disclosure activities, analysts’ coverage does 
not alleviate information asymmetry when the information monopoly is the main source of 
PEs’ speculative profit. I also find that PEs in LBOs help the borrower obtain easier access to 
social capital at a lower cost by introducing innovative financing vehicles (in my case, the 
convertible bond). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that using innovative debt 
securities raises the leverage to a level that is too high, which could hurt the economy41. In 
the real business world, even the most experienced PEs42 could fail in such highly leveraged 
deals.  
 
With the empirical confirmation of my research hypotheses, I now proceed to the study’s 
conclusion. In Chapter six, I review my results and discuss the four research objectives of the 
study. The chapter concludes with the practical implications and possible future study. 
                                                            
41 It has been reported that 40% of the US private equity deals exceed the recommended debt levels. The largest 
four LBOs also failed. News retrieved from https://www.thebalance.com/lbo-leveraged-buyout-definition-
threat-3306080. 
42 For example, the Harman deal brokered by KKR and Goldman Sachs in 2007 (Damodaran, 2008). 




Table 5.9 Robustness Test of the Explanatory Variables of Information Disclosure 
1st stage 2nd stage 
Dependent Variable 𝑳𝒏(𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑮𝑬𝑻_𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)̂  




















SHAREHOLDER -0.0263 -2.013***      
 (0.226) (0.731)      
PUBL_ENFORCEMENT -0.112 -24.80*** 3.388 33.39 -5.509 -18.41*** -16.55** 
 (4.349) (9.091) (4.263) (20.43) (4.436) (7.041) (6.665) 
PRIV_ENFORCEMENT -1.048 59.30*** 22.03** -13.32 -18.76 45.57*** 39.90** 
 (3.948) (21.38) (10.64) (14.63) (14.39) (16.86) (15.70) 
ANA_COV -0.00612 0.977 0.778 0.117 0.834 0.988 0.781 
 (0.327) (1.574) (1.571) (1.589) (1.541) (1.575) (1.571) 
COMPULSORY -0.201 -6.218** -5.874** -4.279* -5.279** -6.232** -5.879** 
 (1.431) (2.519) (2.499) (2.569) (2.615) (2.521) (2.499) 
VOLUNTARY -0.310 -1.573 -1.334 -0.685 -1.621 -1.588 -1.337 
 (0.329) (1.374) (1.403) (1.564) (1.414) (1.373) (1.403) 
MEDIA 0.0557 -0.635 -0.671 -0.646 -0.441 -0.632 -0.671 
 (0.200) (1.027) (1.030) (1.034) (1.019) (1.027) (1.030) 
BANK 0.174 0.286 0.188 -0.0367 0.368 0.292 0.189 
 (0.338) (1.824) (1.811) (1.777) (1.812) (1.825) (1.811) 
GVT_EDU -0.449 3.625* 3.622* 3.958* 4.150* 3.629* 3.622* 
 (0.386) (2.118) (2.099) (2.065) (2.164) (2.119) (2.099) 
INDIVIDUAL -0.378 -1.372 -1.433 -1.366 -1.005 -1.366 -1.433 
 (0.329) (1.581) (1.599) (1.622) (1.540) (1.579) (1.598) 
AGE 0.00395 -0.00131 -0.00649 -0.0295 -0.0140 -0.00109 -0.00641 
 (0.00936) (0.0559) (0.0548) (0.0516) (0.0537) (0.0559) (0.0549) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)̂   -0.0468 -0.0376 0.0464 0.0414 -0.0467 -0.0378 
  (0.499) (0.498) (0.489) (0.481) (0.499) (0.498) 
MARKET 1.819 11.98 10.36 7.042 13.97 12.09 10.38 
 (1.917) (10.46) (10.35) (10.18) (10.91) (10.47) (10.35) 
STAKE 0.00232 0.0516 0.0502 0.0505 0.0581* 0.0517 0.0502 
 (0.00668) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0352) (0.0344) (0.0332) (0.0333) 
Constant 4.597**       
 (1.922)       
Observations 232 181 181 181 181 181 181 
R-Squared 0.498 0.283 0.295 0.278 0.272 0.278 0.276 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-Stage F Stat 14.58***       
2nd-Stage F Stat   2.162 2.097 1.566 1.809 2.159 2.162 
Wald F Stat  32.24 36.58 43.14 38.76 31.95 32.24 
Hansen J  0.275 1.045 3.166 1.895 0.215 0.275 
Note: This table presents the results of the 2SLS model using the VC subsample. I regressed the different 
variables of information environment against(
EV
EBITDA
)−1. I addressed the endogeneity concern of target firm size 
(natural logarithm number of the employees). The first stage regression is reported in the left-end column (only 
that of the aggregated shareholder rights index is reported). The instrument variables are the index of Indulgence 
versus Restraint (Hofstede, 2015) and revenue of target firm from Zephyr (not reported here). The second stage 
is regressed using the estimated target size given in columns 1 to 6. The robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.








Section 6.2 reviews the significance and methodology of the study. Section 6.3 summarises 
the empirical findings and suggests the policy implications to be drawn from them. Section 
6.4 discusses the limitations of the study, before recommending possible future research 
avenues in section 6.5.  
 
6.2. Study Review 
The literature enhanced my understanding of the links between the institutional environment 
and financing activities. However, there is no closed-form of the link across all types of 
financing activity. The uniqueness of PE-backed financing lies in the PEs complex funding 
model. PEs are hybrid financing institutions of “commercial bankers” (deposit-lenders) and 
“merchant/investment bankers” (underwriter-dealers). The PE professionals aim to provide 
funds for high-risk businesses through a variety of innovative funding vehicles. The growth 
of the PE market raises the need to investigate the favourable institutional environment where 
PE innovates its way around regulatory barriers and develops a business practice to speculate 
in investment opportunities. The emphasis of my study goes well beyond answering the 
question of PE financing efficiency; it develops the first and second order reason to explore 
its universal applicability in the ever-evolving alternative financing phenomenon. 
 




In this study, I collected data from two subcategories of PE-backed deals, venture capital (VC) 
and leveraged buyout (LBO), around the world. I investigate deals with information dating 
back to the 1970s. I compare and analyse the financing cost of a sample of PE-backed deals 
and examine their correlation with the institutional environment. My study fills a gap in the 
literature and generates policy implications.  
 
Because PE is itself a product of the specialisation of financial markets, like accountants and 
lawyers acting as financial intermediaries (Sahlman, 1990), PE financing services should be 
more cost-economic than if the target company searches for funds elsewhere. Holding this 
view, I judge the fair pricing of a PE’s services based on a nation-wide economy. I measure 
explicit and implicit financing costs. My sample comprises 486 LBO deals and 2,998 VC 
deals. The LBO data were obtained from CapitalIQ, and the VC data were from Zephyr. The 
LBO sample covers from 1970 whereas the VC sample covers only those since 1997. The 
financing cost of the LBO sample is the weighted average offering yield of debt securities 
whereas the VC sample is the reciprocal of the enterprise multiple offered by the VCs. 
 
The institutional environment I examine includes formal and informal institutions. The 
former refers to the legal environment. The legal index of creditor rights and debt 
enforcement are applied in specific PE-backed deals of LBO financing; shareholder rights 
and law enforcement are applied in VC-backed deals. I obtain the index of creditor rights 
from Djankov et al. (2007). The debt enforcement index is the insolvency litigation procedure 
(Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2000). Shareholder rights were manually composed 
using a newly issued survey of shareholder rights by CFAI (2013). I obtained the law 
enforcement index from La Porta et al. (2006). The other category of institutional 
environment I examine is informal institutions. I explore the issuance of innovative debt 




instruments in LBO deals, the analyst coverage in VC-backed deals, and the social ties and 
years of business in both the LBO and VC deals.  
 
I regress the comprehensive observations of explicit financing cost detected from both LBO 
and VC financing against the target formal and informal institutions. I apply a two-stage least 
squares regression using the instrumented regressor to account for deal-size heterogeneity 
that may contribute to an endogeneity problem for my findings. In testing the implicit 
financing cost of advisory fees against institutional variables in LBO and VC samples, I do 
not address the endogeneity of transaction size or target size because it was not a concern as I 
previously conjectured. Analysis of the model specification in Section 5.1 indicates that each 
model has decent explanatory power. The robustness checks in Chapter five also suggest that 
my findings are robust to alternative independent variables and different sample composition. 
Table 6.1 summarises the empirical conclusions of this study.  
Table 6.1 A Summary of the Results and Hypotheses Tests 
Hypothesis Decision 
H1a LBO financing enjoys a lower weighted average yield and intermediary fees in countries with 
higher creditor rights standards. 
Partially 
supported 
H1b VC financing enjoys a lower enterprise multiple and intermediary fees in countries with higher 
shareholder rights standards. 
Supported 
H2a Law enforcement reduces the LBO weighted average yield and intermediary fees. Not 
supported 




H3 Public enforcement dominates private enforcement in reducing financing costs in VC-backed 
transactions. 
Supported 
H4a In LBO financing, there is a negative correlation between innovative financing tools and weighted 
average yield and intermediary fees. 
Supported 
H4b In VC financing, there is a negative correlation between analyst coverage and financing cost 
(reciprocal of enterprise multiple) and intermediary fees. 
Rejected 




H5b VC managers’ affiliations with financial institutions offer a higher VC enterprise multiple and 
charge lower intermediary fees. 
Supported 
H6a Older PEs help to reduce the LBO financing cost (weighted average yield) but charge higher 
intermediary fees. 
Rejected 
H6b Older PEs help to reduce the VC financing cost (reciprocal of enterprise multiple) but charge 
higher intermediary fees. 
Partially 
supported 
H7 Informal norm plays a more important role in reducing financing cost in both LBO and VC 
transactions. 
Rejected 




6.3. A Summary of the Findings of the Research Objectives 
6.3.1 Research objective one 
In this study, I point to a generic approach to assess financial intermediaries, i.e., the 
financing cost from the fund demand-side. The empirical result shows that using financing 
cost as a fair standard to judge the efficiency of a financing activity is not only 
mathematically possible but also economically meaningful. For a number of reasons, I expect 
the cost-economy standard can be generalised and further developed to a wider range of 
financing intermediaries.  
 
First, as discussed in section 2.4.2.1, because of the complexity of the PE business model, the 
intermediary equilibrium approach is the most adaptable approach compared with the asset 
class and principal approaches. The financial intermediary approach looks at a bigger picture 
of the wide economy where all participants work towards the end of social well-being, such 
as entrepreneurship, productivity, information transparency, employment and innovation. It 
does not serve the one-party interests such as limited partners, PE fund unitholders or PE 
professionals. As a result, the intermediary equilibrium approach serves as a fair standard to 
judge the appearance and legitimacy of any financing process over time. Second, the 
emergence of any financing intermediary is associated with specialisation of the financial 
markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In the process of specialisation, the costs in the 
transaction of services and products between specialities arise. A cost-economy rule can be 
easily applied to judge the new financing intermediaries such as crowdfunding, peer-to-peer 
financing and other forthcoming financial intermediaries. Third, transaction cost is viewed as 
having great value and deserves further development in the ever-evolving financing activities 
(Collins and Fabozzi, 1991; Lesmond et al., 1999). The literature provides a parameter 
framework to measure the cost, such as search cost μ or fee level of d, induced by financing 




through intermediaries (Chan, 1983). In this study, I conduct a number of trials to judge 
distribution, information and governance efficiency in all stages of PE-backed financing. It 
would be worth further investigating the wider area of economic efficiency proposed by 
classical theories such as allocation efficiency (Markovits, 1975), productive efficiency 
(Samuelson, 1962) or Pareto efficiency (Pareto, 1902; 1916).  
 
6.3.2 Research objective two 
The substitution hypothesis of financing cost in my study consists of both explicit and 
implicit costs. I provide measures of explicit financing cost from the demand-side of PE-
backed firms to enhance my understanding of the economic role of PE. I also introduce the 
implicit costs paid to consultants, lawyers and accountants, often excluded from existing 
studies that can be significant for PE-backed firms in the real business world. I acknowledge 
that this explicit and implicit motivation raises two distinct measures of cost that do not 
consistently correspond to tested institutional factors. Furthermore, unlike the explicit cost, 
which is a number, the implicit cost takes the form of advisory fees. This variable design 
precludes us from aggregating the overall financing cost of PE-backed firms. There is a 
concern that when one institutional factor is significantly correlated with both cost measures 
with opposite signs, I could not make a conclusive judgement of my hypothesis. However, 
my overall results, with one exception, are unambiguous. In my LBO sample, creditor rights 
are negatively related to offering yield but, at the same time, positively related to advisory 
fees. Both cases are consistently significant. Apart from this, all other study hypotheses are 
confirmed. 
 




6.3.3 Research objective three 
The third research objective examines a comprehensive spectrum of the institutional 
environment that presumably shapes the PE business practice and economic outcomes. My 
examined institutional features are significant regarding their diverse geographic span. Using 
country borders as the determinant of the institutional environment, my sample covers 
distinct regions of the world, Asia Pacific, the US, and the EU. However, emerging markets 
such as China, Brazil, and Russia, are rarely covered in existing studies. My examined 
institutional features are specific in their socially optimal value. I examined three distinct 
preferences of debt enforcement procedures before judging the impact of creditor rights on 
restructuring LBO business deals. For shareholder rights, I decomposed the bundle of rights 
into sticks and analysed the effect of each stick separately. The analysis of law enforcement 
also raises an important view that the legitimacy of rights and successful claims over the 
same rights are two different things. Even if the legal rights are delineated, the claim for and 
enforcement of the rights could raise costs.  
 
6.3.4 Research objective four 
Research objective four generates a series of critical informal institutional features that 
determine the overall financing cost. I provide novel evidence of a normative, cognitive 
institution that presumably shapes the PE professionals’ business practice. Based on a norm 
of PE-expected professional settings, I find that financing through intermediaries is not cost 
effective in all the areas, such as information gathering or search efforts, as proclaimed in 
existing studies (Fama, 1985; Mayer, 1988; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Specifically, my test of 
the hypothesis (H4a) shows that PEs’ search efforts facilitate high-risk businesses (start-ups, 
SMEs, distressed business) to gain access to a broader scope of social capital. However, I 
cannot generalise this efficiency to other areas such as information gathering. The rejection of 




hypothesis (H4b) suggests VCs are less motivated to improve the information asymmetry 
since they are brokers of information and can extract rent for intermediary services (Blyler 
and Coff, 2003; Toms et al., 2015). As a financial intermediary becomes more complicated, 
there will be new norms established that will exhibit appropriateness. I propose that a norm is 
a proven efficiency as far as it serves the cost-economy approach. In my examination of the 
cognitive institution of social network and years of business, I find reputational bonding and 
knowledge advantage explains the higher explicit financing cost. Such diseconomies could 
not be easily mitigated because the social network is based more on personal relationships 
than formal authority (Burt, 2009). The cognitive institution differs from a normative 
institution in that the former is an objective working at all societal levels and dominates all 
economic departments including financial markets.  
 
6.4. Implications 
In theoretical implications, I advance the literature with two predictions. First, law 
enforcement matters significantly in the completed part of the contracts leaving the 
incomplete part enforced by informal institutions. Second, additional costs compromise the 
judicial efficiency of legal rights. The cost associated with a claim of legal rights can be 
significant even though the protection of such rights is clearly delineated. 
 
My investigation of distribution efficiency highlights the importance of the self-discipline of 
financial intermediaries, especially those in the centre of the social network. This finding is 
important to investors. In a private financing contract, PEs are the more informed party that is 
expert in taking advantage of exemptions in laws and speculating on investment 
opportunities. When drawing up a contract with sophisticated investors in PEs, one should 




expect additional advisory fees not only at the contracting stage but also at the enforcement 
stage.  
 
My study also has important implications for government, regulatory organisations, licensing 
agencies and professional associations. First, as markets innovate their way around 
regulations, I expect new financing intermediaries such as peer-to-peer lending, crowd-
funding, and other unknown forthcoming intermediaries, to emerge to serve SMEs, start-up 
ventures or distressed enterprises. It will be of particular interest for policymakers to promote 
or enforce standardised deal language (including a deal pricing model such as EV/EBITDA) 
because it signals social capital with deal information. Meanwhile, the financing cost is lower 
using standardised contractual settlements (such as debt securities in LBO deals) compared 
with tailoring contingencies. This is because negotiating and enforcing the latter are both 
costly and more likely subject to moral hazard or other ethical problems.  
 
The concern of potential costs also raises the need for a professional association to promote a 
higher level of prudential standard for financial intermediaries in a less-regulated market. The 
informal institution of networking and reputation bonding is difficult to address in the short-
term, which is the reason government intervention is required. Laws or regulations can 
impose liability on equity investors (in most cases; GPs are mostly incorporated in a limited 
liability partnership) for the loan taken by a firm, especially those looking for mergers and 
acquisitions or restructuring through leveraged buyouts. This would discourage aggressive 
leveraging thereby improving the PEs’ scrutiny. To better match the social capital and 
investment opportunity, financing ease should be given to projects that promote economic 
wellbeing such as innovation and employment. 
 




Finally, my study highlights the need for the “public good” to break down the monopoly rents 
in net banking. One example of public good I propose is a government-backed PE fund. 
Examples from Canada, Australia, Israel, the UK and the US (Barkoczy, 2009; Colombo et 
al., 2016; Cumming, 2007) show that such financing vehicles add value to the national 
economy by various means. Another public good I propose is information disclosure. Based 
on my results, compulsory disclosure is more optimal than analyst coverage.  
 
6.5. Limitations of the Study and Avenues for Further Research 
This study has several limitations. First, my study includes institutional indexes with different 
time regimes. The creditor rights index was developed in 2006, and the shareholder rights 
index is based on a 2013 survey. The law enforcement index is from the study by La Porta et 
al. (2006). I do not consider the amendment of La Porta et al.’s (1997) work by Spamann 
(2010) because the revision is restricted to the anti-director index part and not that of law 
enforcement. The index instrument variables are from Schwab and Sala-i-Martin (2010; 
2015) and Hofstede (2015). Given that my PE financing samples cover over 40 years, there is 
a concern that my data are subject to the limitation of a time-regime mismatch. However, the 
time regime bias should not be a critical concern in my study. Culture values are extremely 
stable over time; it takes decades for cultures to shift. Even so, the rankings among cultures 
remain intact (Hofstede et al., 2011). 
 
Secondly, in our LBO sample, I do not differentiate between the straight bond and those 
embedded with options whose financing cost may be better assessed using option adjusted 
spread (OAS) and not offering yield.  Since my study has a distinct focus on the financing 
cost, in my study of LBO financing, the offering yield at issuance in the primary market, I do 
not consider the ex-post performance of bonds in the secondary market where OAS is widely 




used to judge the fair-pricing of the option-embedded bond. Admittedly, there can be a 
difference between the spread (comparable z-spread of an option-free bond) and OAS. 
However, such a difference, as widely acknowledged in all financing tools, is the main source 
of gain or loss that investors’ speculate. Considering that such differences determine the 
attractiveness of the bond, the OAS is not as important to bond issuers as it is to bond 
investors who are, however, not the target of my study. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that 
pooling straight bonds and option-embedded bonds distorts my main results. Unfortunately, 
data that would enhance the study’s analysis are not available. 
 
Thirdly, the specification of my statistical regression can be substantially improved through 
better choice of an instrument variable. One alternative is culture dimension measures from 
Tang and Koveos (2008). In Tang and Koveo’s (2008) work on cultural dimension, the 
sample countries cover a larger scope including developing countries that Hofstede (2015) 
did not consider. As a robustness test, I use long-term orientation versus short-term normative 
orientation (LTO_TK) and power distance index (PDI_TK) and reran Model 3.3b. My main 
findings remain unchanged after replacing the instrument variables. However, the Models do 
not satisfy all specification criteria and hence are not reported here. 
 
Fourth, a number of my VC and LBO deals are cross-border transactions. Admittedly, when 
looking into international transactions, one should consider institutional factors from both the 
buy- and sell-side. The comparison of these factors, especially the legal variables, helps to 
explain a variety of deal dimensions such as deal volume and pricing (Cal et al., 2015; Wang 
and Wang, 2012). More importantly, the informal institution has been recorded as shifting 
over time with income level as people share knowledge within a society (Tang and Koveos, 
2008). In the same spirit, in the PE industry, professional practice has been known to be 




exported, first from the US, and further shaped by the local regulatory and cognitive 
institution (Manigart et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2005). An examination of how PEs react to 
changes and differences of institutions will greatly complement the understanding of my 
results and should be put on an agenda for further research. 
 
Fifth, since the detection of norms relies on the observation of proxies such as age, social ties 
and analyst coverage of every single PE financing deal, the quality of manually made 
variables can be controlled only at the data-collection stage. Although my findings are 
generally consistent with previous studies, measurements such as institutional variables, 
especially the informal ones, can be challenged for their precision.  
 
Though my study has its distinct focus, there is a need for further study on other determinants 
that may also impact PE financing efficiency. For example, previous studies show that 
institutional environment factors are helpful and worth further development. I recommend 
that a further index be developed and tested for this line of research. Such an index may 
include investor protection rights, financial market depth, and other matters. It would be 
beneficial to test shareholder rights using the LBO sample as the debt instrument applied in 
LBO fund-raising is mostly equity-like. Given that a proportion of debt securities in LBO 
financing is embedded with options, it would also be rewarding to use OAS from a larger, 
comprehensive dataset to explore further empirical examination of over- or under- pricing of 
option-embedded debt security. Another avenue for further study lies in the more precise 
measurement of financing cost. It would be interesting to know how much, in nominal 
dollars, the exact intermediary fee is in a financing deal if reliable data are available. 
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